# THE Public Interest

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# The socialist myth

PETER L. BERGER

It is widely believed that the radicalism of the late 1960's is over. Those who identified with it regret its passing (not least, one supposes, because with it seems to have passed so much of their youth); others are consoled and reassured. But both are mistaken. The more tumultuous manifestations of that period have indeed become rarer—but primarily because so many of the radical impulses of 10 years ago have now become firmly institutionalized. To be sure, the rhetorical goals of the "revolution" have not been achieved; the goals of revolutionary rhetoric are never achieved. Yet the "revolution" has succeeded beyond its wildest expectations in the social milieu that, from the beginning, provided both its place of origin and its principal audience—the milieu of the intellectuals, of the cultural elite.

This success has been spectacular in Western Europe, where various forms of *gauchisme* are culturally dominant—in some countries to the point of a near monopoly. This dominance is not just a matter of intellectual climate or mood; it is exercised through job networks and career channels, through the control of institutions in education, publishing, the media, and the general "culture business." The aftereffects of the late 1960's are somewhat less dramatic in the United States. Yet here, on the cultural scene, there has also been a massive shift to the left, which has found

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a variety of institutional expressions, many of them of great political relevance. Domestic politics continues to be dominated by egalitarian, redistributionist, and liberationist ideas and programs conceived in the late 1960's. Foreign policy is undergoing a convulsive and possibly permanent change as a result of one of the major radical formulations of the late 1960's—the proposition that American world power is immoral and ought therefore to be curtailed, if not dismantled. Most important, within the intellectual milieu there has been a far-reaching delegitimation of some of the key institutions and values of American society: There is a broad, probably growing consensus to the effect that the market economy is intrinsically evil, that the culture of the mass of the American people ("Middle America") is inferior and pathological, and most ominously of all, that the political system of liberal democracy is a corrupt sham.

This body of political and cultural attitudes is not new. It represents merely the latest eruption of a powerful, deeply running current within Western civilization that goes back at least to the early 19th century. This particular eruption, however, comes at a critical moment in world affairs and may have decisive consequences for a very long time to come. For this reason, an understanding of the peculiar affinity of intellectuals for such beliefs is very far from merely an abstract academic concern. It is timely, politically significant, even urgent.

## Intellectuals and the "left"

*Le coeur est à la gauche.* As a tendency, at the very least, this has been true of intellectuals for a long time. To understand why, it helps to ask two questions: What does the "left" mean in this context? And who are the "intellectuals"? Both terms, needless to say, have been the subject of endless definitions and redefinitions. Yet, when all is said and done, the terms refer to empirical phenomena that are readily available and, much of the time, fairly clear. If the "left" is often fractioned and shifting along its outer boundaries, it is always definable in terms of what it opposes—the socioeconomic system of capitalism and its historical correlate, the culture of the bourgeoisie. Whatever else it may mean, to be "on the left" is to be antagonistic to capitalism and to bourgeois culture. Put positively, to be "on the left" is to participate, in whatever manner and to whatever degree, in one of the great myths of modern history—the myth of socialism. As for the "intellectuals,"

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it will suffice to describe them as that social stratum whose principal activity is the production and distribution of ideas. One of the important processes of the 20th century has been the vast increase in the population of this stratum, a development resulting from the growth of what Fritz Machlup has called the "knowledge industry." Daniel Bell has persuasively argued that this development is one of the constitutive features of contemporary Western society.

There have been intellectuals with no tendency toward socialism, as there have been nonintellectual socialists. The affinity between intellectuals and the socialist myth is nevertheless one of long standing, and the recent population explosion of the intellectual stratum has intensified that relationship—an interesting phenomenon in itself, which also suggests that the reasons for the attraction are unlikely to be superficial. Now, the simplest explanation for the affinity (and the one most congenial to those who are "on the left" themselves) would be that socialism just happens to be the only rational conclusion for an informed understanding of the modern world. Thus the increased attraction of socialism could be directly attributed to the spread of the relevant information and insight in an increasingly literate and educated population.

But this explanation will not do. Even if it were true that socialism is the only rational conclusion, this would not explain its dissemination among specific social groups. Modern science, for example, may also be described as the only rational conclusion for certain questions about nature—and yet it took millennia before it came to be established in specific groups in a specific corner of the world. Ideas neither triumph nor fail in history because of their intrinsic truth or falsity. Furthermore, the affinity between intellectuals and socialism is very clearly more than a matter of rational arguments. It is suffused with values, with moral passion, in many cases with profoundly religious hope—in sum, with precisely those characteristics which permit speaking of a socialist *myth* (needless to say, in a descriptive, nonpejorative sense).

The affinity between intellectuals and the left has been noted many times, and there have been various attempts to explain it. Most of the explanations have been in terms of the vested group interests and/or psychological propensities of intellectuals. Vilfredo Pareto viewed socialism as but another rationalization of what he termed "spoliation"—the process by which one group seeks to plunder another; in this view, the intellectuals identifying with socialist movements are simply trying to join what they (rightly

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or wrongly) believe to be the future elite, and their ideology is nothing but a smokescreen for their ambition. Joseph Schumpeter sought the clue to the affinity in the material interest that intellectuals as a group have in the expansion of the modern "tax state"; put simply, intellectuals prefer socialism, and all steps in the direction of socialism, because they expect a socialist system to provide them with a more satisfactory subsidization than a market economy (the likelihood that they are mistaken in this assessment does not invalidate the argument). F.A. Hayek, on the other hand, offered an explanation in terms of the intellectuals' propensity for abstract speculation; socialism seduces less by the riches it promises than by the neatness of its theoretical constructions, its apparent rationality. Bertrand de Jouvenel approached the question along similar lines, and the same interpretation underlies David Caute's treatment of the long flirtation of Western intellectuals with the Soviet Union, which he calls a "postscript to the Enlightenment."

There have been comparable analyses of the leftward shift on the intellectual scene since the late 1960's. Irving Kristol has persuasively argued that there is a kind of class struggle in America today between the intellectuals (now a bloated group numbering in the millions) and the business elite; as always, this class struggle is over privilege and power. Raymond Aron and Helmut Schelsky have interpreted the leftward tendency of Western European intellectuals in essentially similar ways. Daniel Bell, in his most recent work, has ingeniously combined an analysis of class interests with Lionel Trilling's conception of the "adversary culture": Capitalism suffers from a profound contradiction between the rationale of its technoeconomic structure and the cultural ethos of liberationism brought about by the very success of that structure.

## The costs of modernization

Clearly, intellectuals have vested interests like any other social group (leaving aside the question as to whether intellectuals can actually be called a "class"), and it is inconceivable that such interests should not enter into their ideological preferences. It is also plausible that the psychological traits associated with their role as society's full-time theorizers should influence their perceptions of the world. What must be added to the foregoing, however, is a closer look at the mythic qualities of socialism. Put differently: Specific characteristics of the socialist myth have a bearing on the specific affinity between it and Western intellectuals.

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Much has been written, at least from Georges Sorel on, about the mythic quality of socialism. One important element should be added to this line of interpretation: *The socialist myth derives much of its power from its unique capacity to synthetize modernizing and counter-modernizing themes.* Modernization—its ideas, values, aspirations—continues to be the dominant theme of our time, and it is fully integrated into all the various versions of socialism. The socialist program is based on all the standard cognitive assumptions of modernity—history as progress (an idea which must be understood as a secularization of Biblical eschatology), the perfectibility of man, scientific reason as the great liberator from illusion, and man's ability to overcome all or nearly all of his afflictions by taking rational control of his destiny. In these assumptions, socialism—like liberalism—is the child of the Enlightenment. Unlike liberalism, however, socialism has also successfully incorporated the themes that have arisen in protest of the discontents of modernity—notably the theme of renewed community. Both liberalism and socialism have upheld the threefold promise of the French Revolution—of liberty, equality, and fraternity (although they have very different definitions for these terms). But liberalism has rarely had much to say about fraternity; socialism, by contrast, has made this one of its most inspiring ambitions.

Modernity is brought about only at great costs, costs exacted at the time of its inception in Europe, and continuing to be exacted today. The forces of modernization bring on massive material sacrifices and dislocations, from the destruction of English village life in the past to remarkably similar cataclysms in the Third World today. There are large numbers of people who suddenly lose their traditional livelihood and are plunged into acute misery, large migrations of people under conditions of great deprivation, and even mass hunger and virulent new epidemics. But what is more, economic and social dislocations of such magnitude frequently necessitate a quantum jump in the repressive measures of the political order. This aspect of modernization is apparent from the notorious "black codes" of 18th-century England (which, among other innovations, enormously increased the number of offenses, compared to medieval common law, that were punishable under the death penalty) to the luxuriant growth of repressive regimes in the contemporary Third World. But there are also subtler, though by no means less important, costs of modernization. Most of these relate directly or indirectly to the loss of community.

Through most of human history, most human beings have lived

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in small social settings marked by a plenitude of ongoing face-to-face contacts and by intense solidarity and moral consensus. It would be quite false to idealize this condition. It was by no means characterized at all times by general happiness; it included every variety of suffering and oppression. But one kind of suffering that it almost never included was what moderns have come to know as alienation, or *anomie*. Community was real and all-embracing, for better or for worse. The individual was thus rarely, if ever, thrown back upon himself. There were few, if any, uncertainties about the basic cognitive and moral framework of life, hardly any crises of meaning, practically no crises of identity. Individuals knew their world, and they knew who they were. Institutional order, collective meanings, and individual identity were firmly and reliably integrated in the sacred order provided by religious tradition. Human beings were at home in reality—even if, perhaps especially if, this home was often a less than satisfactory place.

Modernity, by contrast, is marked by homelessness. The forces of modernization have descended like a gigantic steel hammer upon all the old communal institutions—clan, village, tribe, region—distorting or greatly weakening them, if not destroying them altogether. The capitalist market economy, the centralized bureaucratic state, the new technology let loose by industrialism, the consequent rapid population growth and urbanization, and finally the mass media of communication—these modernizing forces have caused havoc to all the social and cultural formations in which human beings used to be at home, creating a radically new context for human life. It is hardly surprising that this transformation caused severe discontents, giving birth to counter-modernizing impulses that consistently expressed themselves in movements that invoked the old solidarities, from the Fronde in the 17th century to the latest "nativisms" of the contemporary Third World. Even where there were no organized movements, there was a sense of longing for the restoration of community, for redemption from the alienating power of modernity.

In its political manifestations, counter-modernization is usually perceived as backward-looking, as "reactionary." This perception is often adequate, but is important to see that it can also be forward-looking, "progressive"—whenever the longed-for community is located in the future rather than the past. There are religious prototypes (Jewish as well as Christian) for either type of antimodern sentiment. Socialism is the secular prototype *par excellence* of pro-

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jecting the redemptive community into the future. The genius of socialism, though, is that its secularized eschatology incorporates in addition the central aspirations of modernity—a new rational order, the abolition of material want and social inequality, and the complete liberation of the individual. Socialism, in other words, promises all the blessings of modernity *and* the liquidation of its costs, including, most importantly, the cost of alienation. To grasp this essentially simple fact about the socialist myth and to recall at the same time that modern secularism has greatly weakened the plausibility of competing religious eschatologies is to remove the mystery of the magnetic appeal of socialism. Indeed, if any mystery remains, it is that socialism has not yet triumphed completely.

## "Scientific" socialism

Marxism has been the most comprehensive intellectual formulation (or, if one prefers, legitimation) of the socialist myth. The decisive clue to its tenacious hold on the imagination of large numbers of people is precisely its claim, from the beginning, to be *scientific socialism.* The act of mythological synthesis, so to speak, was accomplished at the very moment when Marx turned the fire of his messianic hope on the dry bones of Manchester economics. To be able to retain all the redemptive expectations of socialism, and to do so on the basis of a "scientific" theory (the more difficult, the better!)—*that* is the central clue to the seductiveness of the Marxist message. Marxism, of course, has separated into different sects (in that, too, it stands in apostolic succession to Judaeo-Christian messianism), and the synthesis has taken correspondingly different forms. A history of Marxism in terms of the permutations of the two components of the socialist myth—the modernizing and the counter-modernizing impulses—remains to be written. Some branches of Marxism have submerged the messianic component in a pedantic "scientism," others have gone the opposite route. It is safe to say, though, that wherever Marxism has maintained a wide appeal, it has sought to keep the two themes in some sort of balance. Put differently, in the face of the dislocations and discontents of modernity, Marxism has always held out the promise that people may eat their cake and have it, too.

Thus the view of Marxism as an offspring of the Enlightenment is as one-sided as the contrary view of it as nothing but a quasi-religion. It is *both,* and in this duality lies its enduring appeal. The socialist myth promises the fulfilment of *both* the rational

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dreams of the Enlightenment *and* the manifold aspirations of those to whom the Enlightenment has been an alienating experience. Such a promise inevitably grates against its imperfect realization in empirical reality, frustrating and often enraging its believers. Needless to say, this is nothing new in the long history of eschatologies, which is, inevitably, a history of the psychology of disappointment. It is all the more important to understand that, given the inherent plausibility of the mythic vision, no amount of empirical disappointments can conclusively invalidate it. Myths are falsification-proof. After all, the disciples of Jesus of Nazareth expected his return in glory within their own lifetimes; Christians are still waiting, despite what Protestant theologians have so nicely called the *Parousieverzoegerung* (freely translated, the slight delay in the Second Coming). The socialist *parousia,* too, has been delayed; claimants to that status have so far been a big disappointment. Socialists are still waiting, though, even if they feel compelled by the empirical evidence to shift the direction of their eschatological anticipation from time to time.

The Soviet Union, of course, has been a major disappointment to many, and the psychological drama of the resulting ambivalences, denials of reality, and ideological reconstructions has been very fully documented. All the same, keeping in mind the peculiar synthesis of modernizing and counter-modernizing impulses in the socialist myth, the Soviet Union has realized its promise in instructive, if somewhat surprising, ways. It was Lenin who, in 1920, characterized Communism as "Soviet power plus electrification"; and 50 years later, Russian reality could be described as "Middle Ages plus intercontinental missiles" (and it is not irrelevant that the counter-modern imagination has repeatedly invoked medieval imagery—as indeed did Marx, in his few lyrical descriptions of life after the socialist revolution). A very short list of these medievalisms will have to suffice here: the restoration of the essentially feudalistic merger of political and economic institutions (the disjunction of these two by nascent capitalism marked the beginning of the modern era); the abolition, at least in theory, of the post-medieval split between public and private life; the governing of society by the party aristocracy (in this respect, one might say that contemporary Russia is actually one up on the Middle Ages—there is now only one aristocracy, uniting within itself the elite functions of both clergy and nobility); and last, but not least, the creation of a new serfdom, which ties the peasant to the land (it was only a few months ago that residents of collective

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farms, who make up close to half the Soviet population, received the right to the internal passports necessary for travel). In other words, the dominant trait of Soviet life that Zbigniew Brzezinski has so aptly called the "bureaucratization of boredom" is not all that far removed from Marx's "idiocy of village life," the sophistication of Soviet technology notwithstanding.

This is obviously not exactly what the original promise was all about. Believers have consequently looked elsewhere for the realization of the socialist myth—of late, mainly to various Third World countries, with China currently heading the list. This is not the place to discuss the bizarre reiteration concerning China of all the old stratagems of wishful thinking that had previously been directed toward the Soviet Union. The main point is that many, if not all, of these socialist regimes can also be described quite well as "neo-medieval" (Shmuel Eisenstadt has suggested "neo-patrimonial," Pierre Bourdieu "socialo-feudal"). The basic formula for coping with the various disappointments is always the same (after, that is, the customarily prior denial that there is anything to be disappointed about): The disappointing country does not embody "true socialism"; therefore, it does not falsify the socialist vision; "true socialism" is either still in the future, or must be looked for elsewhere—if not in Russia then in China, if not in China then in Vietnam, and so on *ad infinitum*. An excellent illustration of this procedure is the designation of the Soviet system as "state capitalism," thus setting it off against the allegedly different system of the Chinese.

## Modernity and its discontents

If these are some of the key features of the socialist myth, the question remains why intellectuals should have a particular affinity to it. As already suggested, the material interests of intellectuals as a "class" may well predispose them toward socialism. But an understanding of the mythic dimension of socialism suggests an additional explanation: *Intellectuals constitute a group particularly vulnerable to the discontents of modernity.*

To some extent this vulnerability is shared by the upper-middle class as a whole, the wider stratum within which intellectuals are found as a result either of birth or of social mobility. It is the upper-middle class that has evolved out of the old bourgeoisie, which had been the historical "carrier" of industrial capitalism and thus had been closer than any other group to the primary pro-

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cesses of modernization. There were others, to be sure, who suffered materially from the birthpangs of modern society while the bourgeoisie reaped the material benefits—the impoverished and displaced rural populations, the new urban working class, the marginal groups generally subsumed under the category of *lumpenproletariat,* and even the sectors of the aristocracy for whom modernization meant a decline in power and privilege. But the more subtle costs of modernization, involving meanings and norms, were exacted of the class closest to the inner turbulence of the process of modernization. It was the bourgeoisie that initially and most directly experienced the impact of rapid mobility, urbanization, pluralism, and affluence. Historians are not in agreement concerning the social, psychological, and ideological consequences of these experiences. It seems plausible, however, that the earlier version of the bourgeoisie succeeded in "containing" the disruptive effects of modernization mainly with the help of two crucial institutions —the family and the church. These two were the pillars of the world of bourgeois respectability, offering shelter to the individual from the alienating forces of modernization. It is precisely these two institutions that have been the major targets of the "adversary culture" of the intellectuals.

The bourgeoisie transformed the larger society in a cataclysmic manner, while at the same time it created a new form of the family, which functioned for its members as an island of tranquility at the very heart of the cataclysm. The "invention of childhood" (as recorded, for instance, by Philippe Ariès) was probably the most important institutional innovation in this respect, with far-reaching consequences for socialization and character formation. At the same time, especially in Protestant countries, the bourgeoisie was infused with a religious ethic that gave coherence and significance to the struggles in the economic, social, and political arenas. It is also probable that the bourgeois family and bourgeois religion were important factors in the very rise of the bourgeoisie to power. Significantly, bourgeois intellectuality turned against these institutions only after the historic victory of the bourgeoisie. In other words, the "adversary culture" arose within the bosom of a world that was already bourgeois in its dominant features.

## The adversary intellectuals

At this point, the differentiation between two segments within the bourgeoisie becomes important—the much larger group of those

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continuing to live within the respectabilities of bourgeois culture, and the initially quite small minority of intellectual adversaries. A question which cannot be answered here is the extent to which this distinction resulted from the respective relations of these two groups to the "mode of production"—the production of "things" by the former, as against the manipulation of symbols by the latter. In any event, this distinction still exists today in the upper-middle classes of contemporary Western societies—but with the exceedingly important difference that the numerical proportion of the two segments has changed drastically. (For the American situation, one may again turn to Kristol and Bell for the most persuasive interpretations of this change.)

Thus there still exists today an upper-middle-class stratum, broadly identified with business and with scientific/technological activities, which continues to "contain" the discontents of modernity within the old bourgeois structures of respectability. This stratum is still animated by the norms of the "Protestant ethic," is antiliberationist in its family and personal values, and is still strongly attached to religion (not only ideologically, but through institutional participation). By contrast, there is a burgeoning "new class" of intellectuals, deeply antagonistic to virtually all the old norms of respectability. It is consumption-oriented rather than production-oriented. Its values for private life are ever more radically liberationist. It is pervasively secularized, often evincing a violent antipathy to all the traditional forms of Christian and Jewish religiosity. And, as a result, this stratum has come to be progressively deprived of the earlier protections against the discontents of modernity. Put simply, the old upper-middle class still manages to be "at home" in the modern world; but the intellectuals suffer increasingly from a profound sense of homelessness—and the socialist myth very directly meets their needs.

This is not to argue that there is something inevitable to this particular affinity. Other myths could, and indeed did, meet the same needs. Both conservative and nationalistic ideologies have had an appeal to intellectuals, as in Europe before World War II. It is very instructive that these were similar to socialist ideologies in that they were also "adversary" to the old bourgeois world—they were anticapitalist, opposed to liberal democracy, and contemptuous of the respectabilities of bourgeois culture. Yet none of them was able to accomplish the peculiar synthesis of modernity and counter-modernity characteristic of the socialist myth. It is certainly possible that new myths will arise on the "right," with

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a new charisma and a strong appeal to intellectuals; the Third World is a likely locale for this. In the West, at this time, there is no sign of a new myth. The socialist myth is virtually without effective competition.

## The power of myths

If the foregoing analysis is correct, there is no reason to expect the dominance of the "left" on the Western intellectual scene to be reversed. The intrinsic power of the socialist vision appears as strong as ever. The new position of the "knowledge industry" has given intellectuals more influence than ever before and has thus given the socialist myth an unprecedented institutional base. Indeed, the myth has achieved a sort of cultural establishment. To be sure, there are great variations within the ecclesiastical community gathered around the myth, and there will continue to be variations. The myth may or may not be couched in terms of Marxist theory; it may be pro-Soviet or anti-Soviet, pro-Maoist or anti-Maoist; it may enter into shifting alliances with other ideologies (such as the counterculture, or politically active Christian groups); it may have different postures toward the norms and institutions of liberal democracy. Yet, in all these transmutations, the myth retains—must retain—its essential antagonism to the world of capitalism and bourgeois culture. Thus to the extent that Western societies continue to be organized by the institutions of that world, those who adhere to the socialist vision will also retain their anti-Western animus.

Myths are not easily generated or manipulated. They have their own dynamics, their own "truth." What can be termed the mythic deprivation of Western societies in the face of the socialist vision thus cannot be remedied by an effort of the will. It is one thing for the historian or social scientist to diagnose the condition, quite another thing to devise plausible remedies. With socialism as the only good myth going, the political and economic elites of Western societies have become remarkably demoralized. The old rhetoric in defense of free enterprise, of the American way of life, and even of the institutions of liberal democracy has come to sound hollow—it increasingly lacks the capacity to convince and inspire. Calls for a revival of liberalism or of the American creed, however well reasoned, will be ineffective unless they can be "fueled" by the power of mythic plausibility. It seems unlikely that, on its own, liberalism—least of all in its social-democratic versions—

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is capable of regaining such power (in Western Europe the mythic edge is unmistakably held by the *left* wings of the social-democratic parties—that is, by those elements least connected with the liberal tradition). It remains possible that there will come a new upsurge of mythical nationalism in the West—even new forms of fascism—but even then it is likely that the essential elements of the socialist vision will be retained. In all likelihood, such an upsurge would take the form of *national socialism* (the terminological likeness to what emerged under this same label in the 1920's and 1930's in Europe is not at all accidental).

There is, however, one fairly effective remedy against the power of the socialist myth—the experience of living in a society where that myth has been politically elevated to the status of official doctrine. One of the savage ironies of the times is that ideologically Marxism is on the ascendancy everywhere—*except* in the countries that call themselves Marxist. One cannot lure a cat from behind the chimney with Marxist rhetoric in the Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe. There Marxism is ceremony, the myth has become a petrified ornament. On the basis of that empirical evidence, one prediction is fairly certain: Western intellectuals will cease to be fascinated by the socialist myth soon after Western societies are taken over by socialist regimes. It must be added, however, that in the not improbable case that these regimes will resemble Soviet totalitarianism, this belated conversion will have little, if any, political significance. For totalitarian regimes, it appears, can survive for a long time without plausible myths and in a cultural climate of pervasive cynicism.

There is one more possibility: a reversal of the long-standing trend of secularization in the Western world generally, and particularly in its cultural elite. Throughout most of human history, the myths that guided life, including political life, sprang from the soil of religious faith. The possibility of such a revival is nowhere more relevant than in America, where religion has had a unique relationship to the social realities of pluralism and political freedom. Religious faith, it need hardly be added, cannot be decided upon or engineered merely through rational insight into its importance. The spirit blows where it wills. However, those who have a stake in the future of liberal democracy, and who are troubled by the delegitimations it has recently undergone, would do well to ponder its relationship to the vital forces of religion still existing in American society.

None of this has an immediate bearing on the *gauchiste* extra-

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vaganza now sweeping the intellectual scene in Western countries. The reasonable expectation is that it will continue, though its ideological details may change from time to time. Those who have come under the sway of the socialist myth are not likely to be dissuaded by arguments, for they have a seemingly unending capacity to reinterpret evidence. They will not be appeased by reforms within Western societies or by protestations of humane concern by those who do not share their ultimate vision. Nor is any of this surprising, once it is understood that they are under the sway of a myth. Myths derive their power from those realms of the mind in which the gods used to dwell, and the gods have always been relentless.

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# Whatever happened to small-town America?

BENJAMIN STEIN

JIM Rockford, private detective in NBC-TV's popular *The Rockford Files,* is in trouble. He is driving along in rural northern California on routine detective business, when his car suddenly hits a big bump and is incapacitated. Rockford, who is used to life in Los Angeles, is frantic. There he is, in the middle of nowhere, without any means of getting out: no taxicabs, no rental cars, no buses, no limousine service, nothing.

Then salvation comes, in the form of a towtruck operator who just happens to be passing by. He offers to tow Rockford into the nearest town for repairs. By chance, the town is named "New Pastoria." Rockford grins with delight; he is back in the driver's seat. But then he gets a jolt—the towtruck driver wants $100 just to tow Rockford a few miles. There is no alternative, so Rockford agrees; at least he'll be able to leave soon. But while he is having lunch and waiting for the car to be fixed, Rockford learns that the repairs, which he thought would be minor, are going to cost over $1,500. Again, that jolt—he isn't in Los Angeles now, so he can't just go to Aamco and get another estimate. The situation is starting to become painful to Rockford—and to look familiar to veteran television viewers as well.

Naturally, the car can't be fixed until the next day. So Rockford

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is consigned to the local motel, where he soon finds himself in the arms of a seemingly confused but seductive teenybopper. Suddenly, someone bursts in and takes a compromising photograph; then while Rockford is still holding the supposedly shaken girl, a deputy sheriff comes roaring up, gun drawn, and threatens him. The deputy turns out to be the girl's fiancé, and he suspects that Rockford has been messing with his girl. Now hardened television watchers know for sure that they are about to see one of the few formula scenarios of the movies and television today—the nightmare descent of the innocent city dweller into the incomprehensibly wicked and evil depths of the countryside. It has been seen a hundred times before, with slight variations, and it is a story as familiar as the one about the rookie cop teamed up with the tough 20-year veteran, or the murdered prostitute with the heart of gold.

This characterization of the small town as evil and threatening to innocent city dwellers is now a staple of contemporary American mass culture. But the small town wasn't always seen that way. Over a relatively brief time, cultural attitudes towards small towns have changed virtually 180 degrees, from the old view of the small town as the bastion of everything good about America to the current view of the small town as everything frightening and corrupt about America. The change has been so complete that when we see a vestige of the old view appear, we are startled.

Yet last summer, when New York City was having such severe fiscal troubles, the old view surfaced. In a column in *The Wall Street Journal,* Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., said that President Ford's reluctance to help New York could be explained entirely by the traditional American antipathy towards the big city, and love for the small town. (Professor Schlesinger has obviously not been watching enough television.) Schlesinger quoted at great length from a book by Morton and Lucia White, *The Intellectual Versus The City—From Thomas Jefferson To Frank Lloyd Wright.* The authors' thesis is that the greatest American thinkers have had a strong animus toward their cities. The Whites say that they can find no unifying theme for this dislike. Some, like Jefferson and William Dean Howells, disliked the American city because it was too commercialized, too filled with the extremes of wealth and poverty. Some, like Henry Adams, disliked the city because it was crowded with large numbers of non-Anglo-Saxon residents. Others, like Jane Addams and Henry James, faulted the American city for lacking the grace and charm of the older, more settled cities of Europe.

At least until the 1920's, many American intellectuals regarded

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their cities as "too big, too noisy, too dirty, too smelly, too commercial, too crowded, too full of immigrants, too full of Jews," and on and on. Small towns, on the other hand, were thought to be America's salvation. Jefferson summed up the small-town virtues that would make America great: "Crime is scarcely heard of, breaches of order are rare, and our societies, if not refined, are rational, moral, and affectionate, at least."

Somehow, between the age of Monticello and the age of Malibu, things have become turned around. In the televised and filmed literature of America, small towns are now the places where bad things happen; the innocent wayfarer returns to the city for protection. It is more or less routine on television for naive families to have a tire blowout outside a small town and completely disappear into the maw of a town-wide criminal conspiracy. The small towns of the movies are no better. Innocent youths ride through them only to be driven off mountain roads, or blown to pieces by crazed local sheriffs. Even the really tough guys—Mannix or Cannon or Baretta or Harry Orwell or poor Jim Rockford—take their lumps in small towns.

## Big-city fear and loathing

To understand what has brought about such a remarkable change in cultural attitudes, it is instructive to see what else happens to Rockford in New Pastoria. He has already been rendered symbolically impotent—what can a man do without a car? Moreover, the very milieu that has left him powerless is the same one that can alone return his power to him—by fixing his car. The dependence that Rockford feels towards his tormentors is like something out of the Patty Hearst trial; it is pitiful. And it reveals the rage that people who cannot fix things feel towards people who can, which is basically the rage of the city dweller towards the small-town dweller. And this provides a clue to the attitude of the media towards the small town. Many writers for the media feel that small towns have some power over them, which they resent enormously.

In fact, the small town has offended against television and movie writers in a number of ways. Not only can small-town people repair things—which puts them immensely more in control of their lives than most writers ever will be—but they are also resistant to the political currents which move writers. For these are the small towns that have cars with bumper stickers reading "This is Wallace Country." These are the small towns that voted for Goldwater. People

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ride around in pickup trucks with rifles hanging in the rear window. They don't protest United States imperialism or refuse to eat grapes. In such small towns, presumably, under every gingham dress is the robe of the women's auxiliary to the Ku Klux Klan.

It is not coincidental that after Rockford is rendered impotent by the forces of the small town, he is then confronted with a teenaged seductress. This dramatizes his impotence and suggests that people in those small towns are not just politically, but also morally, insane. Finally, Rockford's brush with a lawman who is clearly acting against the law is also perfectly true to form. When the political and moral climate is so completely bizarre, what can be expected of law enforcement officials?

After the brush with the deputy, Rockford meets the mayor of New Pastoria, who is also the mother of the juvenile seductress. It turns out that the mayor is trying to lead the formerly economically depressed town to prosperity, through unspecified means. After Rockford returns to his room to sleep, he is plunged into a literal nightmare. Thugs break into his room, claim he is a drug dealer, threaten to kill him, and practically scare him to death. He is then betrayed by a seemingly kind old ex-sheriff, thrown into jail on trumped-up drug charges, and offered his release in exchange for a huge bribe. The story resembles a televised version of one of Kafka's more representative works.

Finally, while out on bail, Rockford breaks into the district attorney's office and finds evidence that the town has been systematically preying on traveling city folk, breaking their cars, charging outrageous repair bills, framing them on various charges, and then blackmailing them—the source of the income for New Pastoria's economic renaissance. Rockford eventually breaks the scheme wide open, but only with the help of authorities from the city. New Pastoria, the quintessence of the small town of television and the movies, comes in for a hell of a beating.

## Cultural politics and the media

But the reasons that small towns came to have such a bad image in the "industry" involve more than merely political differences and have even deeper roots.

Even while Jefferson was writing about how wonderful life was in rural Virginia, early abolitionists were noticing that in those idyllic Southern towns, some human beings owned other human beings. That in itself was terrible, and the owners often did terrible

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things to the people they owned. The idea gained strength, especially after the Civil War, that small Southern towns were places where the mask of law was used to hide horrifying crimes against law and morality.

Some early silent and talking pictures picked up the theme. The most notable example was *I Am a Fugitive From a Chain Gang,* in 1932, which marked a turning point of sorts because its message was that small Southern towns were so evil and corrupt that they unjustly oppressed white people, too.

At about the same time, small towns were being scorned by many great American novelists of the 1920's who—from Baltimore or New York or Paris—saw the American small town as the lair of the "booboisie," that dreaded American species named by H. L. Mencken. Small towns were not only stupid, but terribly unfashionable as well.

The classic example of a small-town conspiracy against the outside world was not revealed, however, until after World War II. A film called *Bad Day at Black Rock* told the story of a small town in the Southwest that went amok after Pearl Harbor and murdered a local Japanese-American farmer, whose son was fighting with the Nisei forces in Italy. Spencer Tracy, who had been with the Nisei soldier when he was killed, brings the son's medal to his family after the end of the War. All the people in the small town participate in the coverup, and when Tracy gets too inquisitive, they try to kill him. It is in all ways a prototypical story—there is the same bewildering solidarity, the same lawless police officials, and the same lazy cunning that were to be copied again and again by television and the movies. It was no coincidence, as the saying goes, that *Bad Day at Black Rock* came out in 1955, a time when virtually the entire American mass media were arranging themselves into a political and cultural style which still persists to this day, although some weakening is evident.

It is obviously problematic to move from analyzing media prototypes to analyzing the sociological reality of the creators of such images. Yet writers for television and films have political and cultural points of view, just like everyone else. And they are predominantly liberal and antiestablishment (without realizing, of course, that they *are* the "establishment," show-business intellectuals maintain one of the most delightful routines of "doublethink" anywhere). It is no accident that George McGovern and Tom Hayden found many large donors in Hollywood. The people who are now writing were shaped intellectually at a time when most intellectual respectability,

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so it seemed, belonged to left-wing thought. Many idolized Franklin D. Roosevelt and hated Joe McCarthy. In Hollywood, finding a writer who is a Republican is almost like seeing a woman without painted toenails at the Beverly Hills Hotel swimming pool. When the Presidential elections come around, the longest lists of writers and directors will always be found on the stationery of the most liberal Democratic candidates.

To such people, small towns are the enemy. Small towns did not support Adlai Stevenson; some of them didn't even like Roosevelt. These writers' formative years were spent reading about lynchings in small towns and rural areas. They know that once they leave New York or Los Angeles, they are in political *terra incognita,* and that scares them. When they depict a small town as frightening, they are really telling us that they are frightened.

But they are more than frightened; they are angry, too. By consistently casting conservative votes, the small towns have blocked them politically from creating the kind of America they would like to create. Small towns now have lots of people who didn't like big cities in the past because big cities had too many Jews, and a truly great number of the people who write movies and television shows are Jewish. It is hardly surprising that many of these writers should not be enamored of small towns.

Not that there is any religious animus involved—far from it. These writers do not care one bit about the religious practices of the people in the small towns. If they are religious, that is one more piece of hypocrisy, but piled on top of so much hypocrisy, it doesn't matter much. What is at work is an ethnic/cultural polarity. The typical Hollywood writer, from my experience, is of an ethnic background from a large Eastern city—usually from Brooklyn. He grew up being taught that people in small towns hated him, were different from him, and were out to get him. As a result, when he gets the chance, he attacks the small town on television or the movies.

No matter that statistics show that living in a small town is about seven times safer than living in a large city. A person whose sole source of knowledge about America came from watching television detective shows would think that driving outside a big city is comparable to jumping off a tall building. Any number of movies—*Deliverance, Macon County Line, The California Kid*—make the same point. The television shows and movies are not telling it "like it is"; instead they are giving us the point of view of a small and extremely powerful section of the American intellectual community—those who write for the mass visual media.

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## The cultural civil war

What is happening, as a consequence, is something unusual and remarkable. A national culture is making war upon a way of life that is still powerfully attractive and widely practiced in the same country. To be specific, about half of all Americans still live in small towns and rural areas, and, more interestingly, about three out of four Americans sampled in a 1975 Gallup poll said they would prefer to live in a suburb or a small town, or on a farm. (Almost 25 per cent chose a farm!) Thus feelings of affection for small towns run deep in America, and small-town life is treasured by millions of people. But in the mass culture of the country, a hatred for the small town is spewed out on television screens and movie screens every day.

So far as I know, this is a historical first. In many earlier societies, there had been a literature which belittled and criticized the small town and the rural way of life. But it was confined to small groups of the population. For the masses of the people, there was a folk tradition which glorified the rural and small-town way of life. Now that situation is turned around. Television and the movies are America's folk culture, and they have nothing but contempt for the way of life of a very large part of the folk.

In no time before the advent of television has a writer been able to reach so many people so quickly. Similarly, before the age of television, writers as a group were never able to circulate their opinions so widely in so short a space of time. What happened was the coincidence of a cultural event and an electronic event. The cultural event was rather complicated. It involved the emergence among television and movie writers of a predominantly left-wing, antiestablishment style of thought and view of the world—the result of a whole series of events that are too lengthy to enumerate (and which I do not fully understand), but are clearly apparent. Part of that worldview is an animus against small-town America. The electronic event was the growth of television; and entry to its ranks of writers, as for the movies, was decided on a strictly meritocratic basis. The result was that aggressive, striving people with a modicum of talent could become television and movie writers. Thus the medium and the message came together around the mid-1950's, although the two had been converging for some time before.

The consequence of this merger has been that the American people are told falsehoods about their country—untruths that those in control of writing for the media believe, or at any rate refuse to disbelieve. And the falsehoods have consequences.

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The anti-small-town show makes the point clearly. Poll after poll has shown that Americans in cities fear crime more than anything else—even more than inflation. Statistics also show that the most frequently committed crime is simple mugging, and that the typical mugger is a teenage, minority-group male. And what people fear when they leave their cars and houses are precisely teenage, minority-group youths.

But most writers of America cannot cope intellectually with the idea that some of those pitiful minorities, whom they were taught were oppressed and tormented, are now themselves tormenting others in turn. Many therefore take their own free-floating anxiety about crime and violence and move it to a place that is more comfortable for them—the small town, which they were taught to hate and fear. It is a complete reversal of reality to make the small town more dangerous than the big city, but it accords perfectly with these writers' view of reality—or what reality should be. (There are other examples of this inverted depiction of crime on television. For instance, if a crime is committed in the city, it is usually by a person who is either rich or insane. The real world, in which violent crimes are committed by people who are poor, vicious, and quite sane, rarely shows its head.)

The simple consequence of this distortion of reality is that people are misinformed. Far more serious and dangerous, however, is that people are taught to hate and fear their own culture. They are given additional reasons to detest a fundamental social unit of their country—the small town. This detestation leads like a stream, among many such streams that such writers and intellectuals have fashioned, into a mighty confluence of doubt of America by Americans. People are told that their culture is, at its root, sick, violent, and depraved, and this message gives them little confidence in the future of that culture. It also leads them to feel ashamed of their country and to believe that if their society is in decline, it deserves to be.

It is simply inconceivable that a medium capable of making a brand new deodorant number one in sales in only six months ("Try it under your own two arms—we're Sure") could not, after years of trying, make Americans feel ambivalent about small towns.

## A small-town revival?

And yet, the polls still show a strong attachment to the concept of small-town life. That, perhaps, is the result of some reality penetrating into the minds of people who watch television. Those peo-

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ple have been to small towns. The small towns are often pretty, clean, and quiet. No one hurt them or threatened them there. So the television shows make them feel ambivalent about the small town, but cannot destroy all feelings of affection. What the television shows and movies can do is create self-doubt and confusion. What would be terribly interesting would be the reactions of Americans to small towns if their views had not been affected by television shows and movies that are filled with negative images.

We may get to see just that. There are signs of a change in the attitude of the media toward small towns and rural America. Somewhere along the line, someone discovered that the hatred of small towns collided with the environmental issue. Suddenly, for the groups whose parents were taught that everything outside the city was the domain of the Klansman, the city and its pollution now became the enemy.

A new generation of ad men and women and music hucksters have come along who realized that when you call something "country" or "farm-fresh" or "natural," people think of it as lacking poisonous pollutants and additives. On the same shows where the small town is cruelly trapping the innocent city dweller, the commercials are showing how wonderful it is to live on a farm and get fresh food and have a fresh complexion, and how healthful it is to live in a small town where there is plenty of fresh air and hard work. People have begun to think that out in the country, there are not only fewer sulphur-dioxide emissions, but less meanness and tension. Television documentaries now tell about city people who are leading new lives in Vermont and Maine.

A generational clash is developing in the media. The people most in tune with the generation of the 1960's and 1970's know that, despite all the television shows, Ralph Nader has authoritatively told them that big cities are disgusting, unhealthy places—and they believe him. Such people are resuscitating the country image in those media forms which most quickly adapt to changing trends, music and advertising. On the radio air waves, country music expands to new stations at an almost geometric rate. It is customarily only a matter of time before such trends move to prime time and the silver screen.

But the writers who grew up without the environmental issue are still around, and are still powerful. Their world view has not changed and they are still grinding out the melodramas which make the small town eat dirt.

So a struggle in the media continues in which ground is gained

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and lost. The signs of how it will turn out are unclear, but they seem to indicate a small-town renascence. A recent phenomenon is the sudden emergence of pictures about small towns, particularly in the South, which are not slanderous and which are making big money, even in suburban markets. Think of Burt Reynolds and you can think of the cinematic genre referred to. The emergence of Nashville as a powerful media center is another sign of the regeneration of the image of the small town. It grows daily more powerful in both records and films, and it is the capital of small-town America (a fact which earned it an astonishingly crude slam in the movie which bears its name). Several new television shows are set in small towns—*Sara*, *The Bionic Woman*, and *Mary Hartman, Mary Hartman*—and the small towns are treated affectionately. Even a recent made-for-television move adapted from the works of John O'Hara took a compassionate view of small town life.

Still, these are just straws in the wind. The predominant theme in prime time and at the theater is still that small towns are places where bad things happen to innocent people. It is a view that is neither realistic nor helpful to America or to anyone in particular, but it reveals something about how the media and our culture are shaped.

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# A prospect for parks

DONALD E. SIMON

THE park system of New York City is the product of more than a century of active expansion. In 1976, there are approximately 23,000 acres of park land under the City's jurisdiction; 13,000 additional acres formerly in City possession are now part of the federally administered Gateway National Recreation Area. More than 17 per cent of the total acreage of the city is public park land—an acre of open space for every 210 residents. The policy of constant acquisition was a result of valid planning assumptions based on optimistic estimates of long-term trends. For generations New York's population had been increasing. Each year additional acres of open space succumbed to development as urbanization swept across the five boroughs. Planners sought to provide facilities both in congested areas and in regions that soon would be developed. In the Depression era, because of a reduced rate of housing construction, park development was often far in advance of need.

The parks and recreation facilities of New York City represent an enormous investment. In the 19th century it was difficult to convince citizens that they should invest for the benefit of future generations. Opponents of parks argued that their development would impose a burden on the tax rolls. Not only would acquisition and

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construction costs be great, but the tax base would decline. Of course, events soon demonstrated that the creation of parks had a positive impact on the tax structure. Areas adjacent to parks became the most desirable; the dramatic increases in tax rates following park development more than offset any loss.

Its parks became one of the chief glories of New York City. But in recent years there have been confusing developments. In many congested neighborhoods with almost no available park space, the few parks to be found often lie all but unused by local residents. In recent years community groups have marched to City Hall as often to oppose proposed park construction as they have to appeal for it. For many people a park is no longer an amenity: It represents a threat to their safety and a liability to the value of their own property. In a quarter of a century, a long-established philosophy has been overturned. The image of a greensward decorated with a monument to a national hero or a playground filled with happy children has been replaced by visions of acres of weeds interrupted by vandalized statues, or playgrounds barren of any usable equipment occupied by the social dregs of the community.

From the most prosperous to the most squalid neighborhood, the cry is the same: The parks are not properly maintained and are often inhabited by undesirables. Even in high-population-density areas the few parks remain unused while children play amidst parked and moving cars and adults lounge on building stoops.

### The example of Fort Greene

Consider Fort Greene Park in downtown Brooklyn. In the late 1840's, Walt Whitman, then editor of the Brooklyn *Eagle*, spearheaded a drive to provide a park in what had become a congested district. Fort Greene Park was the result. In the post-Civil War era the neighborhood around the park became one of Brooklyn's most fashionable. Elegant brownstone townhouses ringed the park, and their inhabitants promenaded in it. By World War II the elegance had been replaced by squalor. Houses were subdivided to provide single-room-occupancy apartments. By the mid-1950's the park became a no-man's land, a symbol of a dying neighborhood. People said, only partly in jest, that even the police were afraid to enter it.

In recent years Fort Greene has experienced a rebirth. The mansions and townhouses are being renovated by middle-class families. Serious crime and fear have declined. In response to community requests, the City parks department initiated a comprehensive pro-

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gram in the late 1960's to rehabilitate the park and to restore the Revolutionary War monument. The total investment exceeded $500,000. Numerous meetings were held between department and community representatives. Plans for the restoration followed guidelines established by the local residents. Everything possible was done to involve the public in the park's future.

But the vandalism and destruction that had plagued the park prior to its restoration continued after the work was finished in 1974. In some cases vandals undid during the night what the restoration contractor had built the previous day. Even before the project was completed, some residents of Fort Greene asked park officials not to restore certain ornamental bronze details of the war monument since it was almost a certainty that they would be stolen. As one resident said: "To put them back in the park would be like throwing them in the East River."

Despite considerable financial investment and countless hours spent by City officials and local residents, Fort Greene Park is still not used by the community except for brief periods (weekends and after school on weekdays) when there are enough people present to counter the regular congregants. It is said that in Fort Greene everyone points with pride to the park. The tragedy is that they point to it from afar.

Fort Greene is only one of many parks in similar circumstances. Certainly inadequate budgets explain part of the physical decline of the parks. But that is only a small part of the explanation. Another reason is that there are too many "parks" in the wrong places. For decades every municipal public works project that involved new land uses produced its share of new park sites. These were often small parcels that were found to be useless for private redevelopment or public purposes because of their size, location, or configuration. Whether leftovers from urban renewal or scraps created when highways and parkways were thrust across the City's gridiron plan, this excess acreage was mapped as park land in the belief that any new addition to the park holdings was good. But many of these marginal sites were isolated from the community they were to serve, leaving them without the casual supervision offered by normal pedestrian street traffic. The new additions were welcomed without considering who would use them or how they would be maintained. By now it is clear many are not attracting patrons or are attracting the wrong kinds of users.

More significant, however, have been a variety of social changes. Thus, the pattern of policing in the parks has had to change. In the

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eyes of any local community there are those who are undesirable—who repel, or frighten, or anger residents. It is no longer possible for the police to exclude or harass or arrest such people because the neighborhood objects to their lifestyle. For instance, congregrants on street corners invariably incur the wrath of shopkeepers and residents. In case after case, following pressure by the police, such people ultimately move to a neutral area—the park or playground. Apart from an adjoining resident who might object to the noise or activity in the park, most of the community is satisfied. The problem has been removed from the streets. Many a park first acquired its less inviting reputation in this fashion. Unfortunately, once a park becomes the province of special groups, Gresham's law takes over. The community at large leaves the facility to the new claimants. Thus begins a decline that often results in the park being abandoned to all but the most antisocial people. This process is not limited to small playgrounds. The City contains numerous no-man's lands abandoned by all but the bravest dog walker.

## The misuse of space

An inappropriate design sometimes contributes to the process of decay. In southeastern Queens a cooperative housing development known as Rochdale Village was built on the site of the old Jamaica Race Track. As part of the plan for the utilization of the site, in addition to the housing, certain parcels were allocated for schools, some for commercial activities (stores, parking, etc.), and others for park and recreation use.

The City parks administration viewed Rochdale as an opportunity to demonstrate the positive social influences of innovative design. This would not be just another park in the midst of a housing development: It would be an imaginative use of the space. A nationally prominent architect was retained to design the park and to supervise the construction. His plan called for the creation of a number of large earth berms that would produce a multi-level space. This scheme would also serve to isolate activities from one another; it would provide additional space (the multi-level approach producing greater land area than a flat surface); and the setting would be a relief from the flat land and rectangular shapes of the remainder of the housing development. The design was applauded by all who saw the plans. Indeed, upon completion, the project received a number of awards from the design professions.

Sadly, the park did not win the praise of local residents. They

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complained that the visual barriers created by the berms provided perfect opportunities for muggers to hide. The slopes were steep enough to prevent the elderly or the mother with children from making an escape. Yet they were not impassable to the assailant who had just committed an assault. A less serious, but more frequent, problem was that children would pelt park users with gravel —the upper levels were great places from which to throw stones. The windows of the adjoining elementary school bore mute witness to the attraction the hills and rocks offered.

Within a short time of its opening, Rochdale Park began to show signs of deterioration. The berms eroded and washed onto lower-level paths filling catch basins and causing floods after every rain. The park proved to be ill-suited for the realities it had to meet. The designer had failed to consider the inability of the City to provide extensive and intensive care for the facility he created.

With both crime and decay already evident, the residents of Rochdale Village petitioned the parks administration to remove the berms and replace them with facilities of a more conservative design. The battle continues. The most objectionable berm (the one near the school) was removed. The City pleads that it has no funds to continue the reconstruction. The community feels threatened and frustrated by the continued existence of the berms. And Rochdale Park? It lies almost unused.

Rochdale Park is a particularly tragic episode because it was built at a time when people should have known better. The files of the parks administration were filled with reports describing instances of vandalism and abandonment when the community felt out of touch with the neighborhood park. There was already a good supply of guidance available to any inquirer: Where parks were not part of the local community, they were destined to become burdens to their area.

A small park in the Canarsie section of Brooklyn again demonstrates how an asset can become a liability. The area is one of middle-class, single-family homes. The park occupies the end of one block. Residential properties are separated from the park by a 16-foot-high chain link fence.

In recent years the park has become the nighttime haven for roaming bands of teenagers. Activities in the park at first were merely annoying to the neighbors; in time, they became dangerous. Drug use and sales were reported. Park equipment was vandalized on an almost daily basis. Adjacent homeowners were threatened by those in the park when they complained. Holes were cut through

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the fence and private yards were vandalized. In desperation, the community association demanded that the parks administration replace the fence with a 16-foot-high brick wall. They were willing to live in the shadow of such a barrier if they could obtain relief from the constant bombardment.

Needless to say, the wall was never built. No funds were available for the barrier. The police in the area insisted that the situation was under control and that no drastic measures were needed. The arrival of cooler weather reduced the number of incidents. Yet, some cynical (and angry) residents forecast (as they insist that they have for a number of years) that with the return of warm weather the problems will be back as well.

## Arenas for conflict

Just as parks become the "turf" of various groups within a community, they also become the arena in which hostilities associated with neighborhood change become visible. Neighborhood change often begins with the older population failing to occupy all the housing in the area. Their own children have moved elsewhere. The vacuum is then filled by people who are often both of a different ethnic or racial identity and younger. The school and the park are the sites where the first skirmishes are fought. But whereas the school is a closely supervised situation that usually forces the repression of overt hostility, the playground—an unsupervised, neutral space—is the perfect setting for social conflict.

Cunningham Park in northwestern Queens is one of the City's larger, naturalistic reserves. It is surrounded by pleasant, middle-class neighborhoods. In many respects these communities resemble suburbs far more than typical New York City neighborhoods.

In the late 1960's the parks administration undertook a program to provide a swimming pool for every community. A few olympic-size pools, complete with bathhouses, were built at central locations. A larger number of small pools with minimal facilities were located in congested neighborhoods. But the greatest impact was to come from the installation of more than 60 so-called "mini-pools," really large steel tanks with appropriate ladders, filters, and pumps. These pools could be installed anywhere there was an adequate water supply and sufficient drainage capacity. One of the pools was allocated to Cunningham Park. The specific site was to be well within the park, away from the residential areas.

Public hearings on the project revealed a deep hostility against

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anything that might upset the delicate use patterns that existed in Cunningham Park. There already were problems with teenagers who used the parking lots as lovers' lanes, occasionally becoming boisterous and disruptive. The neighborhood feared anything that would attract additional people (especially outsiders—even worse, blacks from Jamaica).

Following the meetings, it was clear that the pool would never be accepted. Later, the same reluctance was voiced by a number of communities. Most surprising to park officials, some of the areas rejecting pools were themselves poor and overcrowded. Residents were jealous of the small amount of stability they had in their neighborhood and were adamant in refusing anything that might compromise what they had.

A few years after the mini-pool incidents, there was an even more glaring display of anti-park sentiment. This time the locale was South Brooklyn, an area of multi-family dwellings and small industrial and manufacturing plants. The area lacks recreational facilities. When a parcel fronting on the Gowanus Canal became available, the site was proposed by city planners as the solution to the needs of the district.

Officials at a public hearing were amazed when one person after another denounced the park idea. People favored instead a proposal by a supermarket chain to construct a modern grocery and adjacent parking lot—this despite evidence that the streets in the area could not handle the traffic that a supermarket would generate. Moreover, the residents insisted that it would not be acceptable just to postpone a decision on the park. They wanted the market built as a way to preclude any future park development. The proposed park was seen by the community as a magnet for undesirables. Clearly people preferred to suffer traffic and noise rather than endure the problems they were sure a park would produce.

Another instance where community pressure determined park policy was the case of the Columbia University gymnasium. Along the upper west side of Manhattan Island lies a plateau called "Morningside Heights," which overlooks the flat Harlem plain to the east. In the 1870's the severe cliff on the eastern side was set aside as a park. Today Morningside Park, as the site was named, is more than just a division between low and high ground, for the park separates Harlem from Columbia University, which occupies the more exclusive elevated area.

The extreme difference in elevation between Harlem and the Heights always limited the use of the park as a link between the

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two areas. People preferred sitting on benches along the park's perimeter rather than venturing into it. By the 1950's a rising crime rate in the area gave people added reason to avoid the inside of the park. Because there was so little use, few people objected when, in the early 1960's, the extreme northern tip of the park was used as the site for an elementary school.

For a number of years, Columbia had been searching for the proper site for a new physical education and gymnasium building. Citing the elementary school as a precedent, the university proposed what it thought to be a fair plan: It would construct a building in the park with facilities on the upper floors for students and a public gymnasium (with access from the lower portion of the park) at the base. Columbia would provide the staff for the entire gymnasium complex. This was viewed as a generous offer by the school in return for land that was, by all accounts, used by very few people. Columbia and the City quickly agreed to terms for the project, and, despite some local opposition, contracts were signed and planning was begun.

Unfortunately, however, the time was not ripe for a university to be expanding onto public property, no matter how fair the terms. The first dynamite blasts of the construction touched off community and student protests that not only forced the university to abandon the project, but shook the very foundations of the institution. Protestors condemned the encroachment onto park land, and concern quickly ceased to be limited to the park, and expanded to fundamental questions about the relationship of an urban university to its neighboring community. A new City administration called the agreement with Columbia a "giveaway," and under extreme pressure, the university had no alternative but to withdraw from the venture and promise to "restore" the site in accordance with a plan to be agreed to by both the parks department and the community. But to date no restoration has been undertaken: Morningside Park remains empty and forlorn, mute testimony to the violent confrontation of that era. The activity and population that would have been drawn by the public gymnasium are missing. The irony of the Columbia gymnasium episode is that at another time and perhaps in another place such a plan for park use might have drawn praise.

## From conflict to cooperation

The destruction of park property in New York City now runs to millions of dollars annually. Uncalculated is the value of facilities

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that go unused because people are afraid to use them, or because they have been damaged to the point where they no longer offer any recreation or relaxation. But vandalism is not just purposeless mischief, although there is much of that. In many cases, the destruction is a calculated attempt by one group to deny the use of the park to another.

In a local park or playground the question of "turf" is everything. When there is a conflict between an older population and newcomers in a neighborhood, one group or the other will attempt to gain control of the park. The people who are deprived of the space often seek to destroy it.

It is almost impossible to predict which parks will remain immune from blight and social conflict. Yet certain circumstances do increase the likelihood that parks will turn into neighborhood liabilities. First, any park that has no immediate constituency—or where there is no safe and easy access—is not going to be well populated, with the inevitable consequences. Second, those facilities that have been all but abandoned by the City administration also will not attract people. Third, when there is social conflict, the park or playground may be lost in the battle for community dominance.

The remedies are not simple. There is no question that a strong and unified community can make some difference. A united community can exert pressure on the city administration to provide both improved care for the facility and, in some cases, staffing. Where residents offer to assist the parks department in staffing and cleanups, a much more favorable atmosphere pervades the playspace. With so much attention devoted to the playground, potential vandals are at least wary. This is not to say that all problems end, but at least some improvements can be realized.

Sometimes the involvement of local residents in the management of park facilities can be counterproductive. A case in point is Greenwich Village, where Washington Square Park became a rallying point for the community in the 1950's when the City announced its intention to extend Fifth Avenue through the park to connect with avenues to the south. A massive public outcry and legal efforts forced the abandonment of that plan, and the community then lobbied to have its park refurbished and partly redesigned as insurance against any revival of the traffic scheme.

The rehabilitation of Washington Square Park was to be a demonstration of what could be done when a community had control over its own affairs. In an unprecedented action the contract with

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the architectural firm that was to prepare the necessary plans was signed by three parties—the City, the architect, and the "community." The planning process consumed many months as decisions were made, only to be overturned as a result of protests from one interest group or another. Finally, after much delay, plans were completed and the work was begun.

A short time after the rehabilitation was finished, however, the parks department began to receive complaints about adults in the children's playgrounds, derelicts living in the park, and frequent muggings. The design element that had won so much praise—the elimination of fences and gates—was the source of the difficulties: The absence of fences permitted muggers to make their escape across the park's lawns and onto the neighboring streets.

At this juncture, people who had never participated in the earlier design discussions came forward to demand that the entire park be fenced as a means of removing derelicts who were living in the park 24 hours per day. Their plan was to close the park at night, permitting no one to remain after curfew. The proposal was discussed at a community meeting and was eventually rejected; but, even had the resolution been approved, the parks department had no money to fund such a project.

The attempt to permit the community to design its own park in Greenwich Village failed. In the end the City had to install some features that had been denounced by those who had promised to remake Washington Square Park as a showcase. This experience demonstrated that planners should not abdicate their responsibility to vocal residents, for although the planning meetings had attracted many people, the audiences were by no means a cross section of the local population. The park that was built was the embodiment of only some people's social theories. It failed because it did not consider the real problems of the area.

An example of cooperation and eventual improvement followed a confrontation between the City bureaucracy and a local community in what has become known as the "basketball debate." A playground in Queens was suffering constant vandalism to its basketball courts. Some local park officials even suggested removing the nets and backboards since it appeared that their upkeep was impossible. Others from the central office questioned why this facility was subject to such abuse, especially since it had a recreation leader assigned to it five days per week. The problem became clear when someone asked local teenagers if they were aware of any problems with the playground. They complained that whereas the

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recreation leader worked from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, they were in school until 3:00 p.m. on the same days. Just as the users arrived at the playground, the leader was shutting his office and was locking away the basketball. The solution seemed relatively simple: Give the ball to a nearby adult who would agree to collect the ball each evening and return it to the leader in the morning. Yet the bureaucrats insisted that the distribution of equipment was the job of the leader. The debate was finally ended by a directive from the parks commissioner ordering the ball to be given to the willing community resident. Following the inauguration of this procedure, the basketball courts remained free from damage.

## The role of local communities

Perhaps the simplest statement to be made about the decline of park and recreation facilities is that when they are unused and not cared for, they suffer decline. Neighborhood facilities are especially vulnerable to this problem since there is generally only one source of patronage: the community. In contrast, large parks such as Central, Prospect, Van Cortlandt, and Flushing Meadow-Corona draw their users from a broad area, in some instances even from a city-wide base. In such circumstances there has been a large enough population base to overwhelm negative forces.

Yet even Central Park is suffering. The northern district of the park has been all but abandoned by most people. Even in the busy southern end, people are cautious and restrict themselves to the most heavily used areas. On the park's fringes, where local playgrounds exist for the bordering communities, the conditions resemble those to be found in numerous neighborhood parks throughout the city. Some are neglected and unused except by winos and derelicts. Others—and these are usually the ones that have active community associations working for their care—are cheerful and busy.

Where parks are valued by the community there is generally less vandalism. Active communities have made the difference between vital resources and neigborhood eyesores in all parts of the City, in all sorts of areas. An active local organization can defuse hostility and conflict or, at very least, direct it away from the park. In such facilities the staff assigned has the chance to maintain and improve conditions rather than just clean up the results of destructive behavior. It is in these parks that the principles espoused by

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the park planners have a chance to take hold. Those sites can be places for relaxation and recreation.

Obviously, use and supervision are the keys to maintaining a park as an asset. Yet at a time when New York City and other municipalities are furloughing police and fire personnel, how can the parks of New York City receive the activity and personnel that they require?

Perhaps a partial solution is to place existing recreation and neighborhood programs in the parks. For example, many government agencies organize recreational activities as playstreet programs in close proximity to large park areas. Of course, in many cases those parks have been neglected, leaving little more than glass-covered lots. But if a cleanup program were followed by concentrated use, there might be a better recreation program and a better park. Similarly, no one has yet figured out why the Board of Education provides school recreation areas adjacent to many of its facilities and then closes the gates at the end of the school day. In many cases, the City has built almost identical facilities nearby to serve the "after 3:00 p.m." needs of the community. The personnel and programs already exist. It is simply a matter of coordinating activities.

Other economies could be realized by maintaining a proper balance between public needs and the facilities that are provided. Too often, in the belief that once a project receives a budget allocation it will be forgotten for many years, planners tend to overbuild park and recreation facilities. When a small park that has been the site of informal baseball games is rebuilt, the result is often a formal field with elaborate fences and bleachers. In some cases the formal fields prevent other activities (kite flying, for instance) and the sum total of use actually drops. And, in almost every case, the expensive bleachers sit unused. The cost of such follies is immeasurable.

Another case of overbuilding, and perhaps the most counterproductive, is the proliferation of restrooms in parks and playgrounds. Called "comfort stations" by the parks administration, these facilities have heat and hot water—when all that is needed is a basic structure where people can relieve themselves. The addition of heat and hot water adds operating and maintenance burdens beyond the parks department's ability to deal with them. The result is closed comfort stations and buildings that are often targets for vandals. A simple cold water facility that would meet the minimal needs of the public and would require almost no care would

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both save manpower in the parks agency and avoid the need for mothers to dash home with their children.

## Prospects and possibilities

Clearly, the time has come to abandon the endless quest for more parkland, limiting new reservations to obvious conservation areas and to locales where a new park will be a genuine improvement. At the same time, the City must review the continuation of parks that have proved to be unused. The sale of such parcels for private redevelopment would bring money to the City and would remove from the parks department a significant maintenance burden.

Administrative changes are also in order. The parochial jealousies that prevent greater cooperation between the host of governmental agencies already supplying recreation and leisure-time services must be overcome. Programs should be transferred from the streets into the parks to provide the activity and supervision that might make them safe. The parks administration should not remain aloof when social conflict strikes the parks. The long-term attitude that problems in the streets are not the concern of the parks department should be reversed. Local institutions should become involved in a comprehensive effort to provide leadership and activity in local parks, and it should be the responsibility of the parks administration to lead in such an organizing effort. It might be discovered that if a recreation leader spent his time organizing institutional cooperation, there might be enough volunteers and privately paid staff to keep the facilities in operation for most of the day, seven days per week.

My examples have been drawn from New York City, but I am describing a problem that exists in many cities. Wherever public facilities are left untended and unprotected, wherever social change disturbs the stability of older communities, and wherever bureaucratic stagnation prohibits the rule of common sense, the results are the same.

Parks and playgrounds can no longer be viewed as passive elements in the social context of a community. They are affected by complex relationships and balances in the city, and are themselves active elements in social change. We can no longer fail to integrate parks into community life—it is the only thing that may save them. It is not enough to build public facilities. Their interaction with the social life of the city must be understood and evaluated.

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# The "Administrative Presidency"

RICHARD P. NATHAN

WHILE he was President, John F. Kennedy reportedly once told a caller, "I agree with you, but I don't know if the government will." Whether true or not, Kennedy's remark illustrates a difficulty that has challenged modern Presidents: Should the President control the bureaucracy? And if so, how?

Clinton Rossiter speculated 20 years ago in *The American Presidency* that many a President would consider his hardest job was "... not to persuade Congress to support a policy dear to his political heart, but to persuade the pertinent bureau or agency—even when headed by men of his own choosing—to follow his direction faithfully and transform the shadow of the policy into the substance of the program." A number of modern Presidents have wrestled with this problem with varied motives, diverse strategies, and mixed results. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the Brownlow Committee of 1936-37, and a succession of Presidential committees and task forces on executive management have all been part of their effort to give specific meaning to the general statement in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution that "the Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."

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Among recent Presidents, Richard M. Nixon stands out for the typically intense and—for a President—reasonably systematic attention that he gave to this problem. Before the fall, Nixon had devised an elaborate plan for Presidential control over the domestic bureaucracy for his second term—a strategy that can be called the "Administrative Presidency."

## From operations to policy

The idea that the President *should* manage the bureaucracy has long been favored by public administration experts. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Brownlow Committee emphasized the strong executive —in the Hamiltonian model—as the unique contribution of the Founding Fathers. "Those who waver at the sight of needed power," the Committee said, "are false friends of modern democracy. Strong executive leadership is essential to democratic government."

This classical public administration position, now dismissed by some as naive and outdated, has been replaced in the literature for many contemporary students of the Presidency by the more pessimistic interpretation offered by Richard Neustadt. Corresponding with Kennedy's statement quoted above, Neustadt's view downgrades the President's ability to be the chief executive of the bureaucracy: He can persuade and he can dramatize, but he cannot run the show—or at least it is very difficult for him to try to do so.

Another view of the President's relationship to the bureaucracy that has gained momentum since Watergate embodies the concept of "participatory bureaucracy," a sort of "moveable feast" of power rather than the traditional hierarchial model. This is what might be called the "democracy-inside-of-technocracy" theory, or the "blow-the-whistle" code of bureaucratic behavior, in which the President's role is commensurately downgraded. According to this view, the career official should provide not just competent staff work, but also his judgments concerning the right decisions and proper course of action for his agency and program area, about which he presumably has much more expertise than his political superiors.

What is significant about Nixon's idea for an "Administrative Presidency"—an idea shared by his Advisory Council on Executive Organization, headed by Roy L. Ash—is that it was clearly based on the traditional public administration model. Toward the close of his first term, Nixon increasingly came to believe that the President *should* manage, that as the chief elected official of the nation,

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he had every right—indeed, had a responsibliity—to adopt measures that would have the federal bureaucracy carry out his policy preferences. To do so, there were essentially two courses of action available to the President: relying upon strong, Presidentially-appointed domestic-program managers assigned to various executive agencies, or working through the White House and Executive Office staffs to see to it that the President's policy preferences were put into effect. From time to time, the Nixon Administration considered adopting—and, in fact, eventually did adopt—both strategies, only to come to the conclusion at the end of the first term that they could not be pursued together: Strong agency managers, closely tied to the President, are bound to have difficulty functioning effectively if a powerful White House staff is monitoring their every move. The President had to make a choice; Nixon decided to go with strong agency managers as his second term got underway in 1973.

Reduced to its essentials, his plan involved putting his own trusted appointees in positions to manage directly key elements of the bureaucracy without elaborate White House or Executive Office machinery to encumber their efforts. New appointees for the Nixon second term would be arranged so that there would be clear lines of authority. The bureaucracy would report to them; they would be held accountable.

This plan for an "Administrative Presidency" helps to explain Nixon's entire domestic policy. The roots of this plan were in the experience of the first term. The President and John D. Ehrlichman, his chief domestic advisor, came to the conclusion sometime in late 1971 or early 1972 that, in most areas of domestic affairs, *operations constitute policy*. Much of the day-to-day management of domestic programs—regulation writing, grant approval, personnel deployment, agency organization and reorganization, program oversight, and budget apportionment—can involve high-level policy-making. Getting control over these processes was the aim of the President's strategy; and, judged against the lack of legislative success on domestic issues in the first term, there are grounds for concluding that this was a rational objective. Among Nixon's various domestic proposals, only revenue sharing cleared Congress in his first term, despite the fact that Nixon had advocated from 1969 through 1971 a wide-ranging legislative agenda for domestic affairs—revenue sharing, welfare reform, health insurance, and block grants for manpower, community development, education, and transportation. In this setting of legislative non-achievement, there

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are grounds for concluding that a conservative/centrist President facing a considerably more liberal Congress was well-advised to eschew legislative action and concentrate instead on administrative measures.

Existing domestic legislation, typically leaving many decisions to administrative discretion, offers an experienced President wide-ranging opportunities for managerial initiatives as an alternative to seeking Congressional action. But again, a President cannot have it both ways. If he does opt for an energetic managerial strategy, there are sure to be instances where the Congress will dig in and resist legislative initiatives he puts forward; as a result, prospects for his legislative program will be reduced.

## President versus bureaucrat

The strong management strategy, set in motion in 1973, was to be implemented by a new set of Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials, along with a corresponding deemphasis of major domestic legislative initiatives. Nixon and Ehrlichman were no doubt aware of the problems they faced in carrying out this plan. At the same time that the experience of the first term indicated the pitfalls of legislative initiatives, White House aides frequently warned of an uncooperative—even unfriendly—domestic bureaucracy. According to Hugh Heclo, writing in *The Public Interest*, No. 38 (Winter 1975), the Nixon Administration's view was that it "faced not only an opposition Congress but also an opposition executive, a collection of agencies and departments with a vested interest in the ways of the past." A study forthcoming in *The American Political Science Review* bears out this interpretation. In 1970, Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman interviewed 126 supergrade-level administrators of federal domestic programs and found them "ideologically hostile" to the domestic policies of the Nixon Administration:

> Our findings document a career bureaucracy with very little Republican representation but most pointedly picture a social service bureaucracy dominated by administrators ideologically hostile to many of the directions of the Nixon Administration in the realm of social policy.

Concern about bureaucratic subterfuge, widespread among White House aides at this time, was often expressed in situations where less partial observers would have judged the Administration's intentions to be so unclear that agency officials could not have been

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expected even to know what the President wanted. It was common, nevertheless, for Nixon staffers at White House meetings to discuss at length cases where program managers, without authorization, went to the Congress to plead for help in reversing Administration decisions or attended meetings of interest groups around the country to drum up support for their subversive activities. Close ties between executive branch agencies and Members of the Congress often made it possible for agencies to resist White House policies.

A remark by a White House aide, quoted in *The Wall Street Journal* (June 21, 1971), summed up the attitude of the Nixon staff members toward the bureaucracy:

> President Nixon doesn't run the bureaucracy; the civil service and the unions do. It took him three years to find out what was going on in the bureaucracy. And God forbid if any President is defeated after the first term, because then the bureaucracy has another three years to play games with the next President.

Even Nixon's own Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials were portrayed by Nixon's aides in White House strategy sessions as too easily tempted by the lures and snares of the permanent bureaucracy. Late in 1972, Ehrlichman remarked in his often acerbic way that after Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials were appointed, they were only seen at Christmas parties: "They go off and marry the natives."

Observing this tendency for Nixon appointees to "go native," one agency official, a political appointee and former Republican Congressional staffer, developed in this period his own law of bureaucratic decision making. He noted: "*No decision in government is made only once*"—if at first you don't get your way, keep trying, reopen the question, try another channel, use a different approach. In large agencies, there are sure to be many opportunities for locating a political—that is, appointed—official whose vantage point (Congressional relations, public relations, the budget, substantive concerns, or policy analysis) is such that he will be willing to go back to the Secretary, to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), or to the White House in an effort to overturn or change a given policy decision.

On occasion, Nixon officials would visit the office of a Congressional committee to explain an Administration legislative proposal, only to be told that the committee had already been briefed by career agency officials known to have reservations about the Administration's plans. This led to the establishment in the Depart-

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ment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) of a system of chaperones to accompany career officials on visits to Capitol Hill, along with a clearance system for all such outings. (An indignant response from Senate Finance Committee Chairman Russell B. Long, however, resulted in the demise of HEW's chaperonage plan.)

## New team, new strategy

Nixon unveiled his strategy for an "Administrative Presidency" on the morning after his reelection. At a hastily called meeting, he told Cabinet members and their chief subordinates that they should submit their resignations immediately. The instruction was given in a spirit very different from the *pro forma* manner of the past; it was clear that a new team would be named for the second term. One of their essential tasks would be to take charge of the domestic bureaucracies. Key members of Nixon's new team were James T. Lynn at Housing and Urban Development, Caspar W. Weinberger at HEW, Earl L. Butz at Agriculture, along with a second line of sub-Cabinet officials, primarily made up of former White House aides with close ties to Ehrlichman. The new team was to *take on* the Congress and *take over* the bureaucracy. New legislation would be eschewed in deference to this administrative strategy. A system of "Super-Secretaries" was established—Lynn for Community Development, Weinberger for Human Resources, Butz for Natural Resources, and George P. Shultz (then Secretary of the Treasury), for Economic Affairs. The White House staff, which Nixon complained had grown "like Topsy" in his first term, was to be pared down. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Henry Kissinger, Ash (the new Director of the Budget), and Shultz (doubling as a White House aide for economic affairs) were to be the "starting five" among White House assistants. Other Executive Office personnel would be cut so that the trusted lieutenants appointed as agency heads could have frequent and direct access to the President and these chief aides.

It is ironic that, in the midst of Watergate, this decision in favor of strong, loyalist Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials appeared to involve a deliberate attempt to reduce the power and importance of the White House staff. It may be that there was such a connection in the President's mind. However, there was not even a clue at the time that this was so. To the contrary, it was Haldeman and Ehrlichman who emerged at the top of the new structure, and it

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was quite clear, as noted earlier, that Ehrlichman was the principal architect of the new plan, which had four principal facets.

1. *Personnel shifts*: The balanced Cabinet, customary in American politics, which Nixon himself had relied on in his first term, was dropped. A new Cabinet and sub-Cabinet of lesser luminaries was largely in place when the tide of Watergate crested and the "Administrative Presidency" strategy, together with other plans for the second term, had to be put aside. Commenting on Nixon's decision to retool the Cabinet and put trusted lieutenants in the top agency posts, *New York Times* reporter John Herbers contrasted the independent, national political figures in Nixon's first-term Cabinet with the new breed of the second: "But now high posts, with rare exceptions, are held by little-known Nixon loyalists who can be dismissed or transferred at will without creating a ripple in public opinion" (March 6, 1973).[1] The personnel shifts involved not only Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials and appointed agency heads, but many other top policy posts as well. Within their new agency homes, it was expected that Nixon's new team would also redeploy career program managers, selecting the most cooperative, sympathetic, and talented officials for top posts.

2. *Budget impoundments and reductions*: President Nixon's budget for fiscal year 1974 (submitted in January 1973) involved the strong use of fiscal powers as an essential part of his new management strategy. Few more direct ways could be imagined to take on the bureaucracy. Whole programs were to be stopped by impoundment. Important constitutional issues were raised by these decisions: Can a President use his executive authority to curtail or nullify programs that the Congress had previously enacted? The courts eventually had something to say about these executive actions, but in the early months of 1973 these and other such aggressive uses of fiscal tactics appeared to be immensely powerful.

3. *Reorganization*: The third element of the "Administrative Presidency" was the use of reorganization powers to give the President's trusted lieutenants authority and leverage to act. In some cases, whole activities were reorganized out of existence, and in others, there were significant changes in reporting relationships. An example of the former was the attempt to abolish the Office

[1] From Nixon's original Cabinet, all had exited but Shultz. Among the more prominent and outspoken members of the original group for the domestic agencies were George Romney at HUD, John Volpe at Transportation, Walter Hickel at Interior, and Robert Finch at HEW (whose outspokenness was somewhat of a surprise to his mentor).

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of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in early 1973. Although OEO was established in the Executive Office under Lyndon Johnson, it was not anticipated at the time that a future President would have greater authority over OEO than over other agencies. But instead of following the procedure of the formal Reorganization Act (whereby the Congress has 60 days to disapprove an organizational change), President Nixon's lawyers argued that since OEO was within the Executive Office, the President alone controlled its fate. With this rationale, in 1973 Nixon assigned as the new director of OEO a young conservative, Howard Phillips, an assistant director of OEO and formerly president of the Young Americans for Freedom. The President stipulated that when Phillips had completed his task of dismantling OEO, in part by devolving its functions to other agencies, he would be assigned some other post. Phillip's exuberance in his new task appeared to exceed even White House expectations: In one statement, he was quoted as saying he would do his job so rapidly, before Congress had a chance to react, that no one would be able to put "Humpty-Dumpty" together again. In a more restrained fashion, the special offices in the White House for Consumer Affairs and Science and Technology were devolved to new agency homes and eliminated as Executive Office units. The establishment of the "Super-Secretaries" also constituted an important use of reorganization as a tool for the President to get a firmer hold over the machinery of domestic government.

According to the new "game plan," the reorganization approach was not to be limited to the Executive Office and the Cabinet: Within their respective agencies, Nixon's new appointees were expected to take advantage of opportunities to rearrange their agencies in ways that would enable them to obtain stronger managerial control.

4. *Regulation*: The fourth component of the "Administrative Presidency" was regulation-writing—another exercise of federal authority that had not been thought of in the past as a method by which a President could achieve major policy goals. Two illustrations of how this authority could be used were revealed in conjunction with the federal budget for fiscal year 1974. In the field of social services (where this tactic eventually floundered because of strong Congressional opposition) new rules were issued early in 1973 that restricted the way in which funds to aid the poor through social services could be expended. The new rules, among other steps, required that these funds be used only for persons with specifically defined conditions of need, and then only under a system of de-

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tailed accounting for the services provided. Here the aim was to reduce the options available to social-work professionals, long subject to Administration disdain, and strongly entrenched in the welfare bureaucracy of HEW. On the other hand, in the manpower field, the regulatory power was to be used not to introduce federal government controls, but to reduce them. The aim in this case was to decentralize by implementing Nixon's plan for manpower special revenue sharing through administrative action in the form of changed regulations under existing statutory authority.

Although in retrospect these four elements of the "Administrative Presidency" fit together in a fairly neat package, it is not likely that anyone in the White House systematically identified and defined this framework in preparing for the second term. In any event, it was all for naught: On April 30, 1973, John Ehrlichman, the driving force behind these various measures, was gone. Soon, too, the designations of the "Super-Secretaries" were removed. As the new White House staff was assembled in the late spring and summer of 1973, it came into being in a far different setting. The mandate of 1972 had dissipated, and decisive action, including unnecessary fights with program bureaucracies and Congressional committees, could not now be undertaken. General Alexander Haig, Jr., as Haldeman's successor, called for "an open Presidency" with activist, independent roles for Cabinet officers. The wheel had turned a full revolution.

## Management as policy

It must be emphasized that the abortive "Administrative Presidency" strategy for Nixon's second term was much more than a managerial plan: It was closely tailored to the President's policy ideas. The two main elements of the "New Federalism" agenda, which Nixon had advanced in August 1969, were welfare reform and revenue sharing. Both moved away from the "Great Society" approach of attempting to solve a wide range of social problems by establishing new programs and agencies of the federal government. Instead, the aim was to rely on the community through revenue-sharing programs, and on individuals through a welfare-reform strategy that provided welfare recipients with adequate resources so they could make their own decisions. In his White House Food Conference address, on December 2, 1969, Nixon said:

> The task for Government is not to make decisions for you or for anyone. The task of Government is to enable you to make decisions

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> for yourselves. Not to see the truth of that statement is fundamentally to mistake the genius of democracy. We have made too many mistakes of this type—but no more. Our job is to get resources to people in need and then to let them run their own lives.

Both of these themes—localism and individualism—were closely in line with the anti-big-government, anti-bureaucracy mood of the 1970's.

Just as in physics, if the aim is to shift power, it is necessary to take it away from somewhere else. Nixon's advisers realized that they would have their hands full in attempting to assign more responsibility to state and local governments and individual citizens under his "New Federalism" domestic program, because these policy changes involved reducing the power of strongly entrenched bureaucracies of the national government. In short, having had only limited success with the legislative route to the "New Federalism" in his first term, Nixon decided in his second term to take on the bureaucracy directly, using the "Administrative Presidency" approach.

Although decentralization remained a major aim, it should be noted that Nixon's "New Federalism" domestic program frequently shifted in tone and content. In particular, the President's ardor for welfare reform cooled as the time for reelection neared. It dropped off completely following the controversy over George McGovern's "demogrant" plan in 1972. After the election, there was in addition an across-the-board shift to the right in the President's budget and related messages for 1973.

The post-Watergate notion of the "Imperial Presidency" and similar views warning of the dangers of a strong Presidency caution against any attempt, such as Nixon's, to have the President be a strong manager. Yet Franklin D. Roosevelt sought similar goals, and many students of the Presidency credit him for doing so. In the present day, there are good arguments to the effect that we need a force to counter strongly entrenched bureaucracies and interest groups. In *The End of Liberalism*, Theodore J. Lowi warns against just such a concentration of power in centers of technical expertise that are not subject to the give-and-take of democratic political processes.

In addition to such theoretical concerns about the power of bureaucracies, the memoirs of public officials offer abundant examples of the frustrations involved in challenging the functional fiefdoms of Washington. There is reason to think that managerial tasks are harder to perform in Washington than at other levels of our

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political system. Political appointees with state and local experience frequently commented during the Nixon years that they found it more difficult to tackle Washington bureaucracies than those at the state level, which tended to be more responsive to policy decisions by political officials.

The essential question is whether we need to have more and stronger checks and balances *within* the federal executive branch. Nixon's notion that the only way to take on the bureaucracy was to assemble like-minded political appointees strongly committed to his program and policy ideas raises questions of political behavior similar to those raised by Watergate. In the case of Watergate, like-minded associates, strongly devoted to the President, developed a warped and unbalanced perspective where excesses reinforced and fed upon each other. The result was catastrophic for Nixon and for the country. Would this same behavior have occurred in the area of domestic policy if the "Administrative Presidency" had been played out in the absence of Watergate? Would the orientation of Nixon's trusted lieutenants for domestic affairs have caused men to yield to the same temptation to put ends before means? Or would our traditions of public service have been sufficient in these substantive policy areas to assure responsible conduct?

It must be remembered that the key figures of the "Administrative Presidency" were men of character and ability, untainted by Watergate (with one exception, Ehrlichman). George Shultz (economic policy), Caspar Weinberger (human resources), Earl Butz (natural resources), and James Lynn (community development) are all men of centrist or moderately conservative views who, in one capacity or another, have proved themselves to be skillful public-policy managers. It was in the campaign arena, not in the area of domestic policy, that Nixon's choice of unprincipled subordinates produced his ultimate crisis.

The intriguing question whether the "Administrative Presidency" could have succeeded in the absence of Watergate may not be answered for a long time. For Watergate has had a deep impact on political morality in the United States. With a new and heightened concern for political ethics, it is possible that a President with a coherent program could organize his administration to navigate a course similar to Nixon's plan but, at the same time, adhere to high stands of public service and personal conduct. Yet Watergate may have made the "Administrative Presidency" impossible for some time. Its aftertaste will no doubt discourage a future Presi-

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dent from soon again attempting this kind of a domestic strategy; such a firm grabbing of the reins with an emphasis on administrative accomplishment may now be unacceptable. If the domestic bureaucracies have acquired too much power, a solution in terms of a Presidential strategy may now be very hard to implement. Clearly, President Ford is not disposed, or does not seem to be disposed, in this direction.

## Ford and the future

By the time of Nixon's departure, much of the "New Federalism" agenda was in place.[2] It might be argued that President Ford, who appears to hold to a philosophy of domestic policy similar to Nixon's, could have advanced goals closely in line with the "New Federalism" without adopting a management plan specifically designed to do so.

Ford's domestic strategy initially involved a shift back to the traditional concept of a balanced Cabinet. He named to the Cabinet a group of distinguished citizens—some of whom he had not previously known—who apparently were selected without much concern for their political or philosophical orientation. As of this writing, the Ford Cabinet for domestic affairs consists of a Southerner at HEW (a Democrat, considered by many a liberal), a woman at HUD (also with an essentially liberal track record), a black at Transportation, a Harvard man at Labor, a Westerner at Interior. Balanced according to religion, sex, race, and region, the Ford Cabinet in many ways resembles Nixon's first Cabinet. Can such a group be loyal to the Administration's conservative, decentralist domestic policies? The answer in part depends on the importance which the President and his advisers attach to these objectives: Preoccupied with other tasks, the Ford White House has shown little disposition so far to highlight domestic affairs.

Nevertheless, there were signs in late 1975 that the new President, in international affairs at least, was learning the lessons of Nixon's experience—perhaps learning them all too well. Explaining his decision to fire Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in November 1975, Ford said he wanted to avoid "growing tensions" in his Administration. "I need a feeling," said the President, "of

[2] General revenue-sharing, and block grants for manpower and community development. Enactment of the latter two measures, in 1973 and 1974 respectively, came as something of a surprise to most Nixon Administration domestic strategists.

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comfort with an organization: no tension, complete cohesion." Hugh Sidey, writing in *Time* magazine (November 3, 1975), called attention to what he saw as the need for a stronger interest in management in the Ford White House. Although "Ford has repeatedly attacked the bureaucracy," said Sidey, his aides have made "no reliable assessments of how some of the huge Government programs are working." Noting that although Ford had promised to cut federal payrolls, they had increased during his 14-month tenure, Sidey urged that the President "come out from behind the microphone and grapple with the problem himself."

Others have argued that the Congress should give managerial direction to the federal bureaucracy. But even though we may decide that coherent management of the federal bureaucracy is needed, I do not believe that the Congress can fulfill this role. Its oversight role, however, in this area is an essential one.

Aaron Wildavsky has written, "The weakening of the Presidency is about as likely as the withering away of the state" (*The Public Interest*, No. 41, Fall 1975). There was, as might be expected, a strong tendency to think otherwise in the aftermath of Watergate. The long-held belief in the strong Presidency, favored by public-administration groups since the mid-1930's, was abandoned. In a report prepared in 1974 for the Ervin Committee of the United States Senate, a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration rejected the tactics being developed for the Nixon second term: "The federal executive is necessarily pluralistic." Although made up of the ideological descendants of the authors of the Brownlow and Hoover reports, the Academy panel, referring to Nixon's management strategy for his second term, breathed a sigh of relief that Watergate had stemmed the tide of Presidential power:

> The United States Government [under Nixon] would be run like a corporation—or at least a popular view of the corporate model—with all powers concentrated at the top and exercised through appointees in the President's office and loyal followers placed in crucial positions in the various agencies of the Executive Branch. . . . No one can guess how close the American government would be to this closed hierarchical model had not Watergate exposures halted the advance towards it—at least temporarily.

There were many who believed when Nixon resigned in 1974 that his plan for a managerial takeover of domestic government in his second term constituted a threat to our political system. Maybe so; but, as often happens after periods of great emotion, there is likely yet to be a revision of attitudes. When this happens, I predict

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that Nixon's strategy for his second term—not necessarily for *the* "Administrative Presidency," but for a *more* administrative Presidency in domestic affairs—will be seen to have raised basic questions for our political system. In more immediate terms, whoever is elected President in 1976, and whatever his major objectives for domestic affairs (decentralization, reduction of the bureaucracy, fiscal responsibility, full employment, equal opportunity), he would do well, at the outset of his term, to study carefully, the President's role as Chief Executive.

## The managerial agenda

Assuming the next President is so disposed, the key to the establishment of some measure of managerial control over the executive establishment is in one word—*appointments*. The predominant tradition in American government is for a new administration to name a balanced Cabinet, to use this first step for binding and healing, selecting men and women who represent the various streams of opinion, regions, and races that the new President wishes to have represented on his team. Unfortunately, this honeymoon mood often exceeds real prospects for political harmony. As a result, it can exacerbate the normal adversarial relationship between the President and his Cabinet.

Despite the fact that this adversarial relationship is built into our system, the essential point is that it can be ameliorated by naming sympathetic men and women to Cabinet and sub-Cabinet posts, appointees clearly pointed in the same policy direction as the new President in their assigned areas of responsibility. Only with such persons can the President hope to get a handle on running the government. Unless his top appointees share his substantive goals, the normal politics of Washington mitigate strongly against even a semblance of managerial cohesion in government. Managerial experience and interests are additional important qualifications, but basic substantive agreement is the essential ingredient.

If this diagnosis is correct, the next President (unless it is Gerald Ford) will not have time to learn in the caldron of Presidential experience. Once the wrong Cabinet is appointed, the managerial agenda becomes unfeasible. This is the lesson of Nixon's Watergate-aborted "Administrative Presidency."

To conclude, I believe a managerial strategy or emphasis is appropriate for the American Presidency. Even if we assume that the next President is successful in establishing some measure of man-

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agerial cohesion and control over the federal bureaucracy, there still exist an abundance of ways in which his power in this area and in others can be checked and balanced. It can be argued, in fact, that a managerial emphasis on the part of the President enhances popular control, given the tendency of industrialized states to become increasingly controlled from bureaucratic and technocratic power centers. The exercise of a greater measure of civilian control over the Executive branch of the American national government—properly reflective of legal and Constitutional requirements—is fully consistent with democratic values.

## CORRECTION

We regret that an error was made in transcribing the table on page 83 of "The Wavering Polls," by Seymour Martin Lipset, which appeared in the Spring 1976 issue of *The Public Interest* (No. 43), pp. 70-89. Under the column heading "Great Deal of Confidence," the correct figures should be as follows: for "Colleges," 46 per cent rather than two per cent; for "Professors," 29 per cent rather than nine per cent. Under the column heading "Moderate Confidence," the correct figure for "Elected Government Officials" should be 75 per cent rather than 65 per cent. Under the column heading "No Confidence," the correct figures should be as follows: for "Colleges," two per cent rather than 46 per cent; for "Professors," nine per cent rather than 29 per cent.

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# Learning about crime—the Japanese experience

DAVID H. BAYLEY

LIKE the United States, Japan is modern, affluent, urbanized, and industrial. Politically and economically, Japan is part of the "developed" world. But there is one area where Japan is remarkably and perplexingly different—the incidence of criminality.

The number of crimes committed annually in Japan in recent years is actually lower than 25 years ago. In 1948, the peak post-war year for crime, there were 1,599,968 non-traffic offenses committed under the Japanese penal code; in 1974, there were 1,211,055. The crime rate—the incidence of crime per unit of population—is declining; in 1974, there were 112 crimes committed for every 10,000 persons. (This includes all penal code offenses, no matter how trivial, except for traffic violations.) Contrast this with the United States, where yearly increases in crime make dramatic headlines, and are considered as inevitable as death and taxes. In 1974, including only the seven categories of serious crime (murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and auto theft) that the FBI uses to compute its crime index, there were 480 crimes for every 10,000 persons. In other words, there are over four times as many serious crimes per person in the United States as crimes of any sort per person in Japan.

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An individual is 10 times more likely to be murdered in the United States than in Japan; 13 times more likely to be raped; and six times more likely to be the victim of theft. The most mind-boggling statistic concerns robbery, an offense that has a lot to do with the anxiety Americans feel about "crime in the streets." The likelihood of being robbed in the United States is 208 *times* greater than in Japan. Last year there were 436,000 robberies in the United States, compared with 2,100 in Japan. The difference between these figures is not due to statistical quirks. Robbery—theft accompanied by violence or the threat of violence—is defined identically in the laws of both countries. However, because possession of handguns is prohibited in Japan without official permission—which is given only to the police, the armed forces, and the members of international shooting teams—it is much less easy to intimidate, threaten, or coerce. While it is true that people kill, not guns, as gun advocates in the United States assert, the absence of guns nonetheless makes certain kinds of crime more difficult to commit.

Comparison of crime rates in major urban areas in both countries shows the same remarkable differences. There are three times more serious crime per person in New York City than there are crimes of all sorts per person in Tokyo. (So that New York City does not seem a particularly bad American example, it should be noted that, according to FBI statistics, there are at least 45 cities in the United States with higher crime rates.) New York City has 10 times more murders per person than Tokyo, 11 times more rapes, and 235 times more robberies. Almost as many homicides are committed each year in New York City as in all Japan—1,600 versus 1,900—although New York City has only one tenth the population.

Narcotics offenses are a trivial problem in Japan, compared with the United States. Last year just under 10,000 persons were charged with drug-related offenses in Japan. Most of these were in connection with amphetamines (87 per cent). In the United States, over half a million people were arrested for narcotics violations. The proportion of arrests involving hard drugs was twice as high in the United States as in Japan (14 per cent versus six per cent). In Tokyo, only 35 persons were charged with offenses involving hard drugs in 1974. Another thousand were arrested for the use or sale of amphetamines, and 119 in connection with marijuana. This record would be considered astonishing in any large American city.

Japan's low level of drug offenses represents a double success—not just the achievement of a low incidence but the overcoming of what was once a large problem. During the mid-1950's and

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early 1960's, six times as many people were being charged with amphetamine offenses in Japan, and five times more with hard-drug offenses. The Japanese experience suggests that drug contagion may be beaten, a prospect almost unimaginable to most Americans.

Is the difference in criminality between Japan and the United States, shown by official figures, the result of misreporting? No. To be sure, more crimes are committed in both countries than are known to the police, but the rates of underreporting of crime, according to independent surveys in both countries, are the same or higher for the United States, depending on the type of crime. True crime in Japan is estimated to be about 80 per cent higher than what is reported, while true crime in the United States is 100 per cent higher. Official figures thus represent a real difference in criminality between the two countries.

The difference in public safety between Japan and the United States can be experienced and felt; it makes a difference in the way people live. Japanese streets and public places are habitable, even at night. Streets do not become deserted when the sun goes down, and very few areas of Japanese cities are considered "out of bounds," given over to juvenile gangs, prostitutes, and criminals. Americans who live in Japan gradually unlearn old anxieties: They are no longer apprehensive at the sound of a following footstep, the sight of lounging teenagers, or a personal request for directions. Japan is a poignant reminder of the innocence Americans have lost without wholly appreciating it.

## American theories of crime

Why should there be this dramatic difference in criminality and public safety between these two wealthy, modern nations? Or what does the United States have that Japan doesn't? One place to look for explanations is among the theories that Americans produce to account for their own rising crime rate.

Crime is frequently attributed by Americans to social modernity. Rising crime rates are thought to be an inevitable consequence of modern industrial life. But there is not much to choose on this score between Japan and the United States. The economic structures of both countries are very similar: From a quarter to a third of the GNP of each country is produced by manufacturing, only three to six per cent by agriculture and fishing. Japanese agriculture is more labor-intensive than American, so more people work on

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farms than in the United States—17 per cent versus four per cent. This difference in occupational structure is too small to account for the disparity in national crime rates, and the difference between Japan and the United States is as great in urban crime rates as it is in rural crime rates. Japanese as well as Americans are among the most highly educated people in the world. Virtually all Japanese complete nine years of schooling, and the vast majority—over 80 per cent—finish high school. A larger proportion of Americans go to college, but since crime rates decline with education, this factor should have the effect of lowering the American crime rate relative to the Japanese. Both populations are thoroughly exposed to mass media. Official estimates are that 95 per cent of all households in both countries have television sets; radios are even more common. The daily circulation of newspapers per capita is greater in Japan than in the United States.

Japanese are not quite as rich, however, as Americans. Though Japan is within the top 20 nations in the world in per capita income, ranking with Great Britain and Finland, per capita income is about 60 per cent of American levels—roughly $3000 versus $5000. This difference, though substantial, cannot account for the higher criminality in the United States. Few people would contend that affluence alone makes people criminal.

Americans often blame crime on urbanization, and especially population congestion. Newspapers have recently fed this line of speculation by reporting experiments showing that overcrowding among rats produces social deviance. Japanese experience refutes this explanation, unless one assumes that Americans and Japanese react very differently to crowding. The Japanese population is 10 times more densely concentrated than the American—about 110 persons per square mile, as opposed to nine per square mile. Though the proportion of people living in urban areas is the same in both countries—70 per cent—urban densities are significantly higher in Japan. There are about 4,000 persons per square mile in the New York metropolitan area, compared with 14,000 per square mile in Tokyo. One fourth of the entire Japanese population—25 million people—live within 37 miles of downtown Tokyo. The United States would have a population density similar to Japan's if 50 per cent of all Americans lived in a space the size of the state of California.

Americans believe that the criminal justice system—police, prosecution, courts—bears a large responsibility for curbing the incidence of crime. When crime rates rise, the criminal justice system is

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thought to be failing. In recent years, inefficient policing and lenient sentencing have frequently been blamed. There would be less crime, it is argued, if there were more policemen, better trained and better equipped, so that more criminals were caught, and if sentences upon conviction were stricter, so that offenders spent more time behind bars. But if Japanese practices are a guide, Americans expectations are misplaced. There are fewer policemen relative to the population in Japan than in the United States—one officer for every 563 persons versus one officer for every 410 persons. In New York City, before the recent cutbacks, there was one officer for every 186 persons; in Tokyo there is one officer for every 287 persons. On the other hand, because the territory of Japan is much smaller than the United States, Japanese policemen are more concentrated geographically—one officer for every 0.76 square miles in Japan as opposed to one for every 7.1 square miles in the United States. In Tokyo there are 182 policemen per square mile, in New York City only 51. If, therefore, changes in police coverage can affect the crime rate, the crucial ratio would seem to be between policemen and area, not between policemen and population. This argument is rarely made, however; recommendations for increased personnel are usually justified in terms of population growth. Proportionately, the Japanese spend more of their national wealth on policing than Americans do—0.80 per cent of GNP in Japan, 0.56 per cent in the United States. Relative to Japan, then, the United States could afford to increase police personnel in order to lower the policeman/territory ratio. One might speculate that this might, following the Japanese model, reduce crime somewhat.

Contrary to what might be expected, court sentences are not more severe in Japan than in the United States. In recent years about 96.5 per cent of Japanese convicted of crimes were sentenced to payment of a fine, and only 3.5 per cent were sentenced to imprisonment. Moreover, a majority of those sentenced to prison were given a suspended sentence. Though experts agree that these sentences are much more lenient than in the United States, the point is not easy to substantiate statistically. Because of the multiplicity of criminal-justice jurisdictions in the United States, data are not available on average sentences for similar offenses across the country. They are available for Japan, because there is a uniform penal code and a unified court system. One expedient is to compare sentencing in United States federal district courts, for which there is summary information, with all courts of first instance in Japan, on the assumption that court practices concerning federal

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crimes are reflective of judicial norms in state and local courts. In 1971, the average prison sentence given by United States federal district courts was three and one-half years. In the same year in Japan, 94 per cent of persons sentenced to prison terms without labor served one year or less. Fifty per cent of persons sentenced to prison terms with labor served one year or less and 40 per cent more served three years or less. In Japan, therefore, 90 per cent of all persons sentenced to jail terms served not more than three years. Comparing penal sentences for the few crimes common to United States and Japanese criminal codes, the average sentence for counterfeiting is 40 months in the United States, 15 months in Japan; for forging public documents, 31 months in the United States, 11 months in Japan. Stricter sentences are also not the explanation for the dramatically lower rate of narcotics offenses in Japan. Sentences for offenses involving hard drugs in Japan average two years, as opposed to between five and six years in United States. Japanese law does provide for compulsory hospitalization, and the practice is to take addicts off drugs immediately, to go "cold turkey." The death penalty does exist in Japan, and is most commonly given for murder attendant upon robbery. During the period 1968 through 1972, 68 persons were executed—about 13 per year.

In the late 1960's, burning cities and the findings of a national commission prompted Americans to discover violent national traditions generally unacknowledged in history books. Finding that violence was "as American as apple pie," as Rap Brown said, Americans began to blame the past for contemporary criminality. Unfortunately for this line of argument, traditions of violence are by no means unique to the United States. Japan has them as well. Student demonstrations, for example, more sustained and more violent than the antiwar movement in the United States, have been a fixture of Japanese politics for a generation. Assassination of political figures has a much larger place in Japanese history than in American history. And the tradition continues, forcing the Japanese police to maintain close watch over radical groups of both the left and the right. The wounding of Ambassador Reischauer in the early 1960's by a knife-wielding assailant was not nearly as surprising in Japan as it would have been in the United States. Within memory Japan embarked on a brutal and far-flung imperial adventure. Its soldiers, too, have had their My Lai. The samurai warrior, armed with two curved swords, is a prominent figure in contemporary popular culture. Japanese television is as inundated with bloody samurai dramas as American television has been with

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shoot-outs at the OK corral. If America has a cult of the gun, Japan has a cult of the sword. Japanese history is no less blood-soaked or cruel than American history. It would be difficult to argue that contemporary Japanese culture bears fewer traces of its own past than American culture does of its own past.

## Informal social controls

So where do we turn if modernity, congestion, the criminal justice system, or violent traditions do not explain the difference in crime rates? An alternative approach is to free ourselves from American views about the causes of crime and examine what Japanese society does to control deviance that Americans do not customarily consider. Rather than measuring Japanese criminality against American theories, let us consider it against the perspective of Japanese practice.

The key to social discipline in Japan lies in the greater vitality of informal controls over individuals. Japan relies less than the United States on formal institutions of government—such as police, prosecutors, and courts—to curb criminality. Order is maintained through active informal supervision of personal behavior by family, workmates, and neighbors. This informal system has three interlocking features that contrast sharply with American social practices: the vitality of informal groups, the legitimacy of authority, and the assumption by informal groups of responsibility for maintaining social order.

Despite industrialization and urbanization, Japan has preserved the cohesion of small-scale social groups more successfully than the United States. Personal identity for Japanese, who prize mobility and individual autonomy less than Americans do, is dependent on membership in particular groups. Social position is defined more idiosyncratically than in the United States. A Japanese is not just an engineer, but an engineer with Mitsubishi, educated at Tokyo University; not simply a civil servant, but a civil servant in the Accounting Section of the Ministry of Finance with 15 years seniority; not simply a brother, but a brother in the Matsuoka family of the Setagaya ward of Tokyo, formerly of Kurashiki in the Okayama Prefecture; not simply a police officer, but an Inspector in the Crime Prevention Section of the Shibuya Police Station. While in the United States people are also known by their associates, in Japan they are almost unrecognizable without these affiliations. This explains why personal introductions and name cards

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specifying social location are so crucial in Japan. They ensure that the newcomer is affiliated with, and hence responsible to, people who are known and trusted. The American cocktail party makes Japanese acutely uncomfortable because it forces them to interact with anonymous, essentially interchangeable people.

Because of their dependence on particular groups, Japanese are extremely sensitive to the regard of these associates. They shrink from any action that might jeopardize their acceptability, for the greatest calamity that could befall them would be exclusion. Then they would be outcasts, eternal strangers without the emotional fulfillment of belonging. As a result, Japanese have, in the apt phrase of one commentator, a "heightened sense of the fatefulness of their antisocial impulses." Americans, by contrast, value social mobility; they want to be able to pull up stakes, to sever dependency, to be autonomous. It is instructive that the classic American tale of rejection and loss of roots, that of Philip Nolan, the "man without a country," involves statelessness—the loss of national affiliation. The consequences of severing other associations seem to arouse fewer fears for Americans. And, since the Vietnam war, it may be that even national association is less prized than before.

This is not to suggest that Americans do not value the regard of their fellow human beings at work, home, play, worship, and so forth. The difference between Japanese and Americans is not the difference between being "inner-directed" and "other-directed." What is different is the scale and anonymity of the reference groups. Japanese live within stable networks of named people; Americans live in a more impersonal human environment, where people are substitutable. Social constraints in Japan are thus less diffuse than in the United States; they are overlaid with the emotions of personal attachment.

The capacity for exerting the kind of social control found in Japan has been eroded in the United States. For example, a larger proportion of families remain intact in Japan than in the United States. In the United States about four marriages in 10 end in divorce; in Japan, although divorce can be obtained by mutual consent, only one marriage in 10 fails. There are fewer families headed by women in Japan—five per cent versus 12 per cent. The average number of persons living in households is about the same in both countries, approximately 3.2, but the number of persons living alone is greater in the United States. Americans are probably the most mobile people in the world, and this has a direct effect on the cohesiveness of families and neighborhoods. About one

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fifth of all Americans change their residence each year, about half of these moving to another state. By contrast, only about eight per cent of Japanese change residence each year. The average American moves 14 times during his lifetime; the average Japanese, five times. Moreover, Americans move farther, often for thousands of miles. Japanese move within a space somewhat smaller than California, which enhances the opportunity for renewed face-to-face contact with relatives, schoolmates, and friends. Until recently, most Japanese workers, both salaried and hourly, kept the same employer all their lives. Though this situation has changed significantly in the past two decades, labor turnover rates in manufacturing are still half the American rates.

Neighborhoods are also more cohesive in Japan. For example, most have institutions of informal government, known as *chokai*, that collect dues, elect officers, undertake projects, and disseminate information. The *chokai* are not creations of law but rather traditional institutions, centuries old. Similar organizations have been lost in most places in the United States and must now be reinvented, often as a direct response to soaring crime and a need for greater security.

There is, then, a structural difference between Japanese and American society that is critically important to the incidence of crime. Japanese are surrounded by tight networks of known individuals to whom they are connected by blood or shared experience, and whose regard is essential for emotional security. This produces a capacity for informal constraint of behavior that is very much stronger in Japan than in the United States.

## The legitimacy of authority

The Japanese also more readily accept the legitimacy of such informal authority. The characteristic posture of a Japanese before authority is subservience and compliance; the characteristic posture of an American is self-assertion and suspicion, often resentment. Japanese police officers working around American military bases are shocked at the truculence of servicemen caught breaking the law. While Japanese offenders admit their guilt and throw themselves on the mercy of the officer, Americans deny wrongdoing, challenge the officer's right to intervene, and demand to see a lawyer. Guilty pleas in court are more common in Japan than in the United States—95 per cent versus 80 per cent of all prosecutions. Moreover, many of the American guilty pleas are technical—

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the result of plea-bargaining—and do not indicate repentance or admission of error. Plea-bargaining is illegal in Japan. The compliant nature of Japanese offenders is shown by an amazing fact: 90 per cent of all Japanese criminal cases are prosecuted without the necessity of jailing an offender to guarantee his court appearance. At no time from detection through trial is the offender detained.

In the United States, arrest marks the beginning of the criminal justice process; in Japan, the end. Police efficiency is measured in the United States by the proportion of cases "cleared by arrest." Such a figure is meaningless in Japan.

Confronted by authority, Americans struggle and conform; Japanese submit and repent. Admissions of guilt and a display of contrition are conditions for reacceptance of an offender into Japanese society. They indicate that the individual recognizes and acknowledges his transgression against the standards of the community; resocialization has begun. Though contrition is also rewarded in the United States, it is not required for reacceptance. All that is necessary is for the offender to meet the requirements of punishment—to pay his debt, to serve his time.

The efficiency of these two criminal justice systems is sharply affected by the customary responses of the people to authority. Suspects are found by the Japanese police in connection with 57 per cent of all known offenses, while the comparable figure in the United States is a bare 20 per cent. Of these suspects, 68 per cent are prosecuted in Japan, compared with 80 per cent in the United States—a generous estimate based on the rate of prosecution for the FBI's seven categories of serious crime. At these rates, the Japanese prosecute in connection with 38 per cent of known criminal offenses; Americans, 16 per cent. Since admissions of guilt occur in 95 per cent of prosecutions in Japan, and 80 per cent in the United States, conviction is assured with respect to 35 per cent of known offenses in Japan, against 13 per cent in the United States. By the yardstick of convictions, the Japanese criminal justice system is almost three times more efficient than the American.

To the extent that the Japanese criminal justice system deters crime, it does so not because it is severe, but because it is certain. The chances of escaping exposure and censure are much less in Japan than in the United States. The cornerstone of the American philosophy of crime control is deterrence: People will not commit crimes if punishment is prompt and strict. Official action is supposed to reinforce the development of conscience, the internalization of

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moral restraint. Japanese experience suggests that the relationship between formal action of a criminal justice system and the incidence of crime is more complex. Rather than official action prompting compliance with social norms, compliant attitudes toward authority enhance the efficiency of official action. The Japanese police look good because the offender will admit guilt in order to obtain social acceptance. Because authority is informally present throughout society and people accept its legitimacy, criminal justice officials in Japan have a comparatively easier time detecting and prosecuting offenders than their counterparts in the United States. There is a disturbing implication in this for the United States: Once the volume of crime becomes very large, and the system becomes overloaded—as one can argue has already happened in the United States—then both the efficiency of law-enforcement and its deterrent effect decline. Because official efficiency and the volume of crime are reciprocally related, a spiral of increasing crime and decreasing efficiency would be difficult to reverse. Formal systems of control work best when they are needed least. Unfortunately, the converse is also true.

## Law and morality

The last feature in the Japanese system of crime control that needs stressing is the permeability of the boundary between formal and informal authority. Police, prosecutors, and courts possess not merely legal authority, as in the United States, but moral authority as well. Japanese police officers sermonize considerably more often than American officers: They lecture people of all ages and stations on the obligations of being a "proper Japanese," on manners, on courtesies appropriate to elders, on the danger of bad companions, and on the obligations of friendship. Americans tend to separate moral and legal authority, assigning them to different persons—legal authority to policemen, moral authority to priests, teachers, and relatives. They resent the assumption by either set of the other's role. A moral figure that helps the police is a "fink"; a legal figure that sermonizes is told to make a formal charge or else "bug off."

Formal and informal roles, legal and moral ones, interpenetrate in Japan because government is not considered a created entity—it is not the result of an explicit act of fabrication by an existing community, the product of making a constitution. Government is not added on to community; it is intrinsic to community, as par-

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entage is to family. Its role is larger than law, and consequently more difficult to circumscribe. Government officials, such as policemen, have a legitimacy, a moral stature, that they do not have in the United States. They are agents of the community's moral consensus as well as its statutory prescriptions.

The homogeneity of the Japanese population has undoubtedly been important in allowing community and government, morality and law, informal and formal authority, to become combined. Because subcultural groups are few and their numbers very small, there is almost universal agreement on what it means to be Japanese, as well as the value of being so. The largest minority group, two per cent of the population today, are the *burakumin*, historically outcasts who performed menial and unclean tasks, such as butchering and leather-working. They are not physically distinct, and to most Japanese are an "invisible race." The next largest minority groups are the Koreans, one half of one per cent of the population, and the Chinese, scarcely more than one quarter of one per cent. Altogether, less than three per cent of the population have minority status, and the majority of these are solidly Japanese in appearance and culture. While the melting pot of American society is still bubbling and giving off smoke and fumes, Japanese society has produced an ingot of uniform quality.

As Japanese policemen are accepted as moral actors, Japanese citizens are expected to assist policemen actively. The responsibility for maintaining law and order does not belong exclusively to police, prosecutors, and judges. The roles of private citizen and public official mutually interpenetrate. For example, almost every neighborhood in Japan has a crime prevention association composed of citizen volunteers and led by their own officials. These associations, working closely with local police stations, distribute material on household security, warn residents about new forms of crime, post reminders in public places about the importance of telephoning the police promptly if any suspicious events occur, maintain half a million "contact points" in private homes where crime-prevention information may be obtained, and sell special locks and fasteners for doors and windows. In many neighborhoods the associations organize street patrols, some with distinctive uniforms, that give special attention to monitoring the behavior of juveniles during the evening hours in popular entertainment areas. Officers in each police station are designated to work with the associations; they are also given office space and secretarial assistance. Planning and operation of the associations are strictly matters of local initiative,

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though the associations are organized into prefectural and national federations. Each level receives some financial contribution from a parallel level of government—*chokai,* ward, city, prefecture, or nation.

Americans, on the other hand, are unsure of their relations with the police when they are not charged with an offense. Though recognizing that they have a duty to cooperate with the police, they interpret this narrowly, and have devised no mechanisms for giving assistance to the police in an organized, reliable, routine way. Though vigorously defending the right of self-defense, Americans believe that policing should be left to formal authorities. They are suspicious of individuals who go out of their way to lend assistance. Group assistance especially has bad reputation, having become associated in American history with vigilantism. In American tradition, citizen assistance does not supplement police activities, it supplants them. It springs from a breakdown of formal control and is therefore apt to be unregulated and lawless. In recent years, attempts have been made to organize block and neighborhood crime-prevention associations, largely in core areas of major cities. Very often they are regarded by law-enforcement personnel as meddling nuisances or outright threats to law and order.

In summary, the fundamental reason why Japan has a crime rate that is significantly lower than the United States is because its people are encapsulated by familiar small-scale groups that articulate norms of right behavior—norms that are similar from group to group—and apply informal pressure to conform. Economic growth, industrialization, and technological modernization have not produced social atomization in Japan. Though Japan has experienced the same great economic changes as the United States during the past century, its society remains vitally cellular. The economic and social basis for grouping has changed, but the subordination of individuals to groups with responsibility for them remains. Japan is unique among industrial societies in its ability to create and maintain tribe-like groups of small scale. This is fundamental to maintaining low levels of criminality.

The small size of Japan also makes some contribution to its relative peaceableness, but it is unclear how much. While the policemen are concentrated, so too are the people, creating congestion that would be intolerable to many Americans. The size of Japan also reduces the fragmenting effects of mobility. It is tempting to say that limited space has forced the Japanese to learn to live

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together, that tribalization stems from overcrowding. But there is surely nothing necessary about a response of this sort to crowding. If the citizens of other nations—the United States, for example—were similarly congested, they would simply turn on one another, raising the incidence of violence and mayhem. Customs and values, not geography or density, are the important determinants of Japanese orderliness.

## The future of the American system

Two final observations about crime and law enforcement in the United States are prompted by this examination of the Japanese experience. First, the levels of criminal behavior that Americans find so disturbing may be the inevitable consequence of aspects of national life that Americans prize—individualism, mobility, privacy, autonomy, suspicion of authority, and separation between public and private roles, between government and community. The United States may have relatively high levels of criminality because it is inhabited by Americans.

Second, given American traditions, it is questionable whether law enforcement agencies can be much more effective in curbing criminality than they are now. The record so far would indicate that government, unless supported by more vigorous informal social sanctions, cannot contain crime without running the risk of transforming the scope and character of its operations in ways that would threaten other values basic to the American way of life. Moreover, reliance on formal agencies of the criminal justice system may be more than merely ineffective—it may undermine their public support. It is more than a coincidence that rising concern with crime in the United States is accompanied by fierce criticism of the criminal justice system. Though different people have their particular scapegoats, most would agree that the "system" is not working well. Of course it is not: It is being asked to do what it cannot do—namely, take the place of decaying processes of informal social control. Americans are in the tragic and paradoxical position of depending more and more on law-enforcement institutions whose authority they increasingly question and reject.

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# Management and the "post-industrial" society

THEODORE LEVITT

As if the world's industrial nations didn't already have enough troubles, we are now offered a new malady that shatters whatever slight faith remains in the meliorating possibilities of abundance. This is to the effect that we are entering a world of economic entropy: The more economically advanced that nations become, the less their living standards will rise—until, finally, those standards begin to fall.

Advanced goods-producing nations, it is said, become goods-satiated and service-hungry. As affluence waxes, the demand for goods wanes—a third family car seems less urgently needed than the second; after one refrigerator, another is a marginal convenience. On the other hand, the demand for travel, education, entertainment, eating out, health care, and other services accelerates both absolutely and relatively. More of the nation's work shifts from the production worker to the lower-level service worker and the upper-level "knowledge worker," whose activities have only limited access to the kinds of industrial and science-based technologies that so profoundly increased productivity in manufacturing and farming in the last hundred years. Hence costs and prices rise more rapidly, and a structural malignancy increasingly creeps into the economy. As we want relatively more of the things

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that cost relatively more to produce, the less well-off we shall become. Thus the anomaly of our age: Economic progress "immiserizes" itself.

The most sophisticated version of this gloomy prognosis is contained in the account of the coming "post-industrial" society, which elaborately describes the nature and consequences of this structural shift from a production to a service economy.[1] This account is indeed based on some facts and is, on its face, plausible enough.

In the past 15 years, the non-goods-producing sector of the United States nonagricultural labor force rose 52 per cent, versus 38 per cent for the goods-producing sector. Civilian government employment alone rose 148 per cent. While the growing numbers of service and knowledge workers (retail clerks, janitors, repairmen, waiters, scientists, teachers, government employees, and professional and technical workers in medicine, health care, law, and the like) plod ingloriously to produce about as much today as they did 20 years ago, the output of industrial workers expands with the help of automated machines, factory systems, cybernetic controls, and fluid processors. As industrial productivity rises, so do industrial wages. Unless the incomes of service workers also rise, they will suffer from the unequal distribution of productivity gains. But their incomes *do* rise. In the past 15 years, their real incomes have risen nearly as fast as those of industrial workers—82 per cent versus 94 per cent. Between 1968 and 1973 alone, salaries of federal government employees rose an average of 9.1 per cent a year, salaries of local police and firemen 7.3 per cent a year, and salaries of industrial production workers only 6.6 per cent a year. But since service *productivity* presumably lags substantially, rising service wages force everybody to share the consequent inflation and lowered standards of living.

The "post-industrial" society thus seems to be in the malignant grip of its own differential achievements and conflicting desires. Uneven productivity rates and the rapid expansion of the less productive sector create a structural "cost-push" inflation. This in turn is inflamed by what Daniel Bell calls a "revolution of entitle-

[1] Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York, Basic Books, 1973), especially chapters 2 and 3. A more succinct and also unqualified statement of the economic consequences of this structural shift is in Bell's recent essay, "Changing Influences in American Life," *Business and Society in Change* (New York, American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 1975), pp. 65-82. Most of the references in my article are to the 1973 book.

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ments"—the crescive insistence that government should assure everybody a wide range of minimum rights and benefits.

Bell concludes that this "structural . . . problem . . . can be overcome only by somehow finding methods to increase productivity in the service sector." In this conclusion, he is joined by many others. Peter Drucker writes flatly, "The only feasible solution to our economic problem is to raise productivity, and the only way to accomplish this is by raising the productivity of knowledge work"—that is, the work of the upper service ranks, the "managers, engineers, computer programmers, or medical technologists . . . the skilled and semiskilled knowledge workers who are where the growth is and is going to be." Similarly, the President's National Commission on Productivity, made up of practical men of affairs from the upper echelons of business, agriculture, and labor, declared in its 1971 policy statement that "there has been lagging productivity growth within . . . government, the various services, construction, trade, finance, insurance, and real estate" and that their underperformance threatens "a higher standard of living and a better quality of life."

## Service productivity

The problem, then, is whether it is possible to make the service economy in the 20th century as productive as manufacturing became in the 19th century. "How can we do it?" Drucker asks, and responds: "No one has any answers. . . ." Most people seem to believe there *is* no answer. Fortunately there is.

First, however, some moderating propositions: 1) The goods-producing fecundity of industrial society has not been homogenous—its productive prowess has been exaggerated; 2) the productive advances of the service sector have been widely understated and its potentials badly underestimated; and 3) government employment, the most heavily labor-intensive portion of the service sector, though in explosive growth since 1960, is now visibly headed for both a proportional and an absolute decline. Finally, and this is the heart of the matter: The gloomy account of a low-productivity service economy is rooted in an almost wanton disregard of the historical role and future possibilities of the managerial arts for improving labor productivity.

If these propositions are right, the supposed consequences of the supposedly unique structure of the "post-industrial" society are far less real or worrisome than advertised. Nobody really dis-

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agrees about the need for more productivity in the service sector. *Fortunately, we are getting it, we know why, and we know how to get more.*

What is crucially missing in most assessments concerning the possibility of increasing service-sector productivity is any serious consideration of exactly what accounts for the great productivity of the goods-producing industries. We are offered only confident and conventional assertions, based largely on orthodox but unexamined dogma, and very little on any analysis of actual historical situations. Indeed, the conventional "facts" about what produced the magnificent thrusts of productivity in the goods-producing sectors are largely "factoids," merely imaginary as regards historical facts and their relative importance. Overlooked is what I will argue was specifically the most important element in the success of the industrial age—the element of "management."

Ignoring the role of management in the growth of industrial systems *ipso facto* exaggerates the importance of machines and the artifacts of production. Since those machines and artifacts are not presumed to be present or easily usable in service industries today, gloomy conclusions are understandably reached about the future productivity of the expanding service sector, and therefore about the future living standards of the "post-industrial" society.

On the other hand, if the enormous abundance of the industrial age was the product not of new technology but rather of the art of management—that strangely neglected and often rudely dismissed field of activity—then one must consider whether management could also play such a fructifying role in the service economy. I believe that it can—and that evidence on behalf of this thesis is already plentiful.

## The role of management

Management as a practical art originally developed in the conduct of war. Even today, tables of organization and the language of industrial management derive from the military concepts of "line" and "staff." The industrial revolution gradually adopted and expanded these concepts and procedures. Today management is understood and acknowledged as the unique and central characteristic of that revolution, by those who really know the inner workings of modern industry. Management is *the* primary engine of progress, as progress is generally defined. The crucial importance of management has been eclipsed by the historians' almost

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obsessively childlike fascination with the technological artifacts of 19th-century industry and the flamboyant entrepreneurs of that era. But the precise story of how those entrepreneurs rendered those artifacts—the machines, engines, tools, and crude instruments—productive has not yet been properly told to this day. Neither Lewis Mumford nor Max Weber—and certainly not Karl Marx—ever bothered to explore the specific details of the functional roles played by industrial organizers and managers.

The significance of management in the creation and development of the industrial age can perhaps best be understood by noting how long it took for the available technology actually to create that age. Technologically speaking, the industrial age began in Milan around 1335, with the gear-driven time clock. It contained all the mechanical hardware and engineering know-how we associate with the machinery of the industrial revolution in the 19th century. But it took Eli Whitney, in New Haven in 1798, to wrest the available technology from the dead hands of isolated medieval craftsmen and put it into the more productive hands of organized unskilled labor. Whitney's contribution was less technological than managerial. To assemble interchangeable musket parts, he created large-scale factories where there had been one-man shops; he organized, directed, and controlled groups of workers to do with existing technologies what had previously been done singly and alone.

It took over 400 years to go from the clock to the musket factory, and Whitney's contribution was precisely the work of what we call today the "manager." He was also an entrepreneur, but that part of his activity has almost totally obscured a more arduous and encompassing aspect—his role as a serious organizer and manager.

Management consists of the rational assessment of a situation and the systematic selection of goals and purposes (what is to be done?); the systematic development of strategies to achieve those goals; the marshalling of the required resources; the rational design, organization, direction, and control of the activities required to attain the selected purposes; and, finally, the motivating and rewarding of people to do the work. Whitney's idea of interchangeable parts for manufacturing muskets might be said—in the profundity of hindsight—to have led "inescapably" to the creation of the mass-production factory. But it was hardly obvious then—nor was it, in fact, a century later. Henry Ford's singular contribution was not that he invented, or even reinvented, the

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assembly line. He didn't—he merely rediscovered it while witnessing the operation of Julius Rosenwald's Sears, Roebuck mail-order warehouse in Chicago, where roving clerks assembled orders by picking items off the shelves. Ford's unique insight was that the potential buyer's real problem was getting enough money to buy a car, and he set out to solve that problem by finding a way to make cars more cheaply. (On the other hand Ford might have invented installment credit to solve the problem—a "solution" that came later.) The solution derived largely from Ford's seminal reconceptualization of the engineering of the automobile, making it an assembled rather than a constructed machine. If he had not redesigned the automobile as an assembly of parts, it could not have been manufactured on an assembly line, where the shift from independent craftsmen working alone to unskilled multitudes working together—under highly ordered and closely supervised conditions—helped control quality, productivity, and costs.

The functional rationality which characterizes the cognitive mode of management makes a difference. Technology is not enough. It is one of the great modern mysteries that, although so much is owed by our times to the organizing and productive genius of management, the world must constantly be reminded of this fact, which it seems so obstinately reluctant to learn and believe. And, curiously, it is precisely in the world's intellectual enclaves—in the universities, and among writers and journalists—that this obstinacy reaches its apex. Somehow, results are presumed to happen as if by immaculate conception. It is well to appreciate what the absence of good management can mean in our daily lives. For example, it is a fact now unanimously acknowledged by those who understand that, after the Arab oil embargo in November 1973, it took only one week of intensive around-the-clock work by the managers of the oil industry to rearrange completely the entire sourcing, shipping, pipelining, and delivery of the world's oil and petroleum products to get things back on a new, functioning track. I have been told personally by extremely high-placed government officials in Europe, the United States, and Japan that they viewed this as an almost miraculous achievement that none of the governments themselves could conceivably have accomplished. Compare this to the pathetic logistical blunder in late 1975—by Nigerian government officials well trained in economics at the best British universities—that resulted in a massive glut of 120 cement-laden cargo ships in Lagos harbor with no place to dock and no space or little use for their loads.

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Or, consider the venerable business of manufacturing textiles and wearing apparel. In 1969, Czechoslovakian labor productivity in these industries was 56 per cent above that of Hungary. For every 100 workers needed to do the job in Hungary, only 69 were needed in Czechoslovakia. Each Czech worker, aided by more machinery than the Hungarian worker, consumed 4,080 kilowatt hours of electricity a year, against 3,108 for the Hungarian worker. But though the Czech worker consumed on the average 31 per cent more electricity, he produced 56 per cent more goods. It is not that the Czech electric machinery was more modern or that there was more of it; it was that the manufacturing process was better managed. Understandably, even though the state rules both economies, the Czech citizen pays less for his clothes than does the Hungarian. In the end, it is the nature and quality of management that makes the real difference.

## Variations in productivity

In order to assess the possible effects of a shift to a service economy, it is necessary to have a clear picture of the realities of the goods-producing economy.

The amount of capital per employed worker in an industry is an accepted measure of the level of its industrialization. The difference between the value of the materials used and the value of what results from the manufacturing process measures the "productivity" (or "value added") of those employed in the effort. "Value added" per employed person is *the* accepted measure of labor productivity. The automobile assembly line is the prototypical example of the productive rewards of replacing human with machine effort. But compared to oil refining, auto manufacturing is a backward industry. In 1972, the United States oil industry used $173,600 in plant, equipment, and other assets for every single one of its workers; the motor vehicle industry used $22,600. The "value added" per oil refinery employee was $41,600; per motor vehicle plant employee it was only $22,400—relatively greater but absolutely less than in refining. In the fabricated-metals industries (which are heavy suppliers of parts and subassemblies to the auto, machine-tool, trucking, railroad, and other important technology-based industries), the "value added" per employee was only $18,200. While the investment per fabricated-metals employee was $146,930 lower than in the oil industry, it was also $6,000 less than in the food-manufacturing industry. Ob-

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viously, the goods-producing sector of the American economy is neither homogenously capital-intensive nor uniformly productive.

The industrial society we knew prior to World War II, which remains in declining dominance today, was the creation of what Daniel Bell refers to as "inspired tinkerers"—Whitney, McCormick, Ford, Kettering, and even Alexander Graham Bell. They symbolize the triumph of trial-and-error mechanics over raw nature. Now we have the ascendance of science—theoretical knowledge over practical knowledge. Or, so it is claimed. Bell explains: "The science-based industries of the 1970's—electronics, optics, polymers—begin and end with theoretical knowledge. Consequently . . . knowledge becomes an extraordinary strategic resource." There the new productive leverage is supposed to lie, and it does—to a degree. Consider the computer: Starting with Univac in 1952, it is already in its fourth generation. Since 1952, every seven years there has been a tenfold increase in electronic computing speed and productivity. All this is presumed the work of "science."

But is it that simple? The production of integrated circuits and microprocessors (the heart of the new generation of computer electronics) starts with the design of a desired set of circuits. The design, it is true, ultimately derives from a body of theory, or "pure" knowledge. But the designing itself is laboriously done by engineers at a drawing table. These designs are photographically reduced and reproduced by means of a pattern generator that creates a master mask, which is then multiplied in vast numbers ("chips") onto single crystal wafers by means of a photorepeater. Yet both the pattern generator and the photorepeater are themselves manufactured singly by skilled craftsmen working in a manner not much different than that of the medieval clock-maker in effort, attention to metal-working precision, and solitary pride. The runners on which the photorepeater's filming equipment moves are constructed by craftsmen who laboriously grind, sand, and polish metal by hand for days—an effort much like the finishing of the world's most powerful telescope by technicians from Holland, who entered their apprenticeship at age 14. If you measure productivity by the metal shavings and dust the craftsman produces, he cannot compare even to the unskilled worker of 1856 who operated a pedal-driven mechanical grinding wheel in the McCormick reaper plant in Chicago. Yet such a craftsman—whose education was probably limited to a vocational high school in Muncie, Indiana—is a crucial member of that superlatively efficient, science-based knowledge industry, electronics.

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And the manufacturing of the microcircuit chips and microprocessors is by any modern measure the least efficient of industries. A plant is regarded as highly efficient if it yields five per cent usable output out of every batch "cooked" during the first year of a new circuit's production. In subsequent years, 20 per cent is considered acceptable and 30 per cent stupendous, almost miraculous —the remainder are scrapped. What would we say of Detroit's technological might if 70 out of every 100 cars coming off the assembly line were scrapped at the factory?

Bell declares that science-based industries "begin and end with theoretical knowledge." Begin, yes—but not end. Who are considered among the most valued workers in the integrated circuit industry? The handful of people who run the "ovens" that "cook" the chips and microprocessors. They are almost regarded as alchemists, possessing arcane skills that cannot be transmitted by observation or learned by university study. "Learning" is by trial and error, and things often go inexplicably awry, even for the possessors of the secret formulae, carefully recorded in heavily guarded recipe books. No wonder that the most despicable crime in this most "scientific" of knowledge industries is the piracy of a "cooker," a person whose value derives not from theoretical knowledge or college education, but from the same kind of artful (even "primitive") tinkering typical of Whitney, McCormick, and Kettering. True, without prior developments in theoretical knowledge, the "cookers" would never have had a chance to learn their practical arts. True also that Dr. Charles Townsend could not have invented the laser without the theoretical knowledge of optics, physics, and advanced electromechanics. The situation now is wholly different than it was in the time of Thomas Edison, who achieved spectacular results although he was not familiar with the works of Michael Faraday and others. Conditions *have* changed. We *are* more dependent on knowledge than before. But we ought not exaggerate that dependence.

Though the integrated circuit, the child of theoretical knowledge, is capable of enormous productivity and can be more efficiently produced relative to its performance capabilities than its predecessor, the transistor, its manufacturing process (as well as that of the microprocessor) contradicts the lyrical claims made for the productive advances of the more sophisticated goods-producing industries. Thinking things up is not the same as making things happen. It is not merely that there still are a lot of slips between the cup and the lip. It is simply that though science-

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based industries may begin with theoretical knowledge, they do not *end* with it. Translation of knowledge into results is almost purely a matter of "tinkering"—and, more importantly, a matter of management.

The gap between the scientific origins and the technological practices of the electronics industry is a microcosm of all others. The goods-producing sector is not homogeneously productive on all fronts—not even within given "standard industrial-classification" categories. It may seem permissible to generalize about the differences between goods-producing and service-producing sectors in the rates of productive advances, but such generalization is both unwarranted and misleading. The latest studies, published in 1973, by John W. Kendrick, America's eminent "productivity" scholar, show the following annual rates of productivity increases in United States manufacturing industries between 1948 and 1966: foods, 3.0 per cent; beverages, 2.2 per cent; tobacco, 1.1 per cent; paper, 2.5 per cent; chemicals, 4.9 per cent; stone, clay, glass, 2.4 per cent; primary metals, 1.6 per cent; electric machinery, 3.7 per cent. In a previous study for the period 1899-1953, his calculations showed the following average annual rates of increase: foods, 1.7 per cent; beverages, 1.6 per cent; tobacco, 3.5 per cent; paper, 2.3 per cent; chemicals, 2.9 per cent; stone, clay, glass, 2.6 per cent; primary metals, 1.9 per cent; electric machinery, 2.2 per cent.

Obviously, the rates are not homogenous within manufacturing, or between time periods. And this is the case outside the United States, as well. A 1972 United Nations study showed that the relative productivity per employed person in manufacturing industries exhibited wide variations: In 1969, France was 29.9 per cent above Czechoslovakia; Czechoslovakia 17.8 per cent above Austria; Austria 57 per cent above Hungary. What seems clear is that productivity varies not only among manufacturing industries and nations, but by stages in industrial life cycles as well.

## Utilizing technology

To speak of the goods-producing sector as more "productive" or more steadily expanding in productive efficiency than the service-producing sector is to enlist a few facts into an excessively encompassing generalization.

Between 1899 and 1953, the average annual productivity increase in the United States railroads was 2.6 per cent; in local transit, 2.5 per cent; in telephone service, 2.0 per cent. Each of

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these *service* industries did better during this half century than industries manufacturing foods, beverages, apparel, lumber products, leather products, primary metals, nonelectric machinery, and furniture.

Though service productivity has generally lagged behind goods productivity, what distinguishes the better-performing service industries is the enormous help they get from technology. The capital invested in America's railroads rose each year (save four) from 1869 to 1931. In 1931, the real (that is, adjusted for price changes) new investment in the railroad industry, in spite of proliferating bankruptcies, was still five per cent above the 1889 figure. The capital invested in the telephone and telegraph industries has risen dramatically each decade from 1879 until today.

Thus the great technological flowering of the industrial sector has also helped the service sector, and in some cases has produced productivity expansion much more dramatic in the latter than in the former. There is no presumption that things will or must be different in the "post-industrial" society. Recent developments are, in fact, quite promising.

Victor R. Fuchs, the leading scholar on the productivity characteristics of service industries, has no trouble confirming that, in the aggregate, the output per man hour in the United States service sector is about half that of the manufacturing sector. *But in recent decades, service productivity has actually grown faster than manufacturing.* Between 1929 and 1965, the productivity growth of the industrial sector exceeded that of the service sector by an average of only .2 percentage points per year. The service industries are catching up. Indeed, in this same period the growth in two service industries actually exceeded the average of the whole manufacturing sector: transportation was higher by 1.4 percentage points; communications and public utilities, by 2.6 percentage points.

Those two were, of course, heavy beneficiaries of technology. But the technological achievements and possibilities in other service industries are widely unappreciated. Fuchs reports three case studies that help make the point. Consider beauty and barber shops. When the safety razor shifted shaving from the barber shop to the home, the demand for haircuts also declined because men visited barber shops less frequently. This reduced the number of productive hours barbers spent during a given workday and the amount of the average transaction. Since these are indices of "productivity," the *measured* productivity of barbers declined—though

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not their efficiency or actual productivity. In beauty shops there was an opposite trend. With the development of better permanent-wave equipment and hair dyes, these services have increased both transaction size and traffic. The accelerated traffic stimulated the creation of even better and faster equipment and dyes, thus raising productivity and traffic even more. All this has been augmented by single transactions that increasingly combine women's haircuts and shampoos. Now, with the sudden shift in men's hair fashions, the frequency of visits by men to barber shops has risen, as has the price of "hair styling"—and consequently the productivity of barber shops.

## Assessing mass transit

These examples help explain the peculiar productivity figures in mass transportation. More people per capita now fly more planes, more often than formerly took trains. Both the train and the plane created quantum increases in real efficiency over their respective predecessors. Yet railroad productivity suffers today, as did barbershops for a while, not because these industries work less well but because fewer people patronize them. Indeed, the measuring system systematically underreports the efficiency of railroads, as it does the efficiency of airlines, because it does not account for the value of time and money. Reuben Gronau's 1970 study for the National Bureau of Economic Research on the value of time in passenger transportation shows that for trips exceeding 176 miles, the time saved in flying relative to train or bus travel, though not measured as a benefit in conventional productivity calculation, adds an enormous increment to the results of that calculation. The plane today (like the train in the past) is thus even more productive in its new applications than is reported, if we include its positive externalities—the time freed for its users' other concerns and the value of money freed from financing the inventory of in-transit products.

The same is actually true of the relationship between public mass transportation and the private automobile. Productivity in mass transportation has declined because, for the most part, patronage has declined. But when the productivity of its alternative, the automobile, is measured in terms of the benefits perceived by its owners, the automobile clearly becomes more efficient even than a fully utilized subway. *Free Transit,* an exhaustive preference and attitude study of Boston-area residents by Thomas A.

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Domencich and Gerald Kraft, shows the "almost complete insensitivity of [mass] transit's share of the market to such transit-system performance variables as its fare or times [i.e., speed]." The convenience, flexibility, and privacy of the automobile are what is valued, even given the substantially higher per-mile costs. No wonder San Francisco's elegant new BART transit system—quiet, comfortable, spacious, fast, running at frequent regular intervals, and now reasonably reliable; with big, free, well lighted parking lots at suburban stations—is now operating at only 40 per cent of expected revenue, and not getting better.

And no wonder that distinguished transit economist and historian George W. Hilton, in his 1974 study of the Urban Mass Transit Assistance program, said that almost all UMTA experimental programs were a flop. No wonder that in a 1974 referendum, Los Angeles area voters overwhelmingly rejected a proposed new 146-mile mass-transit subway system. What they had—their cars—was better, even conceding the cost of the government support system (roads and police, for example) that "subsidize" the private automobile. (But the motorists are *not* subsidized. They pay taxes for what they get.) In the end, had the Los Angeles subway been built, its most notable contribution would have been a further reduction in the reported "productivity" rates of the nation's mass-transit statistics. More technology would have produced less reported productivity because of underutilization. The problem with productivity statistics in the service sector is that they so often fail to measure the total benefits (the externalities, like time and convenience) or to account for shifts to new classifications (like from the live theater to the movies), or are distorted by the underutilization that results from the choice of higher-valued, though not always more costly, alternatives.

When it is said that the "post-industrial" or knowledge-worker society can avoid inflation and the cannibalization of its own living standards only by making service somehow as productive as the technology-based and science-based industries, that is not wrong. But there is nothing inherently more productive about technology. If people don't want the output or resist machines *per se*, the yield of technology will be less, not more.

## The "productivity problem"

Nor does it follow that service is inherently less capable of employing the technologies which, on the average, make manu-

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facturing more productive than service. We have already noted some cases. On more familiar grounds, consider the movies: They vastly raised the productivity of actors who previously performed on stage, night after night, to a few hundred patrons. The same is true of television versus movies. If our productivity data were assembled in terms of the "entertainment sector"—rather than its separate and descriptively arbitrary components, like "motion pictures" and "theaters"—the reported results would be vastly different. As things stand, the results look terrible, but the reality is pretty good: It is actually not the "theater" or the "movies" that people want, but "entertainment." The explosive advances that the movies and then television generated in units of entertainment productivity in their very infancy were greater by magnitudes than the increases made by such pioneers of industrial standardization and mass production as the manufacturers of muskets after the Revolutionary War or the manufacturers of army uniforms in the Civil War.

The "productivity problem" of the service industries is actually being "solved" more rapidly than it originally was in the goods-producing industries. As we have seen, it took over 400 years to go from the clock to Eli Whitney's musket factory. By that standard, the "productivity problem" in manufacturing took a very long time to get "solved." By contrast, the very first commercially produced computer instantly replaced the hand labor of thousands of inefficient and erratic office workers employed in the weekly preparation of corporate payrolls. But the resultant productivity improvements in this service activity did not appear in the statistics. They were buried (and still are) in the gross figures of the industries for which such payrolls are prepared.

The computer is an example of the substitution of productivity-enhancing technology for low-productivity service workers. Other examples are the substitution of coffee-vending machines for waitresses, automatic check-cashing machines for bank tellers, self-operated travel-insurance machines for clerks. In numerous other cases, technology enhances the productivity of people rather than totally substituting for them: typewriters to replace quills and ink; electroencephalograms (and now, electronic brain scanners) to increase the speed and accuracy of neurologists, neurosurgeons, and neuroradiologists; detergents and motorized equipment to increase the productivity, improve the quality of work, and alleviate the burden of scrubwomen; electric tools and electronic diagnostic equipment to speed up, lessen, and improve the work of the auto

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repairman; credit cards to substitute a single credit decision for the many elaborate, costly, repetitive, labor-intensive, and often dignity-destroying activities and decisions that retail purchases and bank loans formerly entailed. Even that most celebrated and isolated knowledge worker, the scholar, now has at his disposal a computerized research service that provides in minutes a perfect hard-copy citation of every professional journal reference of every single publication by, say, Daniel Patrick Moynihan. If Moynihan were a chemist, the scholar could also get an abstract of every listed citation. This miracle comes through the courtesy of Lockheed Information Services, a subsidiary of the aeronautics company whose recent bout with bankruptcy was so gleefully cheered by so many condescending scholars. Examples proliferate everywhere, accounting in part for the productivity increases regularly reported in most service activities.

## The new service fecundity

The industrialization of service is still in its infancy. Perhaps the most important aspect of this process, however, is hidden. While computers, credit cards, electric hair dryers, electric hand tools, typewriters, and the like have already produced substantial productivity gains, the involvement of an entirely different facet of industrialization is even more promising—the use of manufacturing rationality, what we now call management, in the service sector. The power tools, jigs, machines, electronic controls, turbines, chemical processors, and all the knowledge that created them do not in themselves explain the productivity of manufacturing. More important is how all these are managed. Only recently has this kind of management systematically entered into the service industries.

For over a century, historians and economists have emphasized inventions and machines to explain economic development—conceptually combining these in the taxonomy of "land, labor, and capital," and later adding the notions of an "acquisitive spirit" and a "congenial state." What has been neglected, except in the disparaged netherlands of business literature, is an account of the rational management of economic processes. Although management has occasionally been treated by respected thinkers such as Max Weber, it has been regarded as a separate sociological topic, under the subheading of "bureaucracy." Yet, as we have seen, what makes scientific knowledge, inventions, and machines productive

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is not their mere existence, but how they are used—how they are directed, organized, and managed in a complex manufacturing setting.

Bell does not, of course, ignore this point, but he does not note its primordial importance. Indeed, he seldom even uses the word "management." (It appears mostly peripherally, in casual footnotes quoting trivialities by Lenin and Frederick W. Taylor.) When the word is occasionally used, it is as a passive noun (like "scientist") rather than as a functional discipline (like "science"). The closest Bell comes to a serious recognition of the managerial function is in a solitary one-line reference to "professional administrators"—significant in itself, because if management is anything, it is *not* administration. Management selects ends and means; it organizes, plans, directs, controls, and motivates. Administration merely executes.

When facts and logic push Bell's analysis into the general vicinity of managerial activities, his description substitutes strained circumspection for practical familiarity: Historically, according to Bell, "productivity, as a concept, became possible only through a new 'supporting system' which dictated the placement of machines in a new way. To put the matter less abstractly, modern industrial society is a product of two 'new men,' the engineer and the economist." Bell writes that the engineer designs and arranges machines in the "one best way," while "the economist introduces a calculus of monetary costs, within a framework of relative prices, as a means of finding the most appropriate mix of men and machines in the organization of production."

It is not disrespectful to suggest that no known economist of any academic stature ever came within even telescopic range of the practical labor of production. The economist came *after*, not before the industrial system. Yet Bell asserts more than once the putative priority of the economist's view in the history of industrial affairs: "With economics comes a rational division of labor, specialization of functions, complementarity of relations, the use of production functions . . . programming . . . etc." Historically, this puts the cart before the horse. Adam Smith first wrote about such notions in 1776, but they were drawn from his observations of what already existed. It is surely significant that Smith's *Wealth of Nations* begins on the very first page not with theories or prescriptions, but with the description of the division of labor in pin-making—an enterprise already in existence, the result not of the theories of an economist, but of the imagination and enterprise

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of a practical manufacturer who simply did what seemed sensible. Linking economics and economists to the success of the industrial system while completely ignoring the work of organizers and managers describes not history, but instead our own tendency to elevate formal conceptual schemes over plain labor.

I hope to show that the involvement of management in the service sector will substantially alter the conclusions suggested by the concept of the "post-industrial" society. The conspicuous absence in the service sector of the manufacturing mode of thought described by Adam Smith—this practical rationality we call management—accounts for much of the historic lag of the service sector behind the industrial sector and, indeed, the lag of some industrial societies behind others. This conspicuous absence in history has been matched only by scholarly neglect of the subject of management. Yet some examples will illustrate how management, which is itself a technology—though a "soft" technology, it is nonetheless a conscious routine of establishing purposes, goals, and priorities, and a rational system for getting results—is being "rediscovered" and employed to vastly raise the productivity of the service sector.

## "Fast food" technology

Take the case of food. Most of us buy most of it in the supermarket—a part of the retailing branch of the service sector. It represents an enormous advance in productivity over the corner grocery store, where a single clerk filled an order one item at a time while the customer waited. The supermarket substitutes fast and efficient self-service for the slow, inefficient, and often erratic clerk. The customer is a cooperating agent in the production process —and this is also the case with laundromats, cafeterias, and, more traditionally, schools and churches, where study and prayer by the "customers" of education and religion help produce the products themselves.

The supermarket is obviously more efficient than its predecessor. Interestingly, it models the automotive assembly line. The final product (in this case, the parcel of purchased goods) is assembled from the product inventory of the store, just as a car is assembled from the parts inventory of the factory. Though the customer does most of the production work, customer satisfaction is higher. The supermarket is a triumph of entrepreneurship and management over immemorial custom.

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On the other hand, take the case of food that is eaten out. Consider McDonald's. Few of today's successful new commercial ventures have antecedents that are more humble and less glamorous. Yet the thriving nationwide chain of McDonald's hamburger outlets is a supreme example of the application of manufacturing and industrial systems in a service industry. From 1961 to 1974, McDonald's annual sales rose from $54 million to $729 million. During this remarkable ascent, the White Tower chain, whose name had been practically synonymous throughout the land with low-priced, quick-service hamburgers, practically vanished.

The explanation of the thundering success of McDonald's is not a purely fiscal one—e.g., the argument that it is financed by independent local entrepreneurs who bring to their operations a quality of commitment and energy not commonly found among hired workers. Nor is it a purely geographical one—e.g., the argument that each outlet draws its patronage from a relatively small area, thus enabling the number of outlets to multiply easily and quickly. The relevant explanation must deal with the central question of why each individual McDonald's outlet is so predictably successful, why each is so certain to attract so many repeat customers.

Most important are the customer-satisfying consequences of the carefully controlled execution of each outlet's central function—the rapid delivery of a uniform, high-quality mix of low-priced prepared foods in an environment of cleanliness, order, and cheerful courtesy. The systematic substitution of equipment for people, the carefully planned positioning and use of technology, and the meticulous management and use of labor enable McDonald's to attract and hold patronage to a degree no predecessor or imitator has managed to duplicate.

Consider the remarkable ingenuity of the system, which is worth examining in some detail. To start with the obvious: Raw hamburger patties are carefully premeasured and prepackaged in a capital-intensive central commissary, thus leaving neither the franchisee nor his employees any discretion as to size, quality, or consistency. This kind of carefully controlled attention is given to all McDonald's products and activities. Each outlet's storage and preparation space and related facilities are expressly designed for, and limited to, a predetermined mix of products: There is no space for any food, beverage, or service that was not designed into the system at the outset. There is not even a sandwich knife or a decent place to keep it. Thus the owner has no discretion

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regarding what he can sell—not because of contractual limitations, but because of facilities limitations. And the employees have virtually no discretion regarding how to prepare and serve products. McDonald's restaurants are factories in the field—designed and equipped to do only what the planners intended, nothing more or less.

Discretion is the enemy of order, of standardization, and in this case, of quality. An automobile assembly line worker who has discretion and latitude might possibly produce a more personalized car, but it would certainly be less reliable. The elaborate care taken in designing the automobile, making its components, and structuring and controlling the assembly line is what produces quality cars at low prices—with extraordinary functional reliability, considering that the average new assembly line produces more than one completely ready-to-drive car every single minute of its operation. McDonald's operates precisely the same way. Like Henry Ford's Model T, McDonald's owes much of its success to the conscious design of an industrial system productive enough to offer abundance and quality at bargain-basement, customer-attracting prices. That was its original goal and that has been its spectacular achievement. It was no accident.

## The McDonald's "machine"

To understand and appreciate the McDonald's revolution in service, consider the handling of that uniquely plebian American delicacy, french-fried potatoes. French fries quickly become soggy and unappetizing; to be crisp and tasty, they must be freshly made just before eating. McDonald's provides its outlets with precut, partially-cooked frozen potatoes that can be quickly finished in a deep-fry facility on the premises. That is the first step in the process of industrialization, just as Detroit provides the assembly line worker with parts and tools.

The McDonald's fryer is neither so large that it produces too many french fries at one time (thus allowing them to become stale or soggy) nor so small that it requires frequent and costly frying. The frier is emptied onto a wide, flat tray adjacent to the service counter. This location is crucial. Since the practice of McDonald's is to create an impression of abundance and generosity by slightly overfilling each bag of french fries, the tray's location next to the service counter prevents spillage from reaching the floor. Spillage creates not only danger underfoot, but also

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an unattractive appearance that causes the employees to become accustomed to an unclean environment. Once a store is unclean in one area, standards fall rapidly, and the store becomes unclean and the food unappetizing.

While McDonald's aims for an impression of abundance, excessive overfilling could be very costly for a company that annually buys potatoes almost by the trainload. A systematic bias that puts into each bag even a half ounce more than is intended could have visibly depressing effects on the company's earnings. Further, excessive time spent at the tray by the employees could create a cumulative service bottleneck at the counter.

McDonald's therefore developed a special wide-mouthed scoop with a narrow funnel in its handle. The counter employee picks up the scoop and inserts the handle end into a wall clip containing the bags; a single bag then adheres to the handle. In one continuous movement, the employee fills the scoop with potatoes, and then fills the bag—with the exact amount its designers intended —by lifting the scoop toward the ceiling, so that the potatoes funnel through the handle into the attached bag, which is automatically disengaged by the weight of the contents. The bag then comes to a steady rest, on its flat bottom, on the counter.

Nothing can go wrong—the employee never soils his hands, the floor remains clean, dry, and safe, and the quantity is controlled. Best of all, the customer gets a visibly generous portion with great speed, the employee remains efficient and cheerful, and the general impression is one of extravagantly good service.

Consider other aspects of the technology of McDonald's. The tissue to wrap each hamburger is color-coded to denote the mix of condiments. Heated reservoirs hold preprepared hamburgers for rush demand. Frying surfaces have spatter guards to prevent soiling of the cooks' uniforms. Nothing is left to chance or the employees' discretion.

The entire system is engineered and executed according to a tight technological discipline that ensures fast, clean, reliable service in an atmosphere that gives the modestly paid employees a sense of pride and dignity. In spite of the crunch of eager customers, no employee looks or acts harassed, and therefore no harassment is communicated to the customers.

But McDonald's goes even further. Customers may be discouraged from entering if the building looks unappealing from the outside; hence considerable care goes into the design and appearance of the establishment. Some things, however, the architect can-

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not control, especially at a restaurant where people eat in their parked cars and are likely to drop hamburger wrappings and empty beverage cartons on the ground. McDonald's has anticipated the problem: Its blacktop parking lots are dotted like a checkerboard with numerous large, highly visible trash cans, whose purpose is impossible to ignore. Even the sloppiest customer would be embarrassed to drop his trash on the ground. But, just in case someone does, the larger McDonald's outlets have motorized sweepers for quick and easy cleanup. Employees are much more eager to clean the parking lot by riding a motorized sweeper than by using a nail on a stick.

McDonald's has created a highly sophisticated piece of service technology by applying the manufacturing mode of managerial thought to a labor-intensive service situation. If a machine is a piece of equipment with the capability of producing a predictably standardized, customer-satisfying output while minimizing the operating discretion of its attendant, that is what a McDonald's outlet is. It produces, with the help of totally unskilled machine tenders, a fairly sophisticated, reliable product at great speed and low cost.

McDonald's represents the industrialization of service—applying, through management, the same systematic modes of analysis, design, organization, and control that are commonplace in manufacturing. These more than anything account for its success. We have already noted the relationship in beauty shops between productivity and demand, and demand and product innovation. The same is true of McDonald's: The control of production and quality through careful systems design creates the demand that justifies the managerial expense, which in turn improves the McDonald's "machine" and expands its commercial domain—to the greater glory of productivity statistics in the food-service sector.

### Managerial rationality

Precisely the same sort of applied rationality has been used to improve the distribution and service of industrial products. In 1961, the Building Controls and Components Group of Honeywell, Inc. —the nation's largest producer of heating and air-conditioning thermostats and control devices—did a major part of its business in replacement controls (the "aftermarket"). These were sold through heating and air-conditioning distributors, who then supplied plumbers and other installation and repair specialists. At that time, Hon-

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eywell's product line consisted of nearly 18,000 separate catalog parts and pieces. The company had nearly 5,000 distributor accounts, none of which could economically carry a full line of these items. Honeywell therefore maintained nearly a hundred fully-stocked field warehouses that offered immediate delivery to distributors. The result was that distributors frequently sold to plumbers parts that they did not themselves have in stock. They either sent plumbers to nearby Honeywell warehouses for pickup, or picked up parts themselves and delivered them directly to the plumbers. The costs of carrying these inventories were enormous, but were considered a normal expense of doing business.

Then Honeywell made a daring move—it announced its new Tradeline Policy. It would close all warehouses, and all parts would have to be stocked by the distributors. The original equipment, however, had been redesigned in the meantime to use 300 standard, interchangeable parts—interchangeable for most Honeywell controls, and also for many of its major competitors. Moreover, each package was clearly imprinted to show exactly which products made by Honeywell or its competitors the contents were compatible with.

By closing its own warehouses, Honeywell obviously shifted the inventory carrying costs to its distributors. But instead of imposing new burdens on them, the new interchangeable products enabled distributors to carry substantially lower inventories, particularly by cutting down the need for stocking the replacement parts for competitors' products, which the distributors could nonetheless continue to service. Thus they were able to offer their customers faster service at lower costs. Repairs, moreover, could be done more easily and more cheaply.

Honeywell's replacement-market share almost doubled, its original-equipment share rose by nearly 50 per cent, and its trade inventory carrying costs were cut to zero. Whereas previously nearly 90 per cent of Honeywell's replacement sales were scattered among 4,000 distributors, within 10 years after the introduction of the new policy, the same proportion—but of a doubled volume—was concentrated among only about 900 vastly more effective distributors.

What was considered an inescapably labor-intensive problem was solved by the scrupulous application of manufacturing managerial methods. Motivation, hard work, personalization, training, and merchandising incentives were replaced by a revised selection of goals and purposes—not raising sales but creating conditions which

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would make distributors *want* to expand their dealings with Honeywell at substantially reduced costs to Honeywell itself. The basic management decision to focus with imagination on the service problems and needs of the company's distributors and their customers was the starting point. Service became faster, easier, and cheaper not because of good administration, but because of superb management.

Similar thinking is now being used in commercial fields—e.g., by the Transamerica Title Insurance Corporation, in its industrialization of the formerly complex, one-to-one, labor-intensive activities needed to deliver low-cost, accurate, property-title searches and guarantees to its clients.

These examples of the industrialization of service through the application of managerial rationality—McDonald's, credit cards, supermarkets, Transamerica, and others—are neither trivial nor exceptional, selectively plucked out of an otherwise drab reality to suggest speculative possibilities with limited probabilities. They illustrate possibilities that have for the service sector today the same irrepressible potential (even inevitability) that was once characteristic of pin-making, which Adam Smith used as an example in 1776 to illustrate the division of labor—and all that it implied for manufacturing.

## Production versus performance

The historic absence of industrial modes of managerial thought largely accounts for the sluggishness of so many service industries. There is a reason for that absence, and it is well to understand it.

The word "service" evokes time-worn images of personal ministration and attendance. Its etymological brethren are "servile" and "servitude." "Service" generally refers to deeds performed personally (and humbly) for another. It carries historical connotations of obedience, subordination, and subjugation; or of charity, gallantry, and selflessness. In these contexts, people serve because they want to (as in the priestly and political professions) or because they have to (as in slavery, or such roles of attendance as waiter, maid, bellboy, or cleaning lady).

In the higher-status service occupations, such as in the church and the army, one customarily behaves ritualistically, not rationally. In the lower-status service occupations, one simply obeys. In neither is independent thinking presumed a requisite of the job. The most that could therefore be expected in the way of im-

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provements is that, like Avis, service workers would try harder. They would exert more animal effort to do better what they are already doing. They are impotently tethered to ancient, pre-industrial modes of thought.

In manufacturing, by contrast, the orientation is toward the efficient production of results, not toward ritual or attendance on others. Relationships are strictly businesslike, with fewer invidious social connotations of rank or self. In the manufacturing cognitive mode, the search for improvement seldom focuses on ways to improve personal performance in present tasks, but rather on discovering entirely new ways of performing present tasks, or better yet, on actually changing the tasks themselves. The manufacturing routine is not to think of the greater exertion of animal energies (working physically harder, as the slave), of greater commitment (being more devout or loyal, as the priest), or of greater dependency (being more obsequious, as the butler). Instead, it involves the greater exertion of the mind. In its simplest form, the question is what kinds of tools, old or new, what different materials, or what kinds of skills, processes, organizational rearrangements, incentives, controls, and audits might be enlisted to improve greatly the intended outcome. Often, the problem is turned inside out: Does the intended outcome really correspond to the problems its users are trying to solve? Might the problem be redefined, or the tool redesigned to make it faster or cheaper, while improving its quality and effectiveness? In short, manufacturing looks for solutions *inside* the very tasks to be done and problems to be solved —not simply the manufacturing task, but also the user's problems. That is precisely what Henry Ford did so successfully. He turned the problem inside out, converting a costly constructed machine into an inexpensive assembled one, converting a class market into a mass market.

Contrast the cognitive modes of manufacturing with the service industries, where solutions are sought not *inside* the tasks, but in their *performance*. Until very recently, inherited attitudes and ancient cognitive modes sought impotently for possible improvement in the skills and attitudes of the *performers* of service, rather than for possible redefinition or redesign of service itself.

Manufacturing has outperformed service because it has for a long time thought technocratically and managerially about its functions. Service has lagged because it has thought humanistically. Since all of us are human, and none machines, that is an unappetizing pill to swallow. Yet regardless of what we would like,

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it is inescapable that as long as we think in largely humanistic rather than technocratic terms, the service sector of the modern economy will forever lag. So long as we view service as invariably personal—as something performed entirely by personal effort or by the dedication of individuals for the direct benefit of other individuals—it prevents us from seeking alternatives to the use of people. It prevents us from redesigning the tasks themselves; from entertaining revised purposes; from creating new plans, tools, processes, systems, organizations, or controls; perhaps, even, from eliminating the conditions that created the problems in the first place.

## Productive prototypes

To improve the quality and efficiency of service takes the kind of technocratic thinking that in other fields has replaced the high cost and erratic elegance of the artisan with the low cost and predictable munificence of the manufacturer. This is now rapidly happening, thought not without frequent setbacks, stemming generally from elegant technocrats who promise too much, too soon. (Not everybody wants to eat at McDonald's, though it sometimes looks like it. Not everything is equally accessible to industrial rationality—though more is than meets the casual eye.) There are now over 1,400 Mr. Minit shoe-repair shops in continental Europe that, through a total redesign of shoe-repair equipment and operations layout, resole a pair of shoes at phenomenally low prices in less than five minutes—without dust or noise—while the customer waits in quiet comfort inside the department store or specialty store where these operations are generally located. The Damon Corporation operates 125 pathological clinics throughout the nation that, with the help of modern machines, 125 salaried M.D.'s, 22 Ph.D.'s, and 1,400 medical technologists, perform a wide range of diagnostic tests that formerly required patients to visit several doctors and clinics, at costs in time and money several times greater.

But the industrialization of health care is not limited to diagnostics. During World War II, the Kaiser Foundation established the nation's first "health maintenance organization" (HMO), providing low, prepaid, outpatient medical services at clinics manned by almost every conceivable kind of medical specialist—highly paid, salaried employees freed from all the troublesome administrative details of ordinary practice. They work full time and only in their specialties, and are occupied full time during regularly scheduled

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40-hour work weeks. There are now hundreds of such HMO's—mostly operated as profit-making firms. Large prepaid membership rolls facilitate economies of scale and sound management, which in turn produce a full range of high-convenience, top-quality medical services at rock-bottom costs.

As for hospitalization, industrialization has also had an impact through specialization. In 1970, the nation's first "ambulatory surgical facility" (ASF) was established in Phoenix, Arizona. There are now over 100 such facilities in the country. The typical ASF is capable of performing some 125 low-risk operations on healthy, low-risk patients. The patient comes in, undergoes tests and surgery, rests, and goes home—all in one day. At the profit-making Northwest Surgicare facility in a suburb of Chicago, a tonsillectomy costs $169. At the non-profit Michael Reese Hospital in Chicago, it costs $548. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, which now honors the claims of 22 ASF's under group life insurance policies, estimates savings of $1 million in the last three years.

Lawyers have access to computerized legal search systems. In greater popularity are the new so-called "boutique" law services that specialize in providing conventional searches, and only that—they do not practice law. Significantly, this is the same kind of specialization that explains why General Motors does not make its own tires, windows, or various other parts: It is a "manufacturing" corporation whose manual work consists heavily of assembling what it has bought—like Sears, Roebuck when it fills a mail order. Or like the American Express Company, with its wide line of packaged travel tours, produced and managed by others—a supermarket of tours fully explained in a regularly published book, in clear, technicolor detail. Travelers know what they'll get, the exact cost—and everything is prearranged, including options to permit custom-tailored vacations, not unlike buying a "customized" car by ordering options in the showroom. And how much simpler and cheaper such a travel service is than the alternative—agonized and costly travel arrangements made by yourself, or by a travel agent whose reliability is questionable, knowledge limited, and avarice limitless.

## The limits of industrialization

The industrialization of the service-sector industries, and hence the enhancement of their productivity, is just now crawling out of infancy and seems on its way to adolescence. As in adolescence,

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there will surely be much abortive experimentation and trauma—but many industries will grow and prosper. Some already have. Knowledge, the most transferable of all resources, seems finally on the verge of making its greatest contribution to our living standards, not so much by the invention of things for the service sector to use as by the reconsideration of goals and purposes and the application of rational calculation, systems, and routines and by the use of management in their direction and control. The "post-industrial" society already has some productive prototypes, and McDonald's is not the only one.

But some things are less easily managed than others. The demand for many service activities—food service, banking, retailing, amusement places, and the like—often fluctuates widely at particular hours of the day and among days of the week. During nonpeak times there is usually idle capacity. If demand were spaced out, it might substantially raise productivity; however, that cannot be easily managed. Entertainment places and some restaurants try to manage it by differential pricing—reduced prices for Wednesday night movies, reduced midweek prices at ski resorts, ladies' day specials at ball games, "happy hour" bargain drinks that start at 3:00 p.m. Moreover, many people are in service because it offers more opportunities for self-employment—professional occupations, retailing, repair. Self-employment is over twice as common in service as in the rest of the economy. Where self-employment is the main motivation, managerial efficiency takes a back seat, or at least not the driver's seat. The owner is less likely to make capital-intensive or management-intensive improvements than the professional manager with a different set of motivations. Where "freedom" is traded for income, productivity will probably lag. Victor Fuchs' studies show that within the same service sectors, worker productivity is higher in firms with employees than in firms where the proprietor (and possibly his family) do all the work. In part, the difference is the result of economies of scale—bigger firms are less likely to be proprietor-operated. In part, it reflects the superiority of the professionally managed enterprise. Since there will always be those who would rather earn less than work for others, the superior productivity of competitors will never destroy all those who are less efficient. Small corner grocery stores, small repair shops, and small accounting offices survive, even though their self-employed owners often work for incomes piteously exploitative on a per-hour basis, and generally small also on an absolute basis. This is seldom possible in manufacturing.

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Service-sector productivity will therefore, on the average, remain lower than goods-producing productivity, even when service becomes more industrialized. But it is not the hopeless structural case it is widely believed to be. Not even in government.

### The special case of government

Over 18 per cent of the American employed work force is now in government—federal, state, local. That is 14.3 million out of a 1974 employed work force of 78.3 million. Government is the most heavily labor-intensive portion of the service sector. It is correct to give it special attention for two reasons: Little of its work is assumed to have access to the productivity-improving technology of the goods-producing industries; and it is assumed to be incorrigibly resistant to reduction in size—indeed, it is assumed to be continually expanding. Neither assumption may, however, be completely justified.

First, nobody knows what the productivity of government really is. The experts cannot even agree how to measure it. The result, unbelievable but true, is the official assumption that the productivity of government work neither rises nor falls; the reported data thus show no productivity changes, year in and year out. Second, if productivity can rise in finance, insurance, and real estate management—as it did between 1929 and 1961 (lagging behind the average increase of the total economy by only .26 per cent)—then it can rise in government, where the nature of the work is often very similar. Third, the notion that government work (or, for that matter, white-collar work) can be managed and rationalized just as can blue-collar work, is relatively new. Frederick W. Taylor made his original time-and-motion studies on workers hauling slag and limestone for Midvale Steel Company in Pennsylvania in 1881. What eventually resulted were "scientific management," piecework compensation, and much more that has vastly raised the productivity of manufacturing. Now that white-collar workers (in and out of government) have conceded their proletarian status by joining labor unions, they have opened the gates to similar managerial intrusions in their own work. It was not until 1975 that a manual was written on how to use Taylor's 94-year-old methods to enhance productivity in government and service organizations—and then it was the Japanese who published it.[2] It was not until the adoption

[2] Marvin E. Mundel, *Measuring and Enhancing the Productivity of Service and Government Organizations* (Tokyo, Asian Productivity Organization, 1975).

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of the "Federal Reorganization Plan No. 2" of 1970 that the federal government was required to pay some official attention to developing the managerial skills of its civil-service executives. Now each manager in civil service "supergrades" 16 to 28 must receive at least one week of formal management training. Middle managers in grades 13 to 15 are now required to receive two weeks. That is a beginning; unfortunately, it involves only the federal government. Of the nation's 14.3 million nonmilitary governmental employees, 11.6 million are in local governments.

The spectacle of an ever-increasing number of government employees is, in fact, duplicated in the entire service sector. Between 1950 and 1974, the number of employed service workers rose 90 per cent, of goods-producing workers only 34 per cent. Indeed, as a proportion of the total labor force, service employment has been rising without interruption since 1880. (Though not uniformly: The proportion for the railroads started falling in 1947; the proportion for real estate in 1974 was even with that of 1956). The difference is that the proportion for government has risen faster than any other—up from 13 per cent of the employed labor force in 1950 to 18 per cent now. This increase has come largely from three sources: from the rising role of government in national affairs that started with the Great Depression; from the increase in the permanent military establishment (both in uniform and out) that resulted from the beginning of the cold war in 1948 and the subsequent buildup for the Korean war in 1951; but mostly from the "New Frontier" and "Great Society" programs that started in 1961 at the federal level, and then quickly spread through all levels of government.

There is a special argument about government. It is widely believed that government employment is uniquely resistant to reduction, for several reasons: 1) The public wants increasingly more public services; 2) the "military-industrial complex" and generalized xenophobia will keep armaments spending up; 3) the government is run by its permanent cadre who insure their own permanence; and 4) civil service employment and seniority rules are equivalent to employment guarantees—i.e., even if labor-saving technologies and systems were available, the high-seniority officials (those with the most power) will be the last to go and the last to change, for age and inertia are on their side. If white-collar work is ever sufficiently rationalized to raise efficiency and cut employment, government will take at least a generation longer to do likewise. Government will always necessarily lag.

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The third and fourth reasons are essentially the same, and probably about as true in government as elsewhere. Even private industry has a seniority system, institutionalized in the lower-level and middle-level white-collar ranks, rationalized in the upper ranks, and veiled behind a windy rhetoric tough-mindedly claiming the opposite. More things often happen where they are not supposed to happen than where they are.

The second reason—the persistence of high military spending—is contradicted by all of history. In fact, military spending is now declining and has always ultimately declined. United States defense outlays fell from 8.4 per cent of GNP in 1946 (at its peak in 1968 during the Vietnam War it was 9.4 per cent) to 5.9 per cent in 1974. In 1975 outlays were—in constant dollars—below the levels of the early 1960's.

## The "democratic distemper"

As for the first reason, the analysis of Samuel P. Huntington is especially useful.[3] He refers to the "democratic distemper" of the 1960's—the simultaneous increase in the demand for and the actual amount of government activity on the one hand, and the decline of government authority on the other. During what Huntington calls the "democratic surge" of the 1960's, one opinion poll after another showed that public confidence in the leadership of the President, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the military declined almost in proportion to the expansion of their activities. Though the public wanted more government, and was passionately involved in getting more, the more it got, the less it liked what it got. While the authority of government has been restored somewhat in the 1970's, it still lacks the authority it had in the 1950's. The general faith in the capacity of government to achieve many of the democratic, liberal, and egalitarian goals generated by the "democratic surge" of the 1960's is in tatters. Expanding upon Huntington, we can say that the disillusionment probably began about 1969, principally among the liberal intellectuals in the universities. In their introductory essay to *The Public Interest* (Winter 1974) special issue on the "Great Society," Eli Ginzberg and Robert M. Solow, both sensitive and ardent advocates of a more benign society and supporters of a more meliorative state, wrote regarding the programs of the 1960's that "the attack that was finally launched by the conservatives was

[3] "The Democratic Distemper," *The Public Interest*, No. 41 (Fall 1975), pp. 9-38.

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if anything overdue. . . . But more surprising was the growing disillusionment and despair of many of the social architects of these intervention programs and of the constituencies for which they spoke."

Intellectuals understandably believe that what they write has some effect, sooner or later. In the past, egalitarianism and the expansion of government services have enjoyed their advocacy. In time, the public followed. Now the public again follows—this time, leadership in the opposite direction. No matter, however, who leads and who follows, the direction seems clear. Historic precedent is, furthermore, on the side of a reversal of attitudes. Huntington notes:

> During periods of rapid social change . . . democratic and egalitarian values of the American creed are reaffirmed. The intensity of belief during such "creedal passion periods" leads to the challenging of established authority and to major efforts to change governmental structure to accord more fully with those values. In this respect . . . the democratic surge of the 1960's shares many characteristics with the comparable egalitarian and reform movements of the Jacksonian and Progressive eras. Those "surges," like the contemporary one, also occurred during periods of realignment between party and governmental institutions on the one hand, and social forces on the other. The slogans, goals, values, and targets of all these movements are strikingly similar. Consequently, the implication of this analysis is that in due course the democratic surge and the resulting dual distemper in government will be moderated.

There is already a clear reduction in political activity (though not so much in political noise) in the nation, and it is not simply that an unpopular war is over and a distrusted President is out. Most people increasingly seem to feel that things haven't worked, and that the costs have gone out of sight. Finally, the plight of New York City has made things bad enough that everybody not just accepts but insists upon limits, and reductions. Michael Dukakis, an attractive and intelligent liberal Democrat elected Governor of Massachusetts in 1974 on a traditionally liberal ticket, made a tough-minded pronouncement within three weeks of taking office that said, in essence, "We can't afford it. Things haven't worked. We will cut back, and the budget will be balanced." In eight months he had cut 8,000 from the welfare rolls, reduced state employment, and just about balanced the budget.

Anyone who reads the political commentaries and public sentiments in the local newspapers, and hears what is said on the public streets, in the offices and factories, and at local government meetings, cannot escape the accumulating evidence of a repudiation of

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governmental efficacy. People simply want less government and want it to try nothing new—save, perhaps, fiscal policies to prop up the economy and a program of national health insurance. Those are central to their lives—all the rest is suspect, unless people are direct beneficiaries of a particular largesse. And even then, the sentiment for "getting mine" is weakening. Indeed, it is not clear that there ever was wide support for all the "Great Society" programs now in such shambles.

The meaning seems clear enough. The percentage of the total employed labor force in government—now 18 per cent—is decreasing, as it did in the Eisenhower years, not only because the labor force is now expanding, but because government employment is shrinking absolutely. This will certainly moderate whatever structural tendency exists toward declining rates of productivity, slower economic growth, and rising inflation.

## Possibilities for progress

Most government services certainly are different, functionally and qualitatively, from most private-sector services. The technology of management—or management as a form of knowledge—is less easily accessible to some service activities than to others. To that extent, the attempt to expand productivity in the service sector will be more difficult and less rewarding in many cases than in most of the goods-producing sector. The work of the surgeon may be facilitated by better equipment and organization in the operating room, but he can hardly do two appendectomies in the time it has always taken him to do one. The government interviewer at the unemployment compensation application office is not likely to have access to the productivity-improving technologies that created the applicant before him.

On the other hand, there may be more possibilities than meet the casual eye. It is noteworthy, for example, that a large proportion of the continually increasing number of applications for credit cards and small loans are "processed" not by time-consuming personal interviews or application reviews, but by simple, fast (not even computerized), one-page credit-scoring forms. The score coefficients that measure credit-worthiness on these applications are developed through statistically sophisticated sensitivity analysis; the "cutoff" and "acceptance" points are determined with the help of Bayesian statistics. Significantly, this rapid scoring system was the development not of banks, finance companies, department stores, petroleum

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companies, or the American Express Company, but of rank outsiders, trained in systems analysis, who recognized and capitalized on an opportunity to make a dollar—knowledge workers who created a service company to enhance the productivity of other service companies.

Though such a development has made "interviewing" for credit purposes more productive than interviewing for unemployment purposes, it seems unlikely that the same sort of mechanization, no matter how efficient, will be readily tolerated at the unemployment office. Just as there are differences between types of service industries, so there are differences in their susceptibility to industrialization. Technical possibility is not equivalent to practical acceptability.

But to say this is to concede nothing. We saw that the goods-producing industries have not been homogenously productive—ranging on an annual growth basis, between 1948 and 1966, from 1.1 per cent for the manufacturing of tobacco products to 4.9 per cent for chemicals. So also in service—between 1939 and 1963 from .6 per cent annually for barbershops to 3.3 per cent annually for auto repairs.

The theory of the "post-industrial" society conjures frightening apprehensions about the future—a structural transformation leading to reduced productivity and heightened inflation. Substantively, however, this has almost nothing to do with the rise of the knowledge worker, as is claimed. When goods-producing industries outproduced the service industries in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the absence of theoretical or science-based knowledge did not keep the "tinkerers" from making their Brobdingnagian progress. Only by assuming that theoretical knowledge will necessarily be more productive in the future than practical knowledge ("tinkering") has been in the past is there any basis for asserting that the difference in the *kind* of knowledge *per se* will produce a vast new difference in productivity between the goods and service industries.

Nothing in actual experience would comfortably lead one to this conclusion. It has now been over 25 years since fusion physics was proved theoretically feasible; over 10 years since it was proved practically feasible in the laboratory. But widespread safe use is decades distant—all it takes in the meanwhile to make it work is practical technologists—"tinkerers," if you will.

Similarly, Dennis Gabor received the Nobel Prize for his development of holography just after World War II. In the early 1960's, the

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RCA Corporation, with all the vast resources at its command, made a concerted effort to produce a commercially acceptable holographic film and motion picture-making process. The prize was huge: all of Eastman Kodak, all of the Hollywood and television tape market, the entire still- and motion-picture camera market, and an entirely new market calculated in the billions—low-priced home television tape players and tape cassettes. Ten years and several hundred millions of dollars later, the effort, for all practical purposes, was scrapped. It began with theoretical knowledge, but it floundered on the failure of economically justifiable practicality—"tinkering," if you will. The engineers and technicians, blessed with assorted university degrees and masterships in toolmaking, and working day and night under ideal conditions with superb facilities at Princeton, New Jersey, failed—just as John F. Kettering, also a master toolmaker, failed so miserably in the 1920's to create his dream of an entirely revolutionary alternative to the carburetor. Two generations later, scientists at General Motors had meanwhile replaced Kettering, with no results. The most they have been able to do is to use a microprocessor to monitor and improve the mechanical mixing of fuel and air in the same old carburetor.

The knowledge required to create holography is based on science and theory, constructed step by step from the accumulation of other science and theory. And although modern science-based industries may begin with scientific theory, if they are characterized in practice by any one thing, it is precisely *not* that their results were attained through, or end with, theory. "The "tinkerers" are more necessary now than ever. The "cookers" in micro-circuit production are the rule, not the exception, in science-based industries.

## The practice of management

The rise of science-based industries and the importance of the knowledge worker have no structurally unique significance or effects. What is significant is that in the more advanced societies, abundance and affluence create proportionately increased demands for things less easily produced under the conditions of mass-production efficiency. But the recent increased demand for handcrafted artifacts—from "folk" jewelry to "antique" executive desks—tells us that even in the goods-producing industries mass-production efficiency does not exhaust all the public's oscillating wants.

Increasingly more of what is wanted, however, are services. As in the case of beauty shops, credit cards, hamburgers, aftermarket

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repairs of thermostats, medicine, or law, it is reasonable to assume that when markets expand the managerial imagination will apply its own kind of special knowledge to raise productivity.

Whatever else may have changed, the "post-industrial" society is not "post" in the sense that expanding bursts of industrialization are past. Industrialization is more than inventions, machines, and amassed technology. Among the growing proportion of "knowledge workers" are not just engineers, scientists, and technicians, but more importantly, managers. The fleeting references to managers in the literature of the "post-industrial" society are but grudging concessions. What is assumed to be decisive is the expanding scientific elite, with its "systematic development of research and the creation of [disproportionately productive] science-based industries" that are presumed to help produce profound structural imbalances in our society. This lyrical account of science overlooks the fact that science-based industries were "created," "developed," and made "systematic" by *somebody*, that the "joining of science to invention, principally through the organization of research and development efforts" still depends, heavily and inescapably, on the practical labors of honest "tinkerers"—and above all on the work of managers who identify problems and opportunities, define goals and purposes, select means, marshal resources, motivate, energize, direct, measure, control, and reward the performance of people.

All that management did in the past to make technology and abundance possible in the goods-producing industries, and all it is now doing to help convert scientific knowledge into the practical output of technological systems—all this is now in ascendance in the non-goods-producing industries. Something of what can be achieved has already been described. More is surely on the way.

Management is a crucial element of society. If society is indeed going to be "post-industrial," the only recent emergence of the managerial arts in the expanding sectors of society suggests the likelihood that these sectors will enjoy the same productivity-improving results in the years ahead that the industrial sectors did in years past. The predicted apocalypse of structural imbalances that will "immiserize" progress is a misperception of the future. It neglects or fails to account for precisely what, in the end, makes economic progress possible—the practice of management.

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# The Rehabilitation of Punishment

MARC F. PLATTNER

A remarkable turnabout has recently occurred in the perennial debate about how America should deal with its convicted criminals. For over a century, American penology had subscribed to the rehabilitative ideal and its practical concomitant, the indeterminate sentence, which tailors the length of a convict's prison term to his prospects for and progress toward the "cure" of his criminal tendencies. From 1870 through the 1960's, this position represented the "enlightened" view, and reformers strove, with considerable success, to have it embodied in public policy. Then, suddenly, the tide of advanced opinion on this matter began to turn. There emerged a wave of skepticism, and even hostility, toward the theory and practice of prisons that were based upon the rehabilitative ideal, and a wave of concern about the unfairness that characterizes a system of indeterminate sentencing. This assault upon the received doctrine has rapidly been gaining support from all parts of the political spectrum, culminating this year in a host of books, articles, and reports advocating the abandonment of the indeterminate sentence and of rehabilitation as the justification for imprisonment. Politicians as diverse in their views as President Ford and Senator Kennedy have endorsed a return to determinate sentencing, and several state legislatures seem to be moving in this direction.

The dynamics of this abrupt 180-degree turn in elite opinion are fascinating, and reveal a good deal about the situation of American social thought in the mid-1970's. The old consensus in favor of rehabilitation had been based on the liberal embrace of what Daniel P. Moynihan has called (in a slightly different context) the "therapeutic ethic." That is, political liberalism came to accept the understanding of man and society associated with the dominant trends in the behavioral sciences and psychiatry. This included a view of crime as a form of "deviant" behavior, whose causes lay in individual or social pathology. Hence criminals could not properly be regarded as bearing moral responsibility for their actions, or as deserving of punishment. Instead, they were themselves the victims

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of some kind of social or psychological "disorder," and were thus in need of treatment by experts in the behavioral sciences.

Since the amount of treatment required obviously varied depending upon the characteristics of the individual offender, judges were granted wide discretion in deciding the length of the sentence (e.g., one to 20 years). And since the criminal's potential for responding to rehabilitative techniques could not be accurately predicted in advance, parole boards were given wide discretion in deciding whether and when to release a convict before he had served the maximum term imposed by the court. (According to the strict rehabilitative theory, of course, there should be no legislatively or judicially imposed maxima or minima at all; sentences should be totally indeterminate, with behavioral experts enjoying complete freedom to determine when an offender had been sufficiently "cured" of his criminal tendencies to return safely to society.) Although the involuntary confinement of the convict for purposes of treatment curiously resembled a form of punishment, proponents of the rehabilitative theory denied that any punitive intention was involved, citing as an analogy the involuntary confinement of the mentally ill. Punishment and the punitive attitude, they argued, were an expression of a barbaric desire for vengeance, which had no place in an enlightened modern society.

Although the intellectual reaction against the rehabilitative theory did not gather real force until the 1970's, its sources can be found in the general social and intellectual ferment of the 1960's. One development that obviously must be cited in this context is the generally heightened interest in the problem of crime and the emergence of "law and order" as an issue of intense public controversy. The reason for this was simple: the extraordinarily steep rise in crime rates during the 1960's. Yet, while the crime explosion produced considerable political pressure for a policy of "getting tough" with criminals, it was not sufficient in itself to transform liberal opinion. Ramsey Clark, a staunch defender of rehabilitation, remained the preeminent liberal spokesman on this issue. The subsequent turn against rehabilitation cannot be explained primarily as a conservative reaction to rising crime rates. It was made possible only by a discrediting of rehabilitation from the left, part of a larger attack on the postwar liberal consensus that viewed America as a fundamentally just society.

In regarding law-breaking as a result of the "sickness" of the criminal, and as amenable to "treatment" by experts in the behavioral sciences, the rehabilitative theory implicitly assumes that the laws that are broken are just ones. Once this assumption is seriously questioned—as it was by the New Left—the rationale of the rehabilitative theory falls apart, and its application in practice takes on a new and sinister cast. Convicts no longer appear as disturbed individuals receiving much needed and compassionate care for their disabilities, but as more-or-less heroic rebels being forcibly remolded to accept the ways of an unjust society. Similarly, the

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behavioral scientists who treat them no longer appear as enlightened and impartial experts guided by some transpolitical notion of health, but as the henchmen of the ruling class and its self-interested view of what constitutes socially acceptable conduct.

A number of developments during the late 1960's lent plausibility to this critique. One was the *internal* attack condemning social scientists and psychiatrists as well-paid agents of the political status quo, which was led by radical, mostly younger members of these professions. Another was the imprisonment of antiwar protesters and black militants, who were sympathetically regarded, and indeed often admired, by the liberal community, and hence could not easily be branded as candidates for therapeutic help. In addition, the generally heightened sensitivity to issues of race and class led liberals to look with disfavor upon institutions where preponderantly poor and black inmates were being treated by white, middle-class professionals. Given the prevailing intellectual climate, it was but a short step to regard prisoners as simply one more unjustly oppressed group in American society.

THE radical critique of the rehabilitation-oriented prison was given its first systematic popular expression in Jessica Mitford's *Kind and Usual Punishment,* published in 1973. Miss Mitford's basic premise was that the criminal law is not the embodiment of neutral principles of justice, but a "codification of the self-interest" of the dominant elements in American society. The prison is a weapon of class oppression, and what is billed as "rehabilitation," far from being a humanitarian effort to help disturbed individuals, is simply a subtle and insidious way of grinding down enemies of the existing order: "For the prison administrator, whether he be warden, sociologist, or psychologist, 'individualized treatment' is primarily a device for breaking the convict's will to resist and hounding him into compliance with institution demands, and is thus a means of exerting maximum control over the convict population. The cure will be deemed effective to the degree that the poor/young/brown/black captive appears to have capitulated to his middle-class/white/middle-aged captor, and to have adopted the virtues of subservience to authority, industry, cleanliness, docility."

Despite the savageness of Miss Mitford's attack on liberal reformers (and on their hero, Ramsey Clark), her book was well received by liberal audiences. Though this may be attributed in part to the general vulnerability of liberals to attacks from their left, it was also due no doubt to Miss Mitford's powerful depiction of the practical abuses spawned by the rehabilitative theory. The most frightening of these abuses involved the use of "behavior-modification" techniques on unwilling prisoners. According to Miss Mitford's account, "advanced" prison systems were already employing various kinds of drug therapy and were contemplating the use of neurosurgery. But even where such chilling instruments were not em-

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ployed, Miss Mitford showed how the unfettered reign of behavioral scientists readily led to tyrannical and unjust control over the fate of prisoners. At the Patuxent Institution in Maryland, a "total treatment facility" for "defective delinquents," all inmates were committed for absolutely indeterminate sentences, to be released only when the staff determined that they had been "cured." The result was that those prisoners who refused to cooperate or whose progress did not satisfy the social workers and therapists—a group comprising 46 per cent of the inmates paroled from 1955 to September 1965—were confined beyond the maximum sentence imposed for the crime they had committed.

A constant refrain throughout Miss Mitford's book is the hatred felt by prisoners for the indeterminate-sentencing system, which they feel forces them to play a "treatment game" they do not believe in, subjects their lives to the arbitrary whims of correctional authorities, and produces unjustifiable disparities in the amount of time served for similar crimes. One did not have to share Miss Mitford's own implicit condoning or even approval of criminal behavior to sympathize with the prisoners' complaints against compulsory therapy and the indeterminate sentence. Indeed, an eloquent and prescient indictment of this mode of dealing with criminals was made by the British theologian C. S. Lewis in a brilliant essay, "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment," which was published in 1948:

> On [the] remedial view of punishment the offender should, of course, be detained until he was cured. And of course the official straighteners are the only people who can say when that is. The first result of the Humanitarian theory is, therefore, to substitute for a definite sentence (reflecting to some extent the community's moral judgment on the degree of ill-desert involved) an indefinite sentence terminable only by the word of those experts—and they are not experts in moral theology nor even in the Law of Nature—who inflict it. Which of us, if he stood in the dock, would not prefer to be tried by the old system?
>
> It may be said that by the continued use of the word punishment and the use of the verb "inflict" I am misrepresenting Humanitarians. They are not punishing, not inflicting, only healing. But do not let us be deceived by a name. To be taken without consent from my home and friends; to lose my liberty; to undergo all those assaults on my personality which modern psychotherapy knows how to deliver; to be remade after some pattern of "normality" hatched in a Viennese laboratory to which I never professed allegiance; to know that this process will never end until either my captors have succeeded or I grown wise enough to cheat them with apparent success—who cares whether this is called punishment or not?

It is doubtful, though, whether this critique of the rehabilitative theory would have influenced the recent American debate if it had not been offered in the radical guise in which Miss Mitford presented it.

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There was also a strand within American liberal thought, however, that was able to supply a basis for opposition to the therapeutic ideology—namely, the concern for civil liberties and the rights of individuals. Insofar as the rehabilitative theory asserted that the criminal was "sick" and hence not morally responsible for his crime, it also implied that the convict—like the confined mental patient—was not competent to exercise his rights. And insofar as the rehabilitators were acting on the basis of expert knowledge and a concern for the welfare of the individuals they were treating, the interference of the courts would be unnecessary or even harmful to the prisoners themselves. Although most civil libertarians were probably personally sympathetic to the apparently compassionate character of the rehabilitative theory, it was inevitable that their concern with individual rights and due process would eventually cause them to turn against it. And, indeed, this is what has happened. In defending the rights of prisoners who claimed they were being penalized because of their political views or denied parole on insufficient grounds, civil-liberties lawyers were led to challenge in court the authority of the rehabilitative experts. And as they saw how the system operated, and learned how intensely their clients—the prisoners themselves—opposed it, many civil libertarians came to reject root and branch the rehabilitative theory and its corollary, the indeterminate sentence.

One source of objections to the indeterminate-sentencing system was its obvious unfairness in subjecting offenders convicted of similar crimes to wildly disparate periods of imprisonment. At least one study revealed that different judges varied considerably in the sentences they would impose for identical criminals convicted of identical offenses. Moreover, the wide discretion granted to judges and parole boards made it possible for their personal biases to influence their decisions about confining or releasing convicts. Liberal critics were particularly sensitive to the possibility that such discretion could lead to longer terms for the poor and the black.

Another aspect of the indeterminate sentence attacked by some legal scholars was its use as a form of preventive detention. An important part of the justification for holding some prisoners for long terms under indeterminate sentences was the belief that they would present a danger to the community if they were released. But a number of studies showed how uncertain and inaccurate predictions of dangerousness tended to be, which meant that many prisoners were being confined because of a mistaken belief that they would return to crime.

In this context, mention should be made of the "decarceration" movement, which has played a significant role in recent discussion about prisons. Much of the original impetus toward decarceration came from within the rehabilitative professions themselves. In the treatment of the mentally ill, psychiatrists promoted a movement away from reliance on large state hospitals and toward outpatient care whenever possible. A similar development took place in re-

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gard to correctional institutions in the 1960's, and prison populations fell, while the use of probation and parole increased. Although this trend was supposed to achieve greater success in rehabilitating offenders, doubts quickly arose as to whether "community-based corrections" were in fact producing this result. Nonetheless, proponents of decarceration, like historian David Rothman, continued to defend it on other grounds: It was less expensive, more humane, and less restrictive of individual freedom than institutionalization. In fact, as the evidence mounted that rehabilitation of offenders in any setting was not succeeding, the case for decarceration, from a civil-libertarian standpoint, grew all the stronger. If the rehabilitators could not accomplish what they promised, how could depriving their patients of liberty be justified at all? In this situation, the conflict between civil-liberties lawyers and behavioral scientists became more intense, and even the right of psychiatrists to confine mental patients involuntarily was increasingly challenged.

THE coup de grace to the rehabilitative theory was administered by the social scientists themselves. As the number and kinds of treatment programs proliferated, and as more controlled and rigorous studies were made of their results, the findings revealed that they were not succeeding in reducing recidivism. A massive survey of rehabilitation programs undertaken by Robert Martinson and his colleagues—first reported on in an article by Martinson in the Spring 1974 issue of *The Public Interest*—concluded that there was "no clear pattern to indicate the efficacy of any particular method of treatment." Given the moral and political questioning of the rehabilitative theory that was already taking place, the effect of the Martinson study was devastating. The tide of opinion turned decisively against rehabilitation as a justification for the imprisonment of criminals.

The conclusion that Jessica Mitford had drawn from the discrediting of the rehabilitative theory was that prisons should simply be abolished. This "abolitionist" position was based on a rejection of the three other justifications commonly offered for imprisonment: 1) incapacitation of convicted criminals; 2) deterrence of other potential lawbreakers; and 3) retribution. Miss Mitford glibly denied the effectiveness of prisons in curtailing crime through performance of the first two functions, and simply brushed aside the case for retribution. Nor did she suggest a new form of criminal sanction to replace imprisonment. Since Miss Mitford is neither a utopian nor a fool, she presumably did not really believe that the United States or any other political community could maintain itself without any criminal sanctions whatsoever. Her call for the abolition of prisons made sense only as a tactic forming part of a larger strategy for revolutionary political and social change.

The abolitionist program was destined for failure since very few, even on the left, were upon reflection prepared to accept Miss Mitford's suggestion that imprisonment should not be employed

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for even the most serious crimes. Thus the ultimate effect of the successful critique of the rehabilitative theory was to spark scholarly interest in other functions performed by prisons. Rising crime rates had already begun to focus attention on the incapacitative and deterrent effects of imprisonment. While liberal opponents of the indeterminate sentence tended to be particularly disturbed by the overly long periods of confinement it sometimes allowed, others attacked the indeterminate-sentencing system for releasing many serious offenders without any period of confinement at all. These critics argued that the frequent failure to incarcerate even repeat offenders who committed serious crimes substantially weakened the legitimate incapacitative function of the prison sanction, and that the general uncertainty as to whether a prison sentence would be imposed severely reduced its deterrent capabilities. Moreover, sophisticated statistical studies by economists and sociologists indicated that, contrary to the conventional wisdom among penological champions of the rehabilitative theory, deterrence did indeed "work"—i.e., greater certainty and severity of the sanction did produce a lower rate of crime. Finally, there was even a new willingness to take seriously the old-fashioned concept of retribution—which, in the aftermath of Watergate and the Pardon, no longer seemed quite so barbaric or unreasonable, even to many liberals.

THE wide-open nature of the current discussion of criminal sanctions has led to a reexamination of first principles and to a generally more philosophic level of discourse. This development is reflected in two recently published books on the subject: *Doing Justice* (Hill and Wang, $9.95), the report of the predominantly liberal Committee for the Study of Incarceration written by Andrew von Hirsch; and *Punishing Criminals* (Basic Books, $10.95), written by the conservative social scientist Ernest van den Haag.

The argument of *Doing Justice* is heavily influenced by civil-libertarian concerns and a "basic mistrust of the power of the state." It therefore rejects the rehabilitative theory and the indeterminate sentence on many of the grounds discussed above. Yet it acknowledges, albeit somewhat grudgingly, "at least a partial acceptance of this society's laws: one that permits us to consider violators as, by and large, deserving of punishment." The return to common sense of liberal thinking about crime is nowhere better illustrated than by the following passage from the Introduction to *Doing Justice*, written by Committee members Willard Gaylin and David Rothman:

> One of the sad consequences of the appropriation of the term "law and order" by the extreme right wing as a euphemism for racist feelings that were unfashionable to articulate was that the intellectual community, repelled by the implicit racism, turned away from the legitimate rights that such words imply. The authentic need to investigate the essential importance of both law and order was slighted. Instead, the intellectual community focused all too exclusively on the

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> neglected rights of the criminal offender, forgetting that, while this was a compassionate and necessary pursuit, the welfare of the community was the primary concern of a system of criminal justice.

The Committee's recognition that the criminal justice system must serve the welfare of the community is reflected in its acceptance of deterrence as a reason for imposing criminal sanctions. But given their intense concern for the individual and his rights, von Hirsch and his colleagues are understandably reluctant to allow deterrence or any other crime-control considerations to serve as the primary rationale for punishing particular individuals. Invoking the names of Immanuel Kant and John Rawls, they argue that the claims of justice must take precedence over purely utilitarian considerations. Hence they focus upon the old-fashioned concept of *desert* (a "somewhat less emotionally loaded" synonym for retribution) as the chief justification for punishment. Criminals should be punished because the acts they have committed *deserve* it. And the severity of their punishment should be proportional to the "seriousness" of their crime.[1]

There is, however, another theme that is sounded repeatedly throughout *Doing Justice*—an insistence that the sanction of imprisonment be sparingly used. In the Introduction, Gaylin and Rothman put it this way:

> . . . central to our conception, essential to its balance, is a commitment to the most stringent limits on incarceration.
>
> It would be better to ignore the recommendations of the Committee entirely than to accept any part of them without that focus on decarceration about which all its other arguments pivot. . . . To abandon the rehabilitative model without a simultaneous gradation downward in prison sentences would be an unthinkable cruelty and a dangerous act.

In accordance with this view, the Report recommends that even for the most serious violent offenses—"perhaps" with the exception of murder—no prison sentences should exceed five years, even for repeat offenders. Similarly, it suggests that for crimes like burglary and auto theft, incarceration should not be employed at all (instead, the punishment, apparently even for repeat offenders, would be no more than "stiff schedules of intermittent confinement involving substantial deprivations of offenders' leisure time").

Despite what the statement by Gaylin and Rothman quoted above seems to imply, the Report's reliance on the principle of "commensurate deserts" as the basis for punishment in no way necessarily entails the emphasis on decarceration that accompanies it. Von Hirsch justifies the scaling down of prison sentences by asserting that incarceration is a severe penalty (in the sense of "being very unpleasant, given the prevailing tolerances for suffering") and hence should be restricted to serious crimes. But he

[1] Seriousness, as von Hirsch defines it, "depends both on the harm done (or risked) by the act and on the degree of the actor's culpability".

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offers no clear standard for ascertaining what degree of severity properly corresponds to what degree of seriousness. The standard that first suggests itself, the *lex talionis*, according to which the suffering imposed on the criminal should insofar as possible equal in degree and kind the injury inflicted on his victims, is explicitly rejected by von Hirsch as unnecessarily severe. This traditional principle of "an eye for an eye" indeed seems excessively harsh and inhumane to modern sensibilities; yet difficult problems arise when one attempts—as von Hirsch does—to sever completely the link between the degree of suffering of the victim and that of the criminal. Let us take the example of a victim who is crippled for life as the result of a willful aggravated assault. Whatever von Hirsch may say about how unpleasant incarceration is, I doubt that most people would feel the demands of justice had been met if the assailant served only a two- or three-year sentence.

The Report's suggestion that crimes like burglary and auto theft not be punished by incarceration is also highly problematic. The rationale for this seems to be that nonviolent property crimes fail to "do or threaten sufficient injury" to warrant severe punishment. But harm done or threatened is not the only measure of the seriousness of a crime; one must also consider the profit gained by the criminal. For justice requires that a lawbreaker not benefit from his illegal acts—in other words, that crime not pay. A "professional" burglar or auto thief might well find intermittent confinement, when he is caught and convicted, a small price to pay compared to the profits of his illegal enterprise. In this case, the need for stiffer penalties, at least for repeat offenders, would be clear. That principle of justice which holds that crime should not pay would also enable a desert-based system of punishment to meet the needs of deterrence.

That punishment is necessary to make crime unprofitable and to "avoid cheating those who remained law-abiding" is a point clearly recognized by Ernest van den Haag. Many of the things that can be obtained through crime (e.g., money) are regarded by most of us as desirable. Hence the threat of punishment is needed to "offset the temptation to gratify individual wishes by unlawful means." Because van den Haag regards crime as rational in this sense, he opposes the view that most criminals are "sick," and rejects the rehabilitative model. He comes to the debate over how to deal with convicted offenders concerned primarily with the need to preserve the social fabric and to reduce crime. His conservatism has neither a libertarian nor a moralistic cast. The position he takes might best be described as a kind of hard-headed "realism," and he argues it with considerable learning and sophistication.

Although he emphasizes the utilitarian aspects of punishment, van den Haag is also sensitive to the importance of desert. He recognizes that justice and utility are closely intertwined in the

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institution of punishment—that considerations of justice almost always limit what we are willing to do for the sake of utility. He brings home this point with a particularly telling example:

> If laws aimed only at utility, they would threaten the most severe punishment for whatever causes the most serious and frequent injuries, wherever the threat might restrain people. We should then punish vehicular homicide (negligent manslaughter) by drunken drivers more severely than deliberate murder. The former victimizes more people by far than murder, is no less serious for the victims, and is not caused by passion or malevolence, which produces crimes hard to restrain. Homicidal drunken driving could probably be deterred more frequently than murder by the effective threat of severe punishment. Yet we punish murder more severely. Murderers have intentionally committed a wrong whereas the drunken driver did not intend to kill. We feel that he deserves less retribution because guilt depends on intent as well as on the effect produced.

Yet despite this insight, van den Haag insists on the practical importance of distinguishing the goal of defending the social order from the goal of doing justice to individuals, and stresses those instances in which punishment can legitimately serve the former goal at the expense of the latter. In this connection he cites the harsh, exemplary punishments which may be deemed necessary in an army at war, a ship threatened with mutiny, or a country suffering from a severe famine—punishments which far exceed our ordinary sense of what is deserved. The force of these examples cannot simply be denied. As Machiavelli delighted in pointing out, sometimes there do arise situations of extreme emergency in which the preservation of the political order—the precondition of justice for individuals—requires the abrogation of the ordinary rules of justice. What is disquieting about van den Haag's argument, however, is that he seeks to incorporate the suspension of justice that may be necessary in extreme situations into the everyday workings of the criminal justice system.

Thus, invoking the principle that "the preservation of society and the security and welfare of its members are legitimate political ends beyond justice," he advocates the preventive confinement of "dangerous" offenders *beyond* the terms of punishment deserved by their offenses. Van den Haag proposes that predictions of dangerousness be based on a "categorical method" taking into account such factors as prior convictions and age and sex of the offender, and suggests that "post-punishment incapacitation" be mandatory for violent criminals with "no less than a 60 per cent chance of recidivism." Now, it seems clear from van den Haag's discussion that prior convictions will be the chief determinant of whether additional preventive confinement will be imposed. But prior convictions, as it is argued in *Doing Justice*, can reasonably be viewed as increasing the offender's degree of culpability, and hence as making him *deserve* a lengthier sentence. Thus most of

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the protection for society that van den Haag is seeking can probably be achieved within a system that stays within the bounds of justice. And whatever additional safety benefits might be gained by post-punishment confinement on the basis of statistical factors like age or sex simply are not worth the price of bringing into the criminal justice system an element of blatant injustice to individuals. The crime problem is a serious one, but the situation is surely not desperate enough to justify such an expedient.

Von Hirsch and his colleagues would no doubt be horrified by van den Haag's willingness to override the rights of the convict in this way for the sake of protecting society at large. Yet the Committee for the Study of Incarceration also shows itself willing to allow the principle of post-punishment confinement, albeit for rather different reasons. The Committee admits an exception to its otherwise passionate opposition to predictive restraint in the case of "defendants who stand convicted of serious assault crimes and who have extensive records of violence." Given the public outcry that is likely if short sentences are applied in such cases, the Committee reasons that "unless express authority to invoke predictive restraint is granted here, the entire structure of 'deserved' sentences could become distorted upward." In short, rather than admit that someone handed a fourth conviction for violent crime might *deserve* a sentence of more than five years, the Commitee prefers to countenance a direct violation of its own principle that imprisonment can be justified only on the basis of desert. So while van den Haag is ready to depart from justice for the sake of preserving social order, the Committee is ready to depart from justice in order to preserve a lower scale of prison sentences.

Whatever shortcomings *Punishing Criminals* and *Doing Justice* may have, however, should not be allowed to obscure their considerable virtues. Both van den Haag and von Hirsch clearly reject the two myths that have vitiated so much of the discussion about criminal justice—the view that criminals are "sick" individuals who are not morally responsible for their offenses, and the view that criminals are political rebels struggling against oppression. In place of these myths, both authors affirm the eminently sensible proposition that criminals are lawbreakers who deserve to be punished for their illegal actions. As the differences between these two books show, the acceptance of this proposition by no means provides unambiguous guidelines for reforming our system of dealing with convicted offenders. But it is an indispensable first step toward a just and rational response to the problem of crime.

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# Deregulating the Cities

CHRISTOPHER C. DEMUTH

THE Model Cities program was to have been the crowning achievement of the "Great Society." It was designed for President Johnson by a task force of distinguished academic, business, labor, and civil-rights leaders, working in high secrecy far from the locks and tugs of interest-group politics. It was unveiled in the President's 1966 State of the Union address, in which he said the program would "set in motion the forces of change in great urban areas that will make them the masterpieces of our civilization," through "an effort larger in scope, more comprehensive, more concentrated than any that has gone before." In nine months, the program was passed by Congress and signed into law. Over the next eight years, Model Cities was administered by a bright, earnest, hard working Washington staff; was the subject of more Cabinet-level deliberation than any other domestic enterprise of the federal government; engaged the efforts of thousands of citizens, mayors, city planners, and state and city officials across the land; and received greater federal appropriations—just under $3 billion by the end of 1974—than President Johnson had requested. And by 1974, when Model Cities was incorporated into special revenue-sharing for community development, and was thus effectively abolished, it was the most unequivocal failure of all the "Great Society" programs.

How this came to be is the subject of two recent books, *The Politics of Neglect: Urban Aid from Model Cities to Revenue Sharing*, by Bernard J. Frieden and Marshall Kaplan (The MIT Press, $14.95), and *Between the Idea and the Reality: A Study in the Origin, Fate and Legacy of the Model Cities Program*, by Charles M. Haar (Little, Brown, $15.00). Anyone who wants to know why a nation that used to be able to put a man on the moon can't solve the problems of the cities can find the answer in either book —preferably Frieden and Kaplan's, which is far better written, more analytical, and less polemical. All three authors were involved with Model Cities at one time or another. Frieden was a member of the original task force, chaired by Robert Wood, which proposed the program, and was later a member of another task force, chaired

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by Edward C. Banfield, which reviewed the program for President Nixon; Kaplan was a consultant to the Model Cities Administration for most of the life of the program; and Haar was both a member of the Wood task force and later an Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Both books are unstinting in their criticisms of the program and its administration, and both offer interesting and sometimes amusing peeks into the bureaucracy at work. But both fail to take full measure of the program's failure, and Haar suggests that things might work out better next time if everyone would just try harder. In what follows, I shall be drawing not only on the books themselves, but also on my own experience as a staff assistant in the White House during the early days of the Nixon Administration.

As conceived by the Wood task force, the Model Cities program was an effort to rationalize and redirect federal urban policy. Existing policy was seen as a hash of uncoordinated and often contradictory grant programs that either were not accomplishing their purposes or were accomplishing unworthy purposes. Urban renewal was working to the benefit of real-estate developers and the urban middle-class, not the poor, and it was at cross-purposes with the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and highway programs. Programs which were explicitly directed at the most serious, poverty-related urban problems were (like public housing) concerned with "bricks and mortar" rather than deeper "social and psychological" problems, and were in any event too miserly to have much impact. City governments were not paying enough attention to their poorest slum neighborhoods, for reasons of politics and finances, and the federal programs were hurting rather than helping the situation: The single-purpose categorical grants increased the fragmentation of local government into independent agencies and authorities, stifling local leadership and making concerted attempts to improve slum conditions all but impossible. In sum, the cities were overregulated and underfunded. This was the prevailing view in the mid-1960's in academic circles and in the upper reaches of the federal establishment, and it was no doubt substantially correct. A strong sense of urgency was added to all this, just months before the Wood task force began its work, by the Watts riot in August of 1965.

The solution proposed by the task force was a program of "comprehensive city demonstrations," in 60 to 70 cities, that would blast through the rigidities of the categorical grant programs and demonstrate what a solidly funded, well planned effort could do to improve conditions in the worst city slums. This was to be accomplished by (to use the task force's words) *concentration, coordination,* and *mobilization.* Federal funds would be concentrated in the selected model cities by appropriating $2.3 billion for "supplemental grants" to be spent by the cities on slum-improvement projects according to their own local plans—which would be

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drafted by newly established "City Demonstration Agencies" (CDA's)—and also by making available as much categorical grant money as possible for use according to the local plans. The categorical grants would be coordinated for use in the city programs both from the "top down" and from the "bottom up": In Washington, the federal agencies administering the various categorical grants would coordinate their program requirements and funding decisions to accommodate local program plans; in the cities, the CDA's would use the supplemental grants to induce state and local agencies to expand their programs in slum neighborhoods and to administer them according to the demonstration plans. Mobilization of local initiative would be brought about through the decentralization of decision-making inherent in the noncategorical supplemental grants and in the federal coordination of categorical grants in response to local plans. Local mobilization, as well as an improvement in the "sensitivity" and "responsiveness" of city governments, would be further stimulated by requiring "widespread citizen participation" in the planning and execution of the cities' programs. Finally, since the purpose of the program was to demonstrate that the most serious urban problems could indeed be solved and to lay the political and programmatic groundwork for solving them in all cities later on, two further requirements would be made of local model cities programs: They would have to be based upon "comprehensive planning," attacking *all* the problems of the slum neighborhoods in a rational, systematic fashion; and they would have to be "innovative," employing promising new methods that might be evaluated and later applied elsewhere.

THE program did not turn out as the task force had hoped, and a principal reason was that the proposal, and the legislation drafted to implement it, was based on little more than hope. Although there was little disagreement over the shortcomings of the existing programs, most of the task force's ideas about how to improve on them were highly speculative. As Haar notes,

> No study had shown persuasively that comprehensive planning, as envisioned by the task force, was feasible, or capable of achieving economies or efficiencies. There were only articles of faith that coordination and concentration of aid would bring significant improvements in cities, that the federal aid programs were too confining, that previous programs had not been sufficiently comprehensive, and that slum areas needed experiments and innovations rather than conventional public services received all along by other neighborhoods.

Nor did the task force say just how the reforms it proposed were to be accomplished. There was much theorizing among task force members about how the cities could use their supplemental grants to "fill the gaps" between the categorical programs and "lure" categorical grants into poverty neighborhoods, and how HUD (which would administer the program) would be the "lead agency" in

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securing funds from other departments for use in model cities programs. But this too was just speculation. And there apparently was *not* much speculation about how the inconsistencies in the proposed reforms would be resolved—how coordination of federal programs (which implies the existence of a coordinator) would be reconciled with devolution of authority to the city level, or how systematic planning would be reconciled with widespread citizen participation.

The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 did not illuminate any of these mysteries.[1] It did authorize the Secretary of HUD to make grants to cities to plan and execute programs that would "remove or arrest blight and decay in entire sections or neighborhoods," and that would "make marked progress in reducing" a long list of social ills. But the law did not say how the Secretary or the cities themselves were to see that these things got done, nor did it say how the various agencies of the federal government were to "coordinate" their existing programs (the Secretary was directed to "consult" with other agencies about their programs), nor how the cities were to get widespread participation of their citizens in planning their programs. All of these matters were left to be worked out at the administrative level, so that, when the Model Cities Administration was established at the end of 1966, it was pretty much on its own.

When the first Assistant Secretary for Model Cities took office at HUD, he drew up some program guidelines, instructed his staff to begin making contacts in the other departments for the purpose of coordinating their program funds to meet model cities plans, and began traveling about the country to promote the program with city officials. The first guidelines limited city demonstration programs to "model neighborhoods" no larger than 10 per cent of the population of each city; this was necessary to maintain fund "concentration" because Congress, in enacting the program, had doubled the number of cities without increasing program funds substantially. Soon, hundreds of cities had mailed in applications for planning grants, and the Model Cities Administration staff set about choosing the 60 to 70 winners that would receive the "first round" of planning grants. The staff tried to formulate rigorous, objective criteria for choosing among the competing planning applications. But this proved impossible and the standards they eventually used were based on considerations of city "capacity" and "commitment," which were so vague as to give the staff *more* control than in the case of categorical programs. As reported by Frieden and Kaplan, it was difficult to apply even these broad standards, since most of the cities had simply hired consultants to write their grant applications, or had assigned the task to one or two city hall staff assistants. There was, therefore, ample room for rank politics to influence the

[1] Although the law was titled "Demonstration Cities," President Johnson changed the program to "Model Cities" after a number of Congressmen complained that the cities already had enough "demonstrations."

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selection of the favored cities: Pikesville, Kentucky, and Smithville, Tennessee, for example, were selected because they were the home towns of important Congressmen. The staff was not averse to a little politics of its own—Los Angeles, alone of all the large cities, was excluded from the first round because the Washington staff didn't like Mayor Yorty. (It was added in the "second round" of model cities after the appropriate Congressional complaints.) By late June of 1967, the Model Cities Administration staff had settled upon its choices for the first round of model cities, and then the summer and fall passed while nothing happened at all. Due to a number of frustrating political and administrative delays, no formal announcements were made or planning grants awarded until the following November. In the meantime, morale sagged in the Washington office, many CDA officials in the cities moved on to other pursuits, and the program fell under increasing attack from mayors and civil-rights spokesmen. By the time the first model cities were announced, much of the program's initial political allure had been lost, never to be regained.[2]

The model cities were each given a few hundred thousand dollars to engage in 12 months of planning, plus extensive guidelines and "technical-assistance bulletins" telling them how to plan comprehensively and how to stimulate participation of model-neighborhood residents. There was considerable unhappiness, in both the model cities and in Washington, over requiring the cities to spend an entire year doing nothing but planning. But many people in the Model Cities Administration, including the Assistant Secretary, believed that the only way the cities could intelligently spend the massive amount of money they were going to be getting, and coordinate its impact to achieve maximum results, would be if they first engaged in a highly systematic and rationalized planning process, which would identify the interrelationships among all the many problems of the model neighborhoods, and design projects to take account of them. Also, it was becoming clear that it would take at least an entire year for the Model Cities Administration to hold up its part of the bargain, by getting the other departments to begin putting their funds at the disposal of the local plans.

When the Model Cities Administration staffers began their first serious talks with people from other federal agencies about "coordinating" their categorical funds for use in the model cities programs, they made a number of disconcerting discoveries. Most of the categorical grant programs which seemed pertinent to the model cities plans were either administered according to

[2] Haar makes the harmless mistake of saying that the delay in announcing the first model cities planning grants took place in 1966, rather than in 1967. But he then proceeds to explain that one reason for the delay was to wait until the midterm Congressional elections were past! Frieden and Kaplan correctly note that the principal reason for the delay was to wait until Congress had acted on the Administration's request for first-year supplemental-grant appropriations.

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precise statutory allocation formulas or were administered by the states, leaving little or no discretion for concentrating them on model neighborhoods or coordinating them in response to model cities plans. Only a small fraction of the billions of dollars spent each year by the Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), Labor, Commerce, Transportation, and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) were within immediate control of the Washington offices. Those agencies which did have funding discretion, such as OEO and the Department of Labor, generally exercised that discretion for purposes of their own: to further national goals just as important as those of the Model Cities program (as those in the agencies themselves saw it), or (as those in the Model Cities Administration saw it) to satisfy the parochial demands of powerful local groups such as labor unions and Community Action Agencies. In any event, with few exceptions, none of the other agencies were agreeable to having their programs coordinated by the Model Cities Administration to fit the plans submitted by the CDA's. The only success that the Model Cities Administration had was in persuading some agencies *not* to fund new programs in model neighborhoods until approved by the local CDA's or citizen-participation organizations.

By the summer of 1968, the Model Cities Administration was swamped with proposals for using categorical funds in city plans, and the Assistant Secretary went to Joseph Califano, President Johnson's assistant for domestic affairs, and asked for his assistance in getting the other agencies to go along with the model cities plans. Califano responded enthusiastically, calling up the domestic Cabinet Secretaries and telling them how much importance the President attached to Model Cities, and sending out memos asking for specific procedural steps the Departments could take to accommodate model cities plans. The Departments' responses were not encouraging: Even where they had legal discretion over program funds, they felt they could not safely commit them in advance of yearly Congressional appropriations, and of course by the time the appropriations process was over, most of the funds would already be committed to projects favored by those who voted the appropriations.

Califano continued to exhort the Cabinet officers to do all they could, but he could do little more than exhort. A man as busy as he was could not be expected to get into the details of whether HEW should fund a model cities health center in Gila River, Arizona, or whether HUD's City Demonstration Agency or OEO's Community Action Agency should have the final say over manpower training in Seattle. And although our authors do not report on this, Califano must have realized that if he had gotten into the details, he would have found in every case that there were a dozen good reasons, which he could not reasonably contradict, for an agency's doing exactly as it had done.

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The Model Cities Administration was successful in organizing a number of interagency committees in Washington and at the regional level to review model cities plans in detail and attempt coordination. But although the middle-level staffers from the other Departments attended committee meetings faithfully and were eager to help, they had no authority to commit program funds or revise program guidelines. As a result, these meetings were all talk and no action—as Frieden and Kaplan report, they "had a depressing quality of futility that is difficult to capture in words." Moreover, the committee members from the other Departments had their own strong views about what constituted a sound drug-treatment program, or job-training program, or senior-citizen outreach program, and they didn't mind saying that those people in Dayton should be told that their approach had been discredited years ago. In the eyes of the Model Cities Administration staff, those from the other Departments didn't understand what Model Cities was all about. And the crowning insult came when it appeared just why some of the committee members were such faithful auditors of these meetings: in order to learn where and how the model cities were planning to use their supplemental grants, so their own Departments' funds could be adjusted *downward* or redirected *elsewhere*.

By the time the first model cities programs were announced in December of 1968, the term "supplemental grant" had become an Orwellian misnomer—the grants were not supplementing anything, but were themselves the whole program. The HUD press releases announcing the model cities programs listed numerous projects funded by other agencies, but in most cases the non-HUD projects had neither been planned by the local CDA's nor coordinated at the federal level to fit local plans. By this time, most of the local model cities administrators had come to realize that the promised gush of categorical grant money was never going to be more than a trickle. As a result, most of the supplemental grants were used for projects which could have been funded by the categorical grants, rather than for "innovative" projects or to "fill the gaps" between the categorical programs.

Under the Nixon Administration, Model Cities officials spent even more time trying to secure cooperation from the other Departments, faced as they were with ongoing programs in the full complement of 150 model cities. But they had no greater success than their predecessors, and their frustrations eventually led to the Administration's proposals for consolidating the categorical programs (and Model Cities itself) into special revenue-sharing grants, two of which (for community development and manpower training) were enacted by the end of 1974.

BOTH of the two recent books conclude that the authors of the Model Cities program greatly underestimated the institutional barriers to program coordination at the administrative level. In-

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deed, both books suggest that one of the program's principal contributions was to dramatize the strength of these barriers, thus paving the way for comprehensive consolidation of the categorical programs under the special revenue-sharing laws. (Though Haar has nothing good to say about the revenue-sharing proposals advanced by the Nixon Administration, he does favor special-purpose block grants to the cities "because of the almost impossible task of coordinating and scheduling federal projects at the local level.") Yet it is unclear why this was so. The institutional barriers that frustrated the Model Cities program were not built by the administrative agencies themselves. They consisted not of the bureaucratic arrogance and caprice celebrated in Chamber of Commerce luncheon talks, but of specific restrictions written deliberately by Congress into the categorical program laws and zealously enforced by those groups which benefited from the programs. It is a puzzle, therefore, why those barriers that successfully stood against coordination at the administrative level were later unable to stand against consolidation at the legislative level. Perhaps Congress, since it is more vulnerable to public scrutiny than the bureaucracy, is less free to place the narrow interests of organized groups above what is popularly regarded as the interest of the public at large. Or perhaps Model Cities itself, by advancing large sums directly to the mayors and other local officials, fueled them with sufficient energy and cohesiveness to override the interests of other groups. Neither Haar nor Frieden and Kaplan offer evidence or speculation on this point, nor has anyone else, so far as I know.

The cities had no greater luck than the federal government in fulfilling their part of the Model Cities vision. The planning guidelines which the Model Cities Administration sent to the model cities were incredibly complex—requiring cities to prepare, in sequential order, a precise quantitative analysis of all of the problems of their poorest neighborhoods, a statement of program goals, a strategy statement, a first-year action plan (which specified all proposed projects and the "linkages" among them), a five-year plan, a continuous planning and evaluation program, and an analysis of the proposed administrative structure. If taken seriously, the guidelines would have required social analysis of a kind which very few, if any, living Americans were capable. But the cities did not take them seriously at all. The planning requirements were "an obstacle to overcome rather than a welcome component of the program" (in the words of Frieden and Kaplan), and cities overcame the obstacle by submitting encyclopedic plans many thousands of pages long, containing everything at hand in the way of facts and figures about the model neighborhood, but very little analysis that was not off-the-cuff and faddish. Washington staffers who reviewed these plans would get the feeling—eight inches deep into their 26th plan, their eyes glazing—that they had read it all somewhere before. Sometimes they would check back and discover they *had*

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read it before: Many cities, it turned out, simply copied portions of their problem analyses from other cities. But in truth, at the level of sophistication attempted by most of the plans, one city's problems were about the same as another's.

Frieden, Kaplan, and Haar agree that the Model Cities planning requirements were pretty ridiculous, but neither books says much at all about the actual content of the model cities plans, or how they were influenced by citizen participation, or their eventual impact on the model neighborhoods. This is disappointing, for although both books argue that the emphasis of the program was on "process" rather than "product," a central purpose was clearly to demonstrate substantial improvements in the conditions of slum neighborhoods through concentration of funds, innovation, and citizen participation. Of course, the failure of federal coordination undercut both concentration and innovation, as we have seen. Yet $3 billion is a large sum of money, and both books assume, in criticizing the current revenue-sharing programs, that Model Cities, did achieve an important degree of concentration of funds into poverty neighborhoods and desirable improvements in citizen participation. Frieden and Kaplan note, for example, that although general revenue-sharing has typically provided cities with twice as much funds as model cities supplementary grants, "local political pressures could be counted on to make far less available for spending in the model neighborhood." And they criticize special (community-development) revenue-sharing for being "weak and ambiguous" in its requirements that funds be focused on improving slum conditions, and for its "failure to define a clear and measurable role for residents." But they do not attempt to compare with Model Cities the *total* effect of general and special revenue-sharing on the level of public expenditures benefitting model neighborhoods, nor do they explain how citizen participation has changed (or may be expected to change) from what it was under Model Cities.

Haar does not even attempt to measure the results of the Model Cities program, remarking that to do so would "take us more into the field of speculative theology than of practical politics." Yet Haar finds that the demise of Model Cities and the enactment of general and special revenue-sharing constitute an abandonment of the program's essential purposes, bringing about "changes which are essentially regressive in their probable effect," and he hints broadly that it is *because* the revenue-sharing laws are regressive that the Nixon Administration advanced them. He also believes that revenue-sharing, since it does not require "participation of interest groups not otherwise heard," is "spending without representation." The darkest of motives are lurking here as well: "Madison's reference in his Article 10 to the danger of a 'permanent minority' takes on omnious meaning in the context of the experience of general revenue-sharing to date, which, for example, has been uniformly devoid of significant citizen participation."

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I know of nothing that suggests that Model Cities actually brought either a measurable concentration of public funds into model neighborhoods or the kind of mobilization of local initiative envisioned by the program's framers, and I know a good deal that suggests otherwise. A substantial amount of the cities' supplemental grants apparently ended up maintaining other federal programs which had been cut back in Washington or in the cities. For example, in 1969 the Department of Labor grew dissatisfied with its primary manpower-training program, the Concentrated Employment Program, and began cutting back its grants to local program sponsors. But by this time the program had developed considerable momentum at the local level, and model cities proposals began coming in with plans to reinstate the local programs using supplemental grants. In the same year, the Seattle model cities plan proposed to expand the city's OEO Legal Services Program with $35,000 of supplemental funds—but when OEO's regional office learned of this (through the regional Model Cities coordinating committee) it proceeded to *cut* the Seattle program by the same amount. In both cases, the Model Cities Administration ended up writing out a check to the other departments. Examples such as these abounded in the cities and in Washington throughout the life of the program, to the considerable dismay of Model Cities officials.

More importantly, the elaborate "comprehensive planning" process imposed by the Model Cities Administration, and the requirement that all plans be ratified by citizen-participation organizations, delayed or halted the flow of funds into the model neighborhoods for years. It was *two years* after the signing of the Demonstration Cities Act before the first handful of cities received any supplemental funds at all, and most cities had to wait much longer. The delay was not limited to supplemental funds, for while the Model Cities Administration was almost totally unsuccessful in getting other agencies to commit funds for use in model cities projects, it did have some success in getting other agencies (especially within HUD) *not* to fund any projects in model neighborhoods without the approval of the local CDA and citizen participants. An FHA director reported in the fall of 1969 that he had already held up hundreds of thousands of dollars in mortgage guarantees in one model neighborhood because the local CDA and its citizen advisers had not yet agreed upon their comprehensive plan.

Model Cities officials felt that the initial delay was a small price to pay for the benefits which would come later—well thought-out projects that would produce tangible results and, therefore, Congressional support for even greater appropriations. But it was not that simple. The program created at least two new "veto groups" in every city, the CDA's and the citizen-participation organizations, and while it turned out that these groups had nothing to gain but the supplemental grants, their *mandate* was a sweeping one—to plan "comprehensively" for virtually everything that was

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to happen in their model neighborhoods. And, of course, they took this charge very seriously—calling on mayors to block new construction projects, opposing changes in the administration of the police departments, and quarreling with the Community Action Agencies over the details of *their* programs. Mayor Lindsay had originally testified before Congress that Model Cities appropriations would have to be increased radically over President Johnson's request, because New York City alone would require "approximately" $2 billion. But the planning and citizen-participation requirements engendered such (additional) confusion there that the city never was able to spend even half of the $65 million supplemental grant it received for its first program year! This was apparently a widespread problem. Frieden and Kaplan report that actual expenditures of supplemental funds in all model cities were only 18 per cent of the funds HUD had committed in fiscal year 1970, and 54 per cent in 1972; they were expected to reach 75 per cent in 1973. It would be interesting to know the comparable results under special and general revenue-sharing.

WHILE the planning and citizen-participation requirements were apparently successful in stalling or preventing expenditures in the model neighborhoods, it is doubtful that they resulted in much improvement in the substance of the local programs. As plan-submission deadlines approached, the most aggressive of citizen-participation groups commonly yielded program authority to the professionals on the CDA staffs, who were wise in the ways of writing documents acceptable to Washington, and were also well connected with (and often on detail from) other local agencies. Perhaps as a result, a large share of the supplemental grant projects consisted of supplements to the budgets of the various local agencies, either to expand their regular services (such as day-care and youth-corps programs) or to engage in special projects (such as police-community or teacher-parent "communications" programs). In a study of citizen participation in New York City, where citizen's groups were more active than in most model cities, Seymore Z. Mann concluded:

> While the record is somewhat different on each of the three Model neighborhoods in New York, the first-year plans submitted last May, which guaranteed for New York City the $65 million allotment of supplemental funding, were not the product of the orderly, rational planning system mandated by the HUD guidelines; nor were they, in fact, in many important details the plans that had been developed through the citizen-participation mechanism that had been instituted by the City and approved by HUD.
>
> They were, rather, manipulated and maneuvered out of the system through a fantastically complicated political dance on a taut tightrope accomplished to keep the facade of the process intact and to preserve New York's share of the pie. Here and there one sees an innovative

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> program or project included in the thousands of pages of plan submissions and something of the articulated linkages between social and physical planning as an aspect of the systems planning inherent in the intentions of the Model Cities legislation. For the most part, however, it is difficult to conclude that what was produced was very much different than would have been the case had the elaborate neighborhood planning mechanism and the citizen participation mechanism not existed at all.[3]

While one is hesitant to generalize about anything from the experience of New York, in this case it does seem to have been typical. It is reasonable to suppose that an accurate measure of the effectiveness of citizen participation is the extent to which model cities funds were spend directly in the model neighborhood themselves; indeed one of the primary reasons for the citizen-participation requirement was to increase the amount of funds going into target neighborhoods. If so, then a study conducted for the Model Cities Administration by Booz Allen & Hamilton is some indication of the effectiveness of citizen participation as well as the extent of concentration of the funds the model cities were able to spend. It found that, in 13 model cities studied, *60 per cent of the supplemental funds were spent outside the model neighborhoods.*[4]

THE change of Administration in January 1969 is described very differently in the two books. To Haar, the arrival of the Nixon Administration was a "calamity" and an "unparalleled disaster" for the Model Cities program. He does not explain why this was so, though he does say that the Johnson Administration had "considerable success in stimulating local response," while Nixon's "lack of belief in citizen participation . . . led to increased disaffection and alienation among poor and black residents." This may be true (Haar's book contains no examples of either the successes under Johnson or the disaffection and alienation under Nixon), but it does not seem a fair comparison. The Johnson Administration gave cities a few hundred thousand dollars apiece to plan to spend whatever was necessary to put an end to all their problems, and this naturally stimulated a certain local response. The Nixon Administration was presented with the bills for all of the plans the cities came up with, and no doubt there was some disillusionment and alienation when those bills could be paid only in part. But the Johnson Administration no more championed "citizen participation" than did the Nixon Administration. Indeed, one of the reasons President Johnson commissioned the initial Model Cities task force was his disillusionment with the Community Action Program, which he felt had been taken over by "kooks and sociol-

[3] Seymour Z. Mann, "Participation of the Poor and Model Cities in New York City: The Impact of Participation and Has Participation Made a Difference," Hunter College, CUNY, Department of Urban Affairs, May, 1970.

[4] Booz Allen & Hamilton, Inc., "Study of the Concentration and Dispersion Impact of the Model Cities Program (Washington, D.C., 1971).

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ogists," and it was his Model Cities officials who established the requirement that program authority must rest with the mayors rather than citizen participants.

Frieden and Kaplan give a far more detailed account of the frustrations of Model Cities under the Nixon Administration—President Nixon's skepticism about the program; HUD Secretary Romney's efforts to powder it up and make it look more "Republican"; Daniel P. Moynihan's attempts to secure cooperation from the non-HUD agencies, similar to Califano's efforts and with similar results; and the White House efforts to use program funds for its own purposes, such as school desegregation and revenue-sharing, which were blocked or revised by the mayors and City Demonstration Agencies. But what comes through the Frieden and Kaplan account is that the change of Administrations, far from being an unparalleled disaster, made very little difference at all. President Nixon did not like the program, and at an early meeting told Moynihan he wanted the program "killed." But Moynihan demurred (my notes say that he responded, "Now you worry about our treaties in Southeast Asia and I'll worry about our treaties with the cities"). Though Moynihan was hardly more enthusiastic about the program than was the President, he sensed that large promises had been made to the cities which had to be kept—and probably could not, as a practical matter, be broken. Within the federal bureaucracy, the friends and enemies of Model Cities were about the same as they had been before: HEW channeled more grant money into the model neighborhoods than any other agency; Transportation and Commerce had little discretion to exercise on the program's behalf; Labor and OEO were generally hostile. President Nixon's Model Cities officials fussed with the program—removing the 10 per cent model-neighborhood limitation, relaxing planning and review requirements somewhat, increasing supplemental grants to some cities and decreasing them to others—but they did not change its essentials. And they did not replace it with their own revenue-sharing programs until every last penny promised to the cities by the previous Administration had been committed. Frieden and Kaplan conclude:

> At the White House, the Nixon Administration was clearly less supportive than the Johnson Administration had been, but the basic commitments were nevertheless kept. Despite reservations, President Nixon retained the program, was about as successful as his predecessor in earmarking funds from other federal programs, and eventually spent model cities funds at a rate that was consistent with the target figures the Johnson Administration had originally given to Congress. Efforts from within the White House to divert funds from model cities or to close the program prematurely were reversed as interest-group pressures made themselves felt.

Frieden and Kaplan are right. The remarkable thing about Model Cities is that the arrival of a new Administration, with a very

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different constituency and viewpoint from the one that had launched it, was *not* a calamity. The same legislative and client-group constraints which prevented the program from achieving its highest ambitions also guaranteed that it accomplished its minimum objectives. This is part of the most important of all the lessons to be drawn from the program's history. There is a view of government that sees the large bureaucracies, especially at the federal level, as having a momentum of their own that can be harnessed, either by unworthy special-interest groups or by worthy public-interest groups, to achieve objectives not intended by the legislature. The authors of the Model Cities program believed this—that once the program was established, the executive branch might accomplish more with it than the statute directed—and they were wrong. The model cities were not transformed into the "masterpieces of our civilization," but they did receive almost exactly what Congress said they would in the original legislation—no more, no less.

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